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# CCJ Referenda: CCJ or Caribbean Governance on Trial?

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## What is the issue?

On November, 6th, 2018, Antigua and Barbuda and Grenada, two member states of the sub-regional grouping of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean states (OECS), each held a national referendum on whether those countries should accede to the appellate jurisdiction of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ). As was the case in St. Vincent and the Grenadines in 2009, the referendum failed dismally in both countries. In Antigua and Barbuda 17,743 valid votes were counted. From that amount, 9,234 voted against making the CCJ the final appellate court, while 8,509 voted in favour of the transition to the CCJ. The 'No' votes accounted for 52.04 percent and the 'Yes' votes, 47.96 percent . The overall turnout rate was 33.4% as a total of 52,999 persons were registered and eligible to vote. In Grenada, out of a total registered voters of 79,410, a total of 21,979 (that is 28%) persons voted on whether to initiate constitutional changes that would see the CCJ becoming the final appellate court in the country. Of the 21,979, 12,133 (55.2%) voted against the CCJ as their final appellate court while 9,846 (44.8%) voters were in favor.

In the lead up to the referenda in Antigua and Barbuda and Grenada the "YES" campaign focused on, inter alia: the need to break with the Privy Council to complete independence; the high cost of taking appeals to the UK-based court; greater access to justice through the CCJ and the fact that the CCJ is more culturally sensitive to Caribbean issues. On the other side of the debate some of the arguments against acceding to the CCJ in the appellate jurisdiction included: prioritising electoral reform; the need to first address issues in the lower courts; the concern about political interference in the judiciary; the perceived impartiality of the Privy Council, given its distance from the Caribbean's reality; and the need to address other burning issues, such as youth unemployment and corruption. A major issue in both countries was the fact that, in the end, there was no bi-partisan support for the bill. This was problematic since a two-thirds majority was the threshold necessary for the referendum to succeed. The President of the CCJ, Justice Adrian Saunders offered two reasons for the failure of the referendum in both countries. According to him, "Firstly, is the fact that people have unhappy experiences with their local justice systems. If the court is held in a less than adequate courthouse; if the courtroom is stiflingly hot; if the case is adjourned again and again and again; if a murder accused spends 10 years on remand before his case is heard; then the idea of replacing a British institution (Privy Council) with a Caribbean one is instinctively unappealing" (Saunders 2018). Further, the CCJ President indicate that the second reason was that enough was not done to inform and educate Caribbean

people about the CCJ.

The recent referenda cannot be analysed in isolation from the historical record. Table 1 provides comparative data on referenda results in three CARICOM countries from the ill-fated referendum on the West Indies Federation in 1961 in Jamaica through to the Constitutional referenda in St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Grenada in 2009 and 2016 respectively and the most recent referenda in Antigua and Barbuda and Grenada in 2018.

**Referendum Results in Antigua & Barbuda, Grenada, Jamaica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines**

| | For CCJ | | Against CCJ | | | Total | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Votes | % | Votes | % | Turnout | referndm votes | election votes* |
| **St. Vincent 2009** | 22,646 | 44% | 29,167 | 55% | 53% | 52,262 | 62,805 |
| **Grenada 2016** | 9,639 | 43% | 12,635 | 57% | 33% | 23,177 | 54,524 |
| **Grenada 2018** | 9,846 | 45% | 12,133 | 55% | 28% | 22,098 | 57,364 |
| **Antigua 2018** | 8,509 | 48% | 9,234 | 52% | 34% | 17,782 | 38,832 |
| | | | | | | | |
| **Jamaica 1961**** | 217,319 | 46% | 256,261 | 54% | 62% | 479,220 | 580,517 |

* Total votes in the General Elections that occurred closest in time to the failed referendum
** Jamaica referendum was on "continued membership of the Federation of the West Indies"

While the table above (Gonsalves 2018) provides data for only four Caribbean countries, in a global sense a referendum is a sophisticated instrument of direct democracy that can be problematic. For instance, on June 23, 2016, in what is referred to as Brexit, the United Kingdom (UK) voted to leave the European Union (EU) by 52% to 48%. At the time of writing there is an ongoing crisis with respect to the Brexit deal. Similarly, on October 2, 2016 Columbians rejected a peace deal to end 52 years of war with the FARC guerrillas with 50.02% voting against the peace deal and 49.78% voting in favour. Subsequent to the referendum, Columbia's Congress approved a revised peace accord with the FARC, an earlier version of which had been rejected in the October referendum. In Hungary, a referendum related to the EU's migration relocation plans was held in October this year. 1.64% of the electorate voted "Yes" while 98.36% voted against the government's proposals. Voter turnout in the UK stood at 72.2% while in Columbia it was a mere 37.43%. In the case of Hungary, 44.04% of the electorate participated in the referendum, significantly less than the 50% threshold needed to validate the referendum.

Why do referenda generally fail? Some of the reasons for unsuccessful referenda include, but are not limited to:

1. A referendum is a sophisticated form of direct democracy which requires a well-informed citizenry for its success. However, the voting public is often not always conversant with political and constitutional matters. "Don't know" generally translates to a "No" vote or an all-out boycott;

2. In highly adversarial political cultures, it is difficult to achieve bi-partisan support on matters of national concern. Yet a super majority is usually required for the success of constitutional referenda;

3. Campaigning for a referendum is most

times less intense than general election campaigns;

4. In cases where there are controversial issues, the "No" campaign is often well organised, cutting across political party lines to coalesce religious and class interests to preserve the status quo.

## Why is it important?

Caribbean integration is as necessary as it is problematic. Since its establishment in 1973, through the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has made tremendous strides in the area of functional cooperation. It has had mixed outcomes in coordinating foreign policy and while there is great promise in security cooperation, economic integration remains elusive. Given the vagaries of the external environment and the inherent contradictions that shape the contours of Caribbean polities, economies and societies, CARICOM must be commended for keeping the idea of regionalism alive even as an intergovernmental project.

However, the establishment of the CCJ has become one of the significant corner stones of the CARICOM governance architecture. The idea of a final indigenous court for the Anglophone Caribbean has its genesis as long ago as 1947 at the meeting of colonial governors in Barbados which reflected on the need for a West Indian Court and urged its establishment (Rawlins 2000, 5). As Caribbean integration evolved, in 1998 Heads of Government adopted, in principle, the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Supreme Court, under the new appellation of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) with two jurisdictions: an appellate and an original jurisdiction. In the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the CCJ discharges the functions of an international tribunal applying rules of international law in respect of the interpretation and application of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC). In this regard, the CCJ performs functions like the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the European Court of First Instance, the Andean Court of Justice and the International Court of Justice. In its original jurisdiction, the CCJ can hear disputes between member states, disputes between member states and the Community, referrals from national courts or tribunals of member states and applications by individuals with special leave of the court. Pollard (2007, 193 cited in Grenade 2018, 209-210) outlines three significant functions of the CCJ in its original jurisdiction: uniformity in the interpretation and application of the Treaty; Locus standi for both public and private entities in matters of which the Court is seized; and development of Community law pursuant to decisions taken within the CARICOM process (stare decisis). The role of the CCJ is critical for the effective functioning of the CSM.

In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the CCJ considers and determines appeals in both civil and criminal matters from common law courts within the jurisdictions of member states of the Community, which are parties to the Agreement Establishing the CCJ. To date only Barbados, Belize, Dominica and Guyana are members of the CCJ in its appellate jurisdiction. Why is this so? A major challenge that undermines accession to the CCJ in the appellate jurisdiction is the need to gain parliamentary approval or referenda in member states. This presents a challenge given the Caribbean's adversarial political culture.

Against this background, the outcome of the referendum in Antigua and Barbuda and Grenada respectively, has thrown light on some critical interrelated issues. The CCJ case brings to the fore the unhealthy state of Caribbean democracy: insufficient public education on issues of national concern; lack of consensus among political parties; a mistrust in the state and institutions; increasing discontent among the citizenry about issues that affect their daily lives; and a general dissatisfaction with governance. Moreover, a referendum requires citizens to vote on

specific national issues. Issue-based politics requires a mature electorate who can transcend partisan politics. However, this is not a norm in Caribbean politics. Elections are generally driven by political parties and political mobilisation surrounds political personalities and party loyalties. In essence, both referenda had less to do with the CCJ than with political leadership and governance.

## What should be done?

**Steps that should be taken to address the unhealthy state of Caribbean democracy**

- A sustained campaign to address self-doubt among Caribbean peoples
- Continuous constitutional reform to reflect changes in society
- Sustained public education targeting young people
- Building of trust across the political divides
- Broad-based public education campaign promoting the achievements of CARICOM

1. There is need for a greater sense of self-belief among Caribbean people. For Justice Saunders, self-belief refers to "a clear sense of ourselves; an understanding of our worth as human beings; an appreciation that we are not inferior to anyone, and that we have the capacity to forge our own destiny" (Saunders 2018b). To address self-doubt, there must be a sustained multi-pronged campaign: (a) the teaching of civics in schools; ongoing public debates on Caribbean politics and society; (c) Caribbean culture can be utilised much more to promote a deeper sense of consciousness about the region.

2. Fifty odd years since independence, constitutional reform must be a continuous exercise. To enhance the quality of democracy, the Constitution must reflect changes in Caribbean society. This must be part of a new independence pact between Caribbean people and the State. The constitution must be demystified and made available to citizens in various forms. Social media and other technological platforms can be utilised in this regard.

3. A well-functioning democracy assumes an informed citizenry. Yet, the outcome of the referenda suggests that there was lack of sustained public education on the CCJ. Continuous debate is necessary to create awareness about the constitution in general and the CCJ in particular. Given that several Caribbean countries require a referendum to accede to the Appellate jurisdiction of the CCJ, sustained public education throughout the region is an imperative. Social media should be utilized to reach particularly young people. Debates should be organised in schools, community colleges and within Caribbean universities.

4. There is need to build trust. This will require a transformation in the political culture and a fundamental shift in political behaviour throughout the society. Effective political leadership must be centered on consensus-building and compromise across partisan divides. There is a role for educational institutions and civil society organisations to intentionally create programmes to build trust.

5. Despite its relative success particulary in the area of functional corporation, one of the main shortcomings of CARICOM is its democratic deficiencies and its inability to convince Caribbean people of its relevance. There is a disconnect between CARICOM and the lived realities of Caribbean people. The CCJ should not be

an alien abstract entity. There is need for a broad-based public education campaign to promote the achievements of CARICOM. Regionalism must be meaningful to the people it is intended to serve. Participatory regionalism will enlarge democratic spaces in the Caribbean. Dialogues between CARICOM and Caribbean citizens should be inserted as an institutionalised pillar of CARICOM. A major lesson from the failed referenda is the need to democratise regionalism.

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# Institutional Transformation for the Maximization of the Benefits of Oil Revenues in Guyana


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## What is the issue?

Having had a long history of extractive economic activities as the main driver in the economy, Guyana is currently transitioning to a new era in resource extraction. Massive oil finds by Exxon Mobil off the Stabroek Block are inspiring the hope that the poverty with which the country has been historically associated will soon come to an end. Seeing poverty as the main cause of many other social ills, persons express the hope that with the end to poverty, many other social ills will also be considerably reduced. A few critical minds are, however, skeptical about the distributional aspects of things and are not so convinced that more income would naturally translate into fairer and better distribution and better responses to the many social problems. In fact, they argue that there is a high likelihood that more income generated by an industry that does not necessarily generate much employment could lead to the concentration of wealth among a few. When that few is primarily of a particular ethnic group, there is the high likelihood of the heightening of ethnic conflicts.

Ethnopolitics is a corollary of the latter view

and has been the foremost problematic issue in Guyana even before independence in 1966. Since 1966 political issues have been framed along ethnic lines and the electorate has responded similarly by voting largely along ethnic lines. Voting along ethnic lines mitigates the sustainability of the political demand for good governance and social change.

This situation is compounded by an electoral system which privileges the consolidation rather than the division of votes. Although Guyana has a mix system which includes PR, Contrary to other countries in South America which have adopted the PR system, Parliamentary make up in Guyana seems to accord with countries in the Commonwealth Caribbean many of which have adopted the first past the post (FPTP) electoral system (see figure1). While in the PR system there is a tendency for more than two parties to occupy parliamentary seats without any having a majority thus creating the atmosphere for political negotiations and compromises, in the FPTP system not more than two parties dominate the parliament with one having a slight majority over the other (see figure 1). In such a scenario, a winner-takes-all attitude prevails. Moreover, although in countries with largely mono-ethnic populations such as Barbados, this does not necessarily pose a major problem, in countries such as Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago in which there are two major ethnic groups, political divisions play themselves out ethnically and vice versa thus adding an irrational dimension to political discourse and activity.

## Why is it important?

There is a buildup of cases in which oil-rich countries suffer from tremendous social problems that negatively affect the society's ability to maximise the proceeds from oil economies and transform other sectors of the economy. Nigeria, Venezuela, Ghana, Mexico, Angola, Iran, Iraq, Niger Delta, and Russia are just a few readily available examples. In some cases, oil rich countries have degenerated into violent civil and ethnic conflicts over the maldistribution from the spoils of oil (Dube and Vargas 2006; 2013). With the transition to another extractive economic activity which promises tremendous wealth in Guyana, as long as the societal dynamics which influence the distributional dynamics remain in place, there is a high likelihood that the distributional dynamics remain the same thus leading to violent conflicts in the society.

The relationship between inequality and ethnic conflicts is a mutually reinforcing relationship. As inequality increases and as it manifests itself largely along ethnic lines, ethnic conflict arises. This, in turn, creates the environment for governments to take heavy-handed approaches to governance by limiting civil liberties under the guise of dealing with civil unrest. As governments become more unpopular and illiberal, its members become more inclined to engage in clientelistic politics thus reinforcing inequality. In the final analysis the country become caught up in a self-replicating socio-political bind which eats away at its capacity to translate wealth into development.

## What should be done?

Because there is no agreement on the real source of conflicts in these societies, various schools of thought proffer different solutions. Those who think that conflicts in such societies inevitably arise from the maldistribution of resources, emphasise the need to have institutions which favour a fair distribution of resources and which limits the opportunities for political abuse and corruption. These would include oversight institutions such as Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) ( Davis, 2001; Barnett and Ossowski, 2003) and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), fiscal and political institutions (Schmidt-Hebbel, et al 2016; Peter Kaznacheev 2017).

Others are of the view that it is not institutions




**Figure 1 – Comparison of Parliamentary make-up of countries with PR and FPTP systems in the Caribbean and South America. X axis = number of parties in parliament**

particularly but economic structure, that is the relationship between extractive, productive and service oriented activities, which separates resource rich countries that are affected by chronic developmental problems, including ethnic conflicts, from those that are not. Countries with extractive industries present different nature of problems from countries with manufacturing or service-based industries. These recommend that wealth created in one sector should be invested in developing other sectors thus diversifying the economy both horizontally and vertically. In a diversified economy, there is an increase in occupational differentiation; there is also an increase in the number of interest groups as opposed to the consolidation of interest groups which comes with limited occupational differentiation.

Of those that emphasize the role of structure, some are of the view that social structures matter as much as economic structure. They posit that the best of institutions could become ineffective, if the structural organisation of society generates incentives which make the subverting of these institutions rewarding. They also argue that even with high economic differentiation, societies could still be socially undifferentiated to the extent that some social groups are associated low level occupations, poverty and unemployment than other groups. The USA is one such example. For this group of thinkers, not

only that the structural reorganizing of the society should go hand-in-hand with, if not prior to the establishment of oversight institutions, if not, institutions become sites through which social conflicts continue to express themselves. Importantly, they argue, that the structural organisation of society should move beyond differentiation in the economic structure. Social structural transformation, however, is a long term goal. In the interim, they are still a few options open for institutional reform which could maximise the benefits of the current social, structural organisation of the society and set the stage for future changes by dividing the basis upon which political parties gain their power.

**Benefits of Postelection Negotiations for Executive Arm of Government**

- Enhancement of postelection, cross-party negotiations and compromises
- Inspiring of more interest-based small parties to compete at elections
- Inspiring electorate to vote on issues other than ethnicity

Taking these contributions into consideration, this brief proposes a strategic political institutional reform which would have tremendous positive effect on electoral and political outcomes. Empirical studies have shown that adopting PR electoral system leads to the proliferation of interest-based parties contesting election. The comparison of countries in South American and the Caribbean exhibited in figure 1 above. The proliferation of interest-based parties lessens the importance given to race and ethnicity by foregrounding other group interests whether those be occupational (working class, middle class, business class), geographic, religious, etc. As indicated earlier Guyana has a mixed electoral system that includes PR system but the proliferation effect that is seen in other South American countries with PR systems is not seen in Guyana. Why is this so? This is because, unlike other countries with PR systems, there is no constitutional provision for post-election coalition to form a majority and capture the executive arm of government. The effect of this is that political parties campaign rigourously with the sole aim of winning a majority in order to control both the executive and legislative branches of government and in response the electorate tend to consolidate rather than divide their votes across various interests. If parties are allowed to compete independently to capture votes at any election and combine those votes with other parties post-election in order to win the executive arm of Government, this could lead to three positive outcomes. Firstly, it could enhance cross-party, post-election negotiations and discussions along lines which transcend ethnicity. Secondly, it could also inspire smaller parties to compete at elections knowing that even if they win one seat they would be able to negotiate with larger parties and possibly form part of government. More importantly, however, this electoral change could also inspire voters to move away even if only marginally from ethnic voting and support other interest groups, or it could inspire the formation of parties to represent other ethnic interest apart from the two major ethnic groups. Any of these options open the way for cross-interest negotiations, coalitions, and compromises.

This electoral change calls for constitutional changes which require two-third majority vote in Parliament. While it was unlikely that the major parties would have supported this change before 2015, with the country experiencing major demographic changes as confirmed by the last National Census, large parties would be more inclined now that they can hardly muster an absolute majority as individual parties. Coalition Government, whether the result of a pre-election coalition or post-election coalition will become the preferred form of government as parties try to muster an absolute majority to win not only the executive but also the legislative branch of government. The benefit of the post-election coali-

tion, however, is that it grants greater significance and flexibility to and thus would encourage the formation of smaller parties, who would not necessarily have to subsume their identities under larger parties before an election as is currently the case.

As such, smaller parties in Guyana should be at the forefront of advocating for constitutional changes, especially those which give them more stakes in the electoral process.

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# Medical Marijuana in Barbados: The Need for an Incremental Approach

**Note:** The following brief is based on a recently published research paper by Alana Griffith, PhD and Damina Cohall, PhD. The authors have received an award from the University of the West Indies Cave Hill Campus for Best Applied Research in 2018.

### What is the issue?

The Barbados Drug Abuse (Prevention and Control) Act Chapter 131 prohibits the possession, use, cultivation, trafficking and sale of cannabis in any form (Drug Abuse (Prevention And Control) Act Chapter 131). This prohibitive law is largely intended to restrict the use of cannabis for leisure purposes, especially among vulnerable youths. It negatively affects the usage and research of cannabis or cannabis-derived products for medical usage, which is becoming a fast-growing global industry. The increasing recognition of the medical benefits of cannabis and global trends contributed to the formation of the CARICOM Commission on Marijuana. Like many other Caribbean countries, though there is public discourse on the need to decriminalise the use of cannabis, Barbados is still concerned about the negative social consequences of pursuing this route. This concern is no doubt fueled by the historically negative conceptualisation of cannabis usage in many Caribbean territories (Griffith and Cohall, 2017; Wickham, 2016) and the attitudes of some with regards to the

abuse of alcohol and cigarettes among the youth. There is evidence of a gradual shift in this negative perception (Smith 2017), owing probably to the global activism and education on the medical benefits of cannabis. The Government of Barbados is, therefore, faced with the need to respond to the competing demands of various sections of society and with the emerging global trend with regards to the decriminalisation of the usage of cannabis.

## What has been done?

Barbados is not the only Caribbean country to be faced with the need to carefully navigated the competing national and global social demands. Most Caribbean countries have not so far made any significant steps with regards to decriminalising marijuana for any usage, a few sister CARICOM states have adopted various approaches to the decriminalisation of the substance. Jamaica, for example, in an amendment to it Dangerous Drugs Act in 2015, implemented a hybrid model of legalisation and decriminalisation which allows for medicinal use, research, the development of a cannabis industry, religious use and personal possession of up to two ounces or growth of five plants. Persons caught with less than this amount no longer have to face the court system and serve jail time if found guilty but merely pay a fine referred to as a 'fixed penalty notice'. Subsection 3(a) of Section 7D of the said amended Act makes provision for the cultivation of marijuana for scientific purposes while '[s]ection 6(2) makes provision for those who have been prescribed marijuana by a registered medical practitioner or health practitioner as approved by the Ministry of Health as published in the Gazette'. Apart from these, the Rastafari community also benefit by being able to cultivate and use marijuana for religious purposes at religiously designated sites. The activism of the Jamaican Rastafarian community was instrumental in these substantive changes; for decades the community was putting forward the argument that criminalising the use of small amounts of marijuana was equivalent to both criminalizing an entire cultural community and a large cross-section of youths who associate themselves with the cultural practices of that community . Jamaica's bold step sought to respond to the demands of the various social sections, namely the criminalised youths, the Rastafarian community and the medical fraternity.

Belize, another CARICOM member state made a similar move in November 2017. On November 2, 2017 the country decriminalised the possession of up to 10 grams of cannabis by an amendment of the Belizean Misuse of Drugs Act. Possession of quantities within this range is liable to monetary and non-recordable penalties. Possession of more than the prescribed amount and the possession of any amount in any educational facility remain a criminal offense.

A similar approach was adopted by Antigua and Barbuda. The rationale used by Antigua and Barbuda, however, was different. The country's main justification was the reduction of the backlog of cases in the court system amongst social justice issues. In 2018, the country amended its Misuse of Drugs Act by allowing the possession of up to 15 grams of marijuana. The amendment also makes special provisions for Rastafari.

Although it might be too early to make an informed assessment, especially in the cases of Belize and Antigua and Barbuda, in none of the cases above, there were any significant negative social consequences reported. This is enough to quell the fears of those who are concerned about the negative consequences of marijuana legalisation for medical purposes and the pressure it might exert on the already fragile social welfare sectors in these societies. While paying attention to developments in other countries, Barbados could make some initial steps towards creating the framework for ushering in the use of medical marijuana.

## Policy actions

**Steps in an incremental approach**

- Add cannabis-derived drugs to national drug formulary
- Formulate legislation geared at regulation industry and the introduction of broader range of medical marijuana products
- Transition to cultivation to balance supply and demand and to strengthen local industry

Policy action towards marijuana decriminalization in Barbados should adopt an incremental (step-by-step) approach (Griffth and Cohall 2018). This approach could have two positive outcomes. First, it could gain buy-in from more conservative elements in society who might be against outright decriminalisation or legalisation. It could also place the social welfare and public health sectors in a better position to deal with any unforeseen negative consequences that might arise from full legalisation or decriminalisation

The incremental approach could be pursued in three phases. In the first phase, using the existent framework, marijuana-derived drugs approved by the United States Food and Drug Agency or equivalent international or regional bodies could be added to the national drug formulary. During the first phase, a list of cannabis-derived drugs that have satisfied international medical standards and testing and have met the criteria of the National Drug's Formulary Committee under the Drug Service Act of Barbados could be introduced into the local system with the requisite oversight (Griffth and Cohall 2018). This could serve as a pilot phase. It is in this phase that close monitoring and evaluation and other forms of data collection and analyses will be conducted to inform legislation geared at regulating the industry, which should be done in the second phase. According to Griffth and Cohall (2018), in the second phase, a step further could be taken by introducing '...different formulations of raw forms, tinctures and oils that have shown bioequivalence to established forms of medical cannabis products'. This would first require, however, the formulation of legislative and other rules to govern and regulate the controlled production and distribution of cannabis and the various medical transformation of it. The second phase should cover issues relating to the entire supply chain, and as such it would involve a broad cross-section of social sectors in the research, cultivation, standards creation and imposition, transformation, storage and dispensary of the product. The introduction of cultivation to support a local medical cannabis industry represents a potential phase 3.

## Conclusion

Recent pronouncements by the Prime Minister of Barbados the Hon. Mia Amor Mottley indicate that the government is preparing to formalise the use of cannabis and cannabis-derived products as medicines; thus removing the restrictive and exclusionary process presently used for those trying to access medicinal cannabis by the end of 2018. The announcement indicated that cannabinoids will be added to the drug formulary (see this link) The government has not indicated the sequence of next steps but plans have been announced to pursue a medical cannabis industry (Barbados Today 2018). https://barbadostoday.bb/2018/12/07/medical-marijuana-coming/

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