

Beauty as Symbol in the Heart of the Beholder

Martin J. Schade

Perhaps the most controversial issue in the philosophy of beauty is whether it is subjective, as stated in familiar phrase, “Beauty is in the eyes of the beholder”, or whether it is objective, in that beauty is a feature of external beautiful things. A pure version of either of these positions seems implausible. This paper will synthesize both and offer an understanding of beauty as dialectical and incarnational, in which the “essence of beauty is unity in variety” and is perceived in the “heart of the beholder”.¹ As such, there will be both a metaphysical and epistemological approach given to understanding beauty.

Since the time of Plato Western philosophy has dichotomised all of reality. Therefore, beauty itself has been separated in which there is a mentality of understanding beauty as either subjective or objective. It is now the time to identify our illusion. The philosophy of Dialectical Incarnation can bring humanity to a genuine grasp of the true nature of the totality of reality and therefore discover that, in fact, beauty is incarnation.

The Subjectivity and Objectivity of Beauty

The subjectivity of beauty cannot be denied when one discovers how beauty is expressed in the diversity of cultures in the world.² At the same time one cannot deny that there is some objective condition of beauty which universalizes it. Even opposing philosophers such as Immanuel Kant and David Hume acknowledged that the experience of beauty is fundamentally subjective; nevertheless, they perceived that something important is lost when beauty was treated merely as a subjective state. If beauty is completely relative to individual experiences, it ceases to be of significant value, or even recognizable as a value in the diversity of cultures and societies. As one of the “three Transcendentals” of philosophy, the objectivity of Beauty, as Transcendental, can be identified in the same way as Truth and the Good by being a standard upon which other entities share. Interestingly, Hans Von Balthasar (19) notes that truth without beauty loses its cogency and goodness without beauty loses its attractiveness. There is the need to be able to understand beauty as both subjective and objective.

In establishing the objectivity of beauty, an example might help. If a person says, “ $5 + 7 = 18$ ”, with all sincerity and belief, while another person says “No, you fool, $5 + 7 = 12$ ”, it would be impossible to conclude that there is no such thing as Truth. If disagreements among people negate the existence of Truth, then the statement that Truth is therefore ‘defined by us’ is irrelevant and cannot held to be true.

So it is with Beauty. To deny objective beauty is to deny the existence of “that which when perceived; pleases.” If one denies this existence, one has to account for the fact that indeed a person perceives and is pleased. A relativist would then say, “It is all subjective.” But what is subjective? Is beauty merely subjective? One cannot apply the adjective ‘subjective’ to a noun one has claimed not to exist. It becomes nonsensical. It is similar to Anselm’s Ontological Argument for the existence of God. If one agrees that God is “that than which nothing greater can be conceived” but then turns around and says that “God does not exist”, that person would have to be a “fool”.³ So it is when one says “That-which-when-perceived-pleases does not exist, and is defined by me” must also be a “fool”. It is “foolishness” to deny the existence of beauty as objective simply because people disagree with it. To state that beauty is strictly subjective is to deny Truth by the same logic. How can someone say that beauty is subjective when there exists no Beauty as such?

1 These are quotes I use which are not from any academic transcript but found in the Web and which are stated by Felix, Mendelssohn, H. G. Wells respectively.

2 Jodi Cobb displays the variety of beauty seen in the diversities of cultures in her *National Geographic Live* Photo exhibition “What is beauty?” National Geographic Live

3 Anselm quotes Psalm 14:1 “The fool has said in his heart: There is no God.”

The objectivity of beauty exists, even if it is understood as a condition of the possibility, by the mere fact that if a person discovers the innate, natural desire to declare beauty as universal and objective, there is an obvious conclusion that there exists such a beauty. There is no rational reason why that which is inherently real in a person would be antagonistic with all of reality.

Beauty is therefore both subjective and objective. Beauty as incarnation synthesizes the subjective perspective of beauty with the objective perspective. Beauty is a subjective experience of an universal and external standard of which all things of beauty share. The objectivity of beauty is no longer limited and separate from all particular beautiful things found in the totality of reality. Beauty can be said to be in the “eyes of the beholder” while it is sharing in the objective reality of all beauty. As such beauty is philosophically identified as being comprised of the condition of the possibility of subjectivity and objectivity simultaneously. This is why the fullness of beauty is ultimately in the “heart of the beholder”.

Crispin Sartwell, in his book *Six Names of Beauty* (2004), also recognises that beauty is neither exclusive to the subject nor to the object, but to the relation between them. Extending that relationship even further he attributes beauty as belonging to the situation or environment in which they are both rooted. He identifies that one may attribute beauty to the night sky, for instance, but one does not take oneself as simply reporting a state of pleasure in oneself. In beauty, one is turned outward toward it; one is celebrating beauty in the real external world. Put simply, if there were no perceivers capable of experiencing beauty, there would be no beauty. Beauty emerges in situations and in an environment in which the subject and the object are juxtaposed and connected. Sartwell states that the claim that “beauty is in the eye of the beholder” is false because beauty is a feature of the situation that includes the beholder and the object, the situation in which longing is made that in turn makes us move or cry or love or come. The beautiful thing is not the retinal image of the sunset or the firing of neurons in the brain in response to that image, or even exactly the transport of the soul that is induced. We experience the beauty of the sunset itself. We give beauty to objects and they give beauty to us; beauty is something that we make in cooperation with the world. (2004 5)

Although Sartwell binds the subjective with the objective, the perceiver with that which is perceived, he keeps beauty only in the finite world. Beauty exists only within temporal boundaries. He later explains that “[b]eauty is the string of connection between a finite creature and a time-bound world” (2004 150). It is true that Sartwell takes beauty to a higher level by maintaining beauty’s subjectivity and objectivity, but in the end this understanding of beauty is not fully acceptable for beauty which is incarnation.

Although Sartwell does not acknowledge beauty’s transcendent and sublime nature, he seems to struggle with it. He tells a story of travelling abroad and touring a Venetian cathedral. He is an atheist, but he admits that inside the cathedral, the beauty was so overwhelming that it was as though he felt a presence inside him. Something about the cathedral stirred in him a feeling that he recollects as a yearning for God (2006 58). Though Sartwell remains an atheist, he has inadvertently discovered the dialectical and necessary connection between transcendence and beauty. There is a noted interrelation between God as transcendence and beauty. For beauty is not merely finite, it is also infinite, it is not merely immanent but is also transcendent.

The Problem of Emergence

René Descartes started a new movement which began with the *cogito*. The “I” of Descartes is a thinking being, aware of existing. An innate idea of God emerges within this “I” and the extended world is recognized and confirmed, but as opposing and dualistic. Descartes, with others, started Modern Philosophy with its individualism and ego-centric movement. Descartes was right in starting with clear and distinct ideas of the thinking mind in establishing his philosophy. But the problem is that he started with the “I” as a thinking being rather than the Self as a whole being. The human person is not just a

thinking being when he or she starts his or her earthly, living, thinking existence as a physical, biological, emotional, spiritual and whole being. It is with certainty that the human person is body and soul, and therefore an incarnational being. It is as an incarnational being that the human perceives beauty, which is itself incarnational. The dualism of Descartes which separates reality, and therefore beauty, cannot be the paradigm for a proper philosophy of beauty and incarnation.

So as to understand how the human person, a Self, ultimately experiences beauty as both subject and object one must examine the problem of emergence for it is the Self that brings about the relationship between the mind and the body. A person is composed of both. How are the mental and physical aspects of a person related to one another? From what does the Self, who experiences beauty, emerge? The problem of emergence evokes an attempt in explaining the appearance of consciousness (i.e., the mind) when grasping beauty in a physical being (body). How do the two meet? Did consciousness emerge from a physical realm?

The philosophy of Dialectical Incarnation refutes the problem of emergence because reality is not a dualism. It is the dualism of Western philosophy which brings about the problem, because there has been a separation of spirit and matter, divinity and humanity, transcendence and immanence, subject and object. The Self is an intrinsic whole, and consciousness, as subject, is intrinsically and incarnationally united with the external world, as object. The problem of emergence exists only for those who understand reality as being dualistic. This dichotomy of the world is that which the philosophy of Dialectical Incarnation is identifying as an illusion. When one can understand one's Self as an incarnational being, the "problem" of emergence is no longer a problem. The "problem" for Dialectical Incarnation is to philosophically argue that "matter," body *qua* body, is actually the condition of the possibility for incarnation. "Spirit," mind *qua* mind, is the condition of the possibility for incarnation, as is subjectivity and objectivity. These seeming separate entities are already emerged. There is no problem of emergence. It is time to understand the previous separation is a lack of "seeing," and a lack of understanding in a new dialectical and incarnational manner. One must "see" beauty in its completeness, not merely in the eyes of the beholder nor in a separate physical, objectivity entity.

The dichotomy between the mind and the body has also been critiqued by the well known French Philosopher and Phenomenologist, Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In his *Phenomenology of Perception* he indicates that consciousness and perception cannot be experienced without the physical body. Descartes' *cogito* is no longer adequate. Merleau-Ponty states that "the thinking subject must have its basis in the subject incarnate" (225). The conscious experience of the Self is one where "I become involved in things with my body, they co-exist with me as an incarnate subject" (215). Alex Scott explains this when he says

[b]odily experience gives perception a meaning beyond that established simply by thought. Thus, Descartes' *cogito* ("I think, therefore I am") does not account for how consciousness is influenced by the spatiality of a person's own body (Scott).

Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology had discovered what Dialectical Incarnation is proclaiming. The mind and the body, although valid distinct concepts of consciousness cannot be separate in reality and in the perception and experience of that reality. Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the Self is one which is embodied, what he later calls the "incarnate cogito." Descartes' dualism of separating the body and the mind cannot account for the way in which human beings encounter and perceive the world and therefore perceive beauty. It is understood that our mind is woven into our body, which are in turn woven into the world. Merleau-Ponty reworks Descartes, arriving at his incarnate *Cogito*, in which mind, body, and world cannot be separated (Elkington).

Maurice Merleau-Ponty's influence by philosophers such as Karl Marx and Jean Paul Sartre has certainly brought the traditional understanding of the phenomenological experience into more dialectical perspective. Merleau-Ponty's critique of dualism brought forth what he described as "ontology of flesh" and which may be called "dialectical monism." He rejects the dualistic analyses of

Being... and argues in favour of a mutual 'intertwining' (chiasme) of the lived body-subject and the world... Being made visible constitutes... "the flesh [chair] of the world (Harrison-Barbet).

Now that Descartes' dualism of mind and body has been further critiqued it becomes more evident that a new paradigm is necessary. With the insights of Merleau-Ponty it is discovered that the thinking subject, or *cogito*, is unacceptable. The human Self is now an "incarnate *cogito*" and directly interwoven with other incarnate *cogitos* and the world itself. This is the incarnated being and the Self of Dialectical Incarnation of which the problem of emergence is resolved and in which beauty is in the "heart of the beholder".

One realizes that any endeavour to "know" beauty in the world must begin with the subject who is the searcher. Descartes' cogito is insufficient as a mere thinking being and his dualism, as indicated, is limiting. The starting point is the Self as an incarnational, critically reflective, loving human person, who is intrinsically one with a dialectical harmony found in the common good and the total nature of the world. The mind and the body are conditions of the possibility of a philosophy of the heart, in which a divided dualism is rejected, and a whole physical, biological, emotional, spiritual, conscious loving Self is welcomed. The Self becomes aware of the external world of Nature, and the experience of beauty in that nature, not as a dualistic separation but as a dialectical harmonious one. The human person, as a transcendental Self, must have an incarnational vision so as to "see" the fullness being found in Nature and beyond. The Self is intrinsically open to be a "perceiver of the perceived", and to know beauty as it is, subjective and sublime. Humanity must have a "learned ignorance" through which one realizes that the only way one can come to know the world, God and beauty is through knowing the Self as the sole knower of all that is to be known. God qua God and Nature qua Nature are beyond one's knowledge, therefore to know God and Nature one must see oneself as the centre of the circumference of God-in-the-world and seek the total horizon of God as love, as beauty, and as the totality of reality.

Dialectical Incarnation

The "subjectivity" or the "objectivity" of beauty serves merely as a "condition of the possibility" to grasp beauty as symbol in the heart of those who experience it. It is this discovery of beauty in which Helen Keller testifies by saying that the "most beautiful things in the world cannot be seen or even touched, they must be felt with the heart" (Keller)

In that beauty is in the heart of the beholder, beauty is related to love. Beauty is therefore a harmonious love found in the unity within the variety of all things. This is beauty as it is understood in a philosophy of Incarnation which is the One Love, One Heart of all reality.

Dialectical Incarnation is a philosophy that identifies a unity found in the infinite and diverse particularities (both "spiritual" and "material") of the universe, i.e., the totality of reality. It is that which can fully be perceived when one discovers beauty in "the heart of the beholder." This philosophy is aimed at clarifying how seemingly opposing concepts, such as spirit and matter, subjectivity and objectivity, transcendent and immanent, divine and human, are distinct "conditions of the possibility" but are never separate in actual reality (Kant, Pure Reason 6) ⁴. Dialectical Incarnation breaks down dualisms by indicating that such separation is merely an illusion and that all reality can now be understood as a synthesis of bi-polar concepts. Beauty is now perceived as the synthesis of subjectivity and objectivity. All of reality is a single dialectical entity, and this single dialectical entity is incarnation. When one says that the divine and the human, that spirit and matter, that subjectivity and objectivity are distinct but not separate, one means that one can intellectually grasp the condition, the "concept," of each, but in actual reality one can never separate the two. That opposing entities can be "distinct but not separate" is what Aristotle had in mind when he stated that one cannot separate matter from form and

⁴ The phrase "condition of the possibility" is the term Kant uses to clarify the use of categories in human knowledge (Kant 1968 6). It was a great insight when he developed his dialectical philosophy. I will no longer put it in quotes in that it has become a fairly used philosophical phrase.

form from matter (Metaphysics VII 3 30, VIII 2 15). Incarnation is parallel to Aristotelian substance which, as he explains, is both form and matter, distinct as conditions, as “concepts,” but never separate in reality. Beauty is incarnation and maintains the same unification of distinct conditions, but never separate.

The manner in which “dialectic” is understood and used in this philosophy is the way it was defined by Johann Fichte and then employed by Georg Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx (Reese 174). According to this understanding, dialectic is a process involving the triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. When the synthesis is made, it becomes a new thesis, to which there is then a new antithesis, and so on. The dialectical procedure brings to light contradictions and other types of opposition not sensed before. A general and broad example of a dialectical movement is the following: thesis: humanity is one; antithesis: humanity is many; synthesis: humanity is a unity-in-diversity. With our specific reflection of the understanding of beauty this dialectical method would be stated as such: Beauty is subjective and in the “eyes of the beholder”. Beauty is objective and external, therefore independent from any subjectivity. Beauty is in the heart of the beholder.

Beauty as Symbol

So as to come to an understanding of the dialectical nature of incarnation, and therefore of beauty, it is important to understand the concept of symbol. It is Karl Rahner who explains how symbol “must realize itself through a plurality in unity” (IV 9: 224) Beauty is symbol because it possesses itself in its own integrity while at the same time it represents and points beyond itself to something which is other than itself and makes that other present. Beauty as symbol is a unity in plurality; it expresses the ontology of something more than itself.

An ontology of incarnation is an ontology of symbolism. This is so because all beings are by their nature symbolic, because they necessarily ‘express’ themselves in order to attain their own nature.... Being expresses itself, because it must realize itself through a plurality in unity (Rahner IV 9: 224, 229).

Rahner maintains that it is only to be expected that no theology [nor philosophy] can be complete without also being a theology [and philosophy] of the symbol...in fact the whole of [philosophical] theology is incomprehensible if it is not essentially a theology [or philosophy] of symbols” (IV 9: 235).

In this aspect of Rahner’s philosophy lies the clearest expression of his dialectical and incarnational thought. A symbol is dialectical because it possesses its own integrity, while at the same time a symbol represents and points beyond itself to something which is *other* than itself and makes that other present. As such, a symbol is not merely a sign or an indicator, nor is it a substitute for some absent reality. Rather, a symbol is a unity in plurality; it expresses the ontology of something more than itself. This understanding of unity in difference is not a limit of a symbol, but a perfection of itself. A symbol is not just its materiality, but expresses a complexity of being. A symbol is complex because there is a plurality in its unity. It possesses itself, its own identity, by giving itself away from itself to the other. Rahner continues to say that “a symbol is not something separate from the symbolized...the symbol is the reality” (IV 9: 251).

It is from this description of symbol that one can philosophically grasp why beauty is symbol. First, beauty expresses its own integrity. An experience of beauty is intrinsic while at the same time that experience of beauty also goes beyond itself. One’s subjective experience of beauty is at the same time that which all things of beauty share. An experience of beauty does not point to Beauty or is an indicator of Beauty. An experience of beauty, as symbol, is Beauty. It is in this way that beauty is a unity in variety, or a unity in plurality.

The importance of understanding the concept of symbol, within this philosophy, is more evident when Rahner says that “being is of itself symbolic” (IV 9: 229). This is so, because being is matter and form. All of reality is symbolic, all of reality is dialectical. Beauty is symbolic and dialectical. What is said of symbol is said of being and is said of beauty. Therefore, beauty as being is not a static reality but one

in constant, intrinsic self-realization and self-expression. When I see the absolute beauty of my little daughter, Valentina, when she is sleeping in my arms, her beauty goes much beyond this particular, small individual being. She is expressing and manifesting beauty of all of reality.

A real symbol, as we understand Rahner, makes present that which it symbolizes. This is why beauty is both subjective and objective. I see a beautiful sunset. That particular experience of beauty, that symbol, makes present Beauty. This is not a Platonic Form of understanding Beauty because the symbol is the thing it symbolizes. For example, one cannot see “God”, a name given to divinity, but one can see materiality, one can see creation, one can see incarnation, one can see beauty. If incarnation is the symbol of the divine, then divinity, and the name one gives it, i.e., “God”, is not merely an agent in the world but is the very ground of the whole world process and the unity amidst the complexity and multiplicity of humans in the world. Incarnation is divinity and the totality of reality. Clearly, divinity is active in the world in God’s real symbol, but Rahner emphasizes a radical unity of this real symbol by demonstrating a genuine philosophy and theology of the Sacred Heart, whereby we come to see not only that “God is love and the totality in reality” but that Dialectical Incarnation is a harmony of One Love, One Heart in the totality of reality.⁵

Paul Tillich also offers a philosophy and theology of symbol, one that is less metaphysical and more existential in its application. Nevertheless, the philosophies and theologies of Rahner and Tillich are similar. Tillich states that a “symbol represents something that is not itself, for which it stands and in the power and meaning of which it participates” (Tillich 56). Every symbol opens up a level of reality for which non-symbolic speaking is inadequate. He says that the more we try to enter into the meaning of symbols, the more we become aware that it is a function of art to open up levels of reality; in poetry, in visual art, and in music,[in beauty] levels of reality are opened up which can be opened up in no other way. Now if this is the function of art [as beauty], then certainly artistic creations have symbolic character (56-57).

In the example of art, there is no other way that a painting, a musical piece, a sculpture, any visual or auditory artistic expression of beauty, can be mediated except through the concrete artwork itself. The art, and the beauty of the art, then becomes a symbol of something beyond the external, visual expression. As one remembers, symbols open up levels of reality and the fullness of beauty.

But in order to do this, something else must be opened up—namely, levels of the soul, levels of our interior reality. And they must correspond to the levels in exterior reality which are opened up by a symbol. So every symbol is two edged. It opens up reality and it opens up the soul (56-57). This openness is why we necessarily perceive beauty “in the heart of the Beholder”.

With this understanding of the function of symbols, it becomes clear that symbols cannot be replaced by other symbols. Tillich explains that every symbol has a special function that is just it and cannot be replaced by more or less adequate symbols. Signs can be replaced, but not symbols.

One last aspect of an understanding of symbol must be asked. “Out of what womb are symbols born?” Paul Tillich states that they come out of the womb which is usually called today the “group unconscious” or “collective unconscious,” or whatever you want to call it—out of a group which acknowledges...its own being. It is not invented intentionally (58).

The important point is that the meaning of a symbol as beauty is not created nor invented, and is therefore not merely subjective. A symbol, and therefore beauty for our purposes, is really discovered because it is an incarnation from below. The intention of this philosophy is to have eyes that can see, and hearts that can love, so as to recognize incarnation in the evolution of the totality of reality with its diversity of cultural expressions of beauty. In that beauty is in the heart of the beholder, beauty is related to love. Beauty is therefore a harmonious love found in the unity within the variety of all things. Beauty is a dialectical symbolic entity of harmonious love as it is experienced in the heart of the beholder. This

⁵ Karl Rahner, as a Roman Catholic and Jesuit philosopher and theologian is promoting incarnation as a metaphysical philosophy, not as an apologetics for the Incarnation of Jesus of Nazareth. He philosophical moves to the “Heart” of God and the person of Jesus, because it is the heart that is the synthesis of the mind and body, subjectivity and objectivity.

is beauty as it is understood in a philosophy of incarnation which is the One Love, One Heart of all reality.

Philosophy of the Heart

Incarnation is not a philosophy of the mind, nor is it a philosophy of the body. Either side, alone, is too lop-sided. Incarnation can be best described as a philosophy of the heart. A philosophy of the heart is a synthesis of mind and body. Body and mind are the conditions of the possibility for the heart to love, for the heart, to “know” and to feel beauty found in the entirety of the universe and the Self.

One knows things mentality through the mind, but the mind does not exist without the body. The body, with all its emotions, and the mind, with all its endless capacities, are united in a philosophy of the heart, a philosophy of incarnation, a philosophy of love and relationship. The heart is the symbol of the Self in its being with the world and with the divine. The Self is the perceiver of the beauty perceived. The Self is a particular, individual being present within the diversity of beauty-the- world. Humans are the necessary connection of beauty as subjective and objective. The metaphysics and epistemology of the philosophy of incarnation is: to be is to be known, to be known is to be. Therefore, for beauty to be, it needs to be known, i.e., perceived.

Conclusion

Humanity has entered into a new millennium of evolution. Beauty must now be perceived with this new vision of love as human, divine and the totality of reality. Humanity is coming to realise that the dualism of Western philosophy is not the paradigm to which one can now adhere. A dialectical and incarnational perspective of reality and more specifically of beauty, allows all to be one, in which each particular incarnational being unites with the whole by being a unique incarnation, a unique expression of beauty. Every particular sub-atomic neutron, to the entirety of the cosmos as a whole, is intrinsically summoned to be perfect, which is to be beauty. Each particularity has its perfection to be what it is as unique, and exists so as to be beauty in its particularity. Each of the bi-polar components of reality is the condition of the possibility of incarnation. The human person, as the centre of the universe, is able to recognize him or her Self as the synthesis of subjectivity and objectivity, transcendence and immanence, of God and Nature, of unity and diversity, of spirit and matter. The separation found within the components of the totality of reality must end. Humanity must have hearts that can perceive each and everything as a particularity, found in the oneness of all. This is beauty, this is incarnation. This new “philosophy of the heart” must express itself in the totality of reality so that our world will find its perfection in beauty.

Let us awaken from our slumber and see that we humans are the centre of the circumference of the dialectical One Love, One Heart found in the totality of reality which is beauty.

Works Cited

- Aristotle. *The Basic Works of Aristotle*. New York: Random House, 1941. Print.
- Burke, Cormac. *Man and Values - a Personalist Anthropology*. Scepter, 2006, 15. Appendix II. Individualism and collectivism; personalism and community. 2007. Cormac Burke. Web. 25 June 2009.
- Elkington, Trevor G. “Between Order and Chaos: On Peter Greenaway's Postmodern/Poststructuralist Cinema.” *Film-PhilosophyJournal* Vol. 8 No. 2, January 2003. Web. 7 February 2011.
- Hans Urs von Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord. A Theological Aesthetics; I. Seeing the Form*, ed. by Joseph Fessio and John Riches, trans. by Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius, 1982).

- Harrison-Barbet, Anthony. *Philosophical Connection: Merleau-Ponty* . 18 October 2009. ISFP Publishing. Web. 7 February 2011.
- Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Trans. N. K. Smith. London: Macmillan, 1968. Print.
- Keller, Helen. *Helen Keller Quotes*. Web. 2013 October.
- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. *Phenomenology of Perception*. London: Routledge Classics, 2002. Print.
- Tillich, Paul. ed. Robert C. Kimball. *Theology of Culture*, New York: Oxford U P, 1959. Print.
- Rahner, Karl. *Theological Investigations*. Trans. Kevin Smyth. Baltimore: Helicon P, 1966. I-XXIII. Print. "The Theology of Symbol" IV:9.
- Reese, William L. *Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion*. New Jersey: Humanities P, 1996. Print.
- Sartwell, Crispin. *Six Names of Beauty*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2004.
- Sartwell, Crispin. *Six Names of Beauty*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2006.
- Scott, Alex. "Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception*." 2002. Web. 7 February 2011.
- Welbaum, Sam . "The Transformed Beholder: Objective Beauty as the Impetus for Sanctification in the Theology of Hans Urs Von Balthasar" *Perichoresis* Volume 10. Issue 2 (2012): 245-265.