Care and the Pedagogical Relationship: A Teleological Approach

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Abstract
The tension between discipline and care, fairness and nurturance, is central to issues in pedagogical philosophy. This dichotomy is echoed in psychology by the justice/care distinction in moral thinking drawn by Gilligan (1982). Yet philosophical reactions to Gilligan’s work have varied dramatically. Even those who take seriously her claim that the so-called “care perspective” deserves attention in ethical theory often differ in their application of this idea, taking ‘caring’ as a principle of right action, as a virtue or character trait, or as constituting a new ethical theory entirely. This paper will expand upon the suggestion made by Little (1998) that the justice and care orientations represent different *standpoints* from which to do ethical theory rather than constituting ready-made theories themselves, arguing that a teleological understanding of the “normative essences” of certain relationships can incorporate some of Gilligan’s most crucial insights. The application of this idea to pedagogical ethics – one field in which the concept of ‘care’ has been taken quite seriously – will serve as a lens to focus attention on the benefits and potential flaws of such an approach.

Introduction
It is perhaps best to open this paper with a statement of what it is *not* about. The intersections of philosophy and education are many, multi-dimensional, and rich with possibilities for exploration. The piece of real estate this paper carves for itself is small indeed, situated at the point where one branch of philosophy – ethics – meets one strand of the discourse on tertiary education – pedagogy. The ethics in question is what has been termed an “ethics of care,” and the pedagogical issue concerns the relationship between professor and student. This relationship will be analyzed as the source of moral obligation for educators – a kind of professional ethics, if you like – to be situated within a broader institutional ethic which takes into account the goals and functions of tertiary education beyond the classroom doors. The form of caring appropriate to the relationship between professor and student will be elucidated by reference to recent debates in ethics concerning the ‘justice perspective’ and ‘care perspective’ identified by Carol Gilligan, and the conclusions, though humble indeed in their starting patch of philosophical territory, will be shown to have implications beyond the narrow borders of their origin.

There are almost as many versions of the justice/care divide as there are theorists writing about them, and the application of these various trains of thought to professional ethics has, if anything, muddied the waters further. One strand of the debate organizes itself around a conception of the *self* as both defined and at least partly constituted by its *relations to others*, often with reference to a *telos* or *good* that can be attained only within such relationships. Laying aside the more metaphysical claims about the “radically particularized” or “essentially situated” self that are often called upon to ground this idea, this paper will focus instead on the conception of the human relationship as itself a source of moral value. This idea can be cashed out in various ways: human flourishing is conditional on the flourishing of certain relationships with others, relationships are a necessary condition for the attainment of certain human ends, relationships are themselves constitutive of the good for humans, etc. I have characterized these ideas in deliberately teleological vocabulary, because it is my belief that (as I will argue below) a teleological ethics is most suited to accommodate the deepest insights of Gilligan’s work on care.
This paper proposes that the justice and care orientations represent different perspectives from which to do ethical theory rather than constituting full-fledged theories themselves. I will suggest that the ‘care perspective’ turns us toward the investigation of an under-explored locus of moral value: the inter-human relationship. In sketching the shape that a relation-based moral theory might take, I argue for a teleological understanding of the “normative essences” of various human relationships, taking the pedagogical relationship as a prime example. I will argue that care should be viewed as the normative essence or ultimate goal (telos) of the relationship between student and teacher. Pedagogical ethics will thus serve as a lens for scrutinizing the benefits and potential shortcomings of such an approach for other moral domains.

**Carol Gilligan and Contemporary ‘Care Theory’**

When Carol Gilligan published *In A Different Voice* in 1982, she presented her work as a reaction to the common perception in contemporary psychology that women were less morally mature than men (an opinion clearly traceable to Freud, but bolstered by the work of psychologists like Erik Erikson, Jean Piaget, Daniel Levinson, and even Gilligan’s former mentor, Lawrence Kohlberg). These theories took separation-individuation as their model for moral development, with the final stage of moral maturation typically defined by coming to see the self as bound by universal, rationalizable ethical principles of fairness and equality. Gilligan noticed, in some of her own work, that female subjects consistently failed to reach this “highest level” of moral development, and were less likely to conceive of the self atomistically and of morality as based on notions of what is equitable or just. She argued that, far from indicating moral immaturity, the language women used to describe their ethical judgments—a language of interconnectedness, attention to concrete others, attunement to the specificity of the situation, and a guiding principle of non-violence rather than fairness—was simply “a different voice,” one that had not appeared in most of traditional philosophy because the “great works” had all been written within and modeled on the norms of a predominantly patriarchal society.

Discussion of the “justice” and “care” perspectives Gilligan identified has taken place on a variety of philosophical levels: concerning approach (abstract versus contextual), ontological assumptions (of human separateness versus connectedness), ethical emphasis (on individual rights versus relationships), of spheres of application (public versus private), of metaethical form (stressing the role of reason in performing right action versus the role of emotions in constituting good character), and, of course, gender association (masculine versus feminine). Given this interpretive richness, it is perhaps unsurprising that there has been so much debate in the philosophical literature not only about what conclusions to draw from Gilligan’s work, but on what level (ethical, metaethical, even metaphysical) to draw them. What, precisely, does the ‘care’ perspective give a philosopher to work with?

**The ‘Care Perspective’ as Gestalt**

There is a considerable body of literature in the feminist tradition that seeks to make care and the caring relationship central to ethical theory. Perhaps most common is the thought that “care” is to be taken as a name for a particular character trait or virtue that should be considered morally praiseworthy. A related idea is that “care,” rather than naming a particular virtue within a theory, is meant to pick out “a particular cluster of virtues,” so that care theory is a version of virtue theory that identifies a set of virtues as appropriate for certain relationships. There have been a variety of challenges to these disparate attempts, and Little (1998) diagnoses the source of at least some of the

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1 See, for instance, Piaget 1965, or Kohlberg 1971a, 1971b.
2 Gilligan 1980.
3 Gilligan 1982, ch. 6.
5 Clement 1996.
6 Halwani (2003), Slote (1992), and Fry (1990) all espouse versions of such a view.
ensuing “chaos” in the literature as stemming from their one commonality: their characterization of ‘care’ and ‘justice’ as fully-formed ethical theories rather than as psychological “orientations” or standpoints from which to do theory. “Orientations,” as Little uses the term, are “defined as much by matters of emphasis, selectivity of interpretation, and gestalt as they are by propositional commitment.” It is philosophers’ failure to understand the essentially psychological tenor of Gilligan’s remarks that has led them into mistaken analyses of the philosophical insights her work uncovers. Although the care perspective’s emphasis on, for instance, context and concrete particulars rather than on abstract principles means that it has much in common with an ethical theory like moral particularism or narrative ethics, the most important message of the “other voice” Gilligan identified is not a different theory, full-formed and ready for application, but a fundamentally different way of analyzing and interpreting moral phenomena.

Little’s message is primarily a warning to self-proclaimed “care theorists” against over-hasty generalization and the expectation of consensus, and I think her claim that seeing the care orientation as “a stance from which to do theory” is precisely right. Still, elements of this assessment strike me as overly conservative. One of Gilligan’s key points was to challenge “history’s biased dismissal of the gestalt that sees the self and other as interconnected,” and I believe that this insight demonstrates that it is precisely this question of gestalt – of a foundation of connectedness rather than individuation, of relation rather than separation – that is the most appropriate avenue to explore on the basis of Gilligan’s work. Throughout the text, Gilligan characterizes the “care perspective” as emphasizing the essential interconnectedness of human selves, in contrast to the “justice perspective” which more commonly concerns itself with coordinating the interactions of autonomous individuals.

Still, words like “perspective,” “standpoint,” and “gestalt” have an unsatisfactorily psychological ring to philosophical ears. If we accept Little’s (and, indeed, Gilligan’s) claim that the true message of Gilligan’s work is to understand ‘care’ as a “gestalt,” we are still left with the task of translating this thought into the realm of philosophical theory-building. The emphasis on “gestalt” has several plausible philosophical interpretations. Metaphysicians might take away the need for a defense of a “relational ontology” which, in sharp contrast to many older theories, takes relations rather than persons as ontologically basic; epistemologists might seize on the implications of the re-gestalting of self and other for the intersubjectivity of justified belief. It is my suggestion that we ethicists understand that the relational gestalt explored in Gilligan’s work as pointing us in the direction of an under-explored locus of moral value: the inter-human relationship.

Ethical theories are often depicted as split along lines carved by their primary center of ethical valuation: consequentialists and deontologists fix on action as the crux on which moral deliberation hinges, while virtue theorists instead locate the locus of moral value in the character of individual agents. All of these theories have some resources for the ethical evaluation of various relationships. But whether the emphasis is on individual or action, on character or life narrative, none shifts this focus to the relationships in which individual agents are embedded their whole lives through. But this is precisely the idea I want to explore in this paper: that care, far from being a principle of right action or a character trait, is best understood as the constitutive goal or telos of human relationships, in particular, the relation between student and professor. This approach is closest to the characterization above of ‘care theory’ as picking out a cluster of virtues organized by their relation to an overarching focus on care and caring, though I will try to show that my approach differs slightly in both content and form from some of the most dominant efforts along these lines.

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8 I use the term here in its traditional sense, not in the more technical one employed in, for instance, feminist standpoint epistemologies.
10 Little 1998, p. 204.
12 Gilligan 1982, see especially pp. 164-174.
13 Most notably Strawson 1959 and, arguably, Kant 1788/2002.
One rather obvious way in which it differs is that it does not begin by understanding ‘care’ as a virtue in the traditional sense, and then assessing its value relative to other virtues and concluding that it is more fundamental than these others. Rather, it looks to some of the more radical work done on care in feminist ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics for the resources to defend an ethics in which relationships – rather than the character of the agent or the actions she performs – are the focus of moral analysis. Though it will steer clear of some of these more dramatic claims about the ontology of the human self and the nature of particularized epistemology, the view developed in this paper can be seen as at the very least consistent with much work along these lines. The following section will highlight a few representative ideas from the feminist literature.¹⁴

A Peek into the Feminist Literature

There is much in the feminist critique of “masculinist individualism” in ethics that is consonant with the insights of Gilligan’s actual psychological work. Gilligan (1982) draws on the objects-relations theory of fellow psychologist Nancy Chodorow, and argues that the ‘self’ becomes a self only through its relations with others. Psychological theorizing must remain attuned to this conceptualization of the self as essentially and irreducibly related to others.¹⁵ Philosophically, we might conceive of an analogue in which theory-building begins, not with the character of isolated moral agents, nor with the actions these agents perform, but with the relationships between them. Barbara Applebaum has pointed out that the ontology of persons underlying the feminist nurturance framework is radically different from the received view.¹⁶ The “masculinist” conception of persons identifies them as isolable and discrete entities, whose individual existence is both logically prior to and theoretically separable from any relations they may have with others. Some feminists have proposed an ontology reversing this logical order, based on the idea that “we do not exist in order to relate; rather, we relate in order that we may exist as fully realized human beings.”¹⁷ Many such theories employ the concept of “second-personhood” to capture the idea that our selves develop through engagement with others, and that these relationships are not only ontologically basic but are themselves sources of value for the persons involved in them.¹⁸

Second-personhood has been crucial as both an epistemological and an ethical construct in the feminist literature. Code (1991) describes a second-person epistemology as one in which the existence of other persons is acknowledged as a condition on one’s own self-consciousness, just as in a second-personal ontology, relations with other persons are seen as a condition on one’s own selfhood.¹⁹ Baier (1986) draws on a notion of second-personhood in her work in ethics on trust,²⁰ and more recent publications by non-feminists have also made the “second-person standpoint” foundational in action theory as well as morality.²¹ Yet there is widespread disagreement about precisely what sort of relationship is meant to be ontologically basic – is it, as certain feminists (and Soren Kierkegaard before them) have maintained, only concrete relations to particular others which are important in the metaphysical constitution of the human self?²² Or ought we to say, following Martin Heidegger, that the

¹⁴ A final note: it has been claimed – I think with good ground – that the “justice/care” debate in certain respects maps onto two older debates in ethics: those between “principles/virtues” and “male/female” conceptions of ethical thought (Tong 1998, p. 132.). I want to resist the “gender emphasis” which frequently thematizes such discussions, both because such a focus is inappropriate for the professional context in which I wish to examine the theory, and because I believe it is a mistake to think that gender is the only appropriate axis along which to examine these questions. (Gilligan is also concerned to show that the two orientations, though characterized in gendered terms in her own work, are by no means exclusively concerned with gender associations (Gilligan 1982, p. 2).
¹⁵ See, anachronistically but helpfully, Chodorow 1989.
¹⁹ Code explicitly draws on Baier’s work on “Cartesian persons” – see Baier 1985a.
²⁰ Baier 1986.
²¹ On second-personhood in action theory see Kolodny 2005; in ethics see Darwall 2006.
concept of a relation needs to be more abstract to play a truly foundational role?23

These are weighty questions for philosophers attempting to generate a framework that will encompass all moral behavior. Luckily, we are concerned only with a certain kind of relationship: that between an educator and her students. In the next section I will explore in more concrete terms the idea that a standpoint that focuses on relations rather than individuals or actions will find valuable tools in a teleological conception of ethics, in which the tele or ‘goods’ on which morality is predicated are understood as inhering neither in the actions performed nor in the persons performing them, but in the relations in which such actions and agents are themselves involved.

Teleological Ethics

Aristotle’s ethics is noteworthy for its emphasis on contextuality, community, and its guiding conception of man as an essentially social animal, and it is perhaps no accident that his ethics is also teleological in form. For Aristotle, morality is essentially tied to bringing about the good of man, and this ‘good’ is itself linked with more general views about the activities and objectives that are characteristic of the flourishing of the human life-form. Aristotle works to identify the “function” or “work” (ergon) of man, arguing that it consists in the operation of the rational part of the soul in accordance with virtue.24 Aristotle defines “the virtue of man” as “the state of character which makes a man good and makes him do his own work well.”25 Thus the virtues are those qualities whose possession enables an individual to achieve well-being or flourishing (eudaimonia), and whose absence inhibit movement toward this telos. Aristotle’s teleology is thoroughly enmeshed with his so-called “metaphysical biology” and his hylomorphic ontology of persons against which many objections have been argued.26 There are thus many neo-Aristotelians working to disentangle their predecessor’s teleological framework from its undesirable metaphysical baggage.27

One such philosopher is Alasdair MacIntyre, who has tried to reformulate Aristotle’s teleology with an emphasis on practices and traditions rather than on any quasi-biological notion of human nature itself. He defines a ‘practice’ as “any … socially established cooperative activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity.”28 MacIntyre uses this foundation to introduce the notion of “goods internal to a practice,” which handily takes the place of Aristotle’s notion of “goods essential to an object or being in virtue of its nature.”29 For MacIntyre, there is no way to achieve these “internal goods” except through engagement in the practice: they can be specified only in terms of the practice or ones like it, they can only be identified and recognized by the experience of participating in the practice in question.30

Of course, MacIntyre’s practice-based teleology is itself committed to a new set of contentious claims about the structure of human societies. However, I suggest that we can avoid some of the more problematic elements of MacIntyre’s theory by focusing simply on one particular kind of practice: education. This is much the same approach as that of Pellegrino (1995), who has taken MacIntyre’s emphasis on practice to mean that the idea of a telos is more readily available for professional ethics – those built around a certain kind of practice with a well-defined end or goal – than for ethics in general.31 Pellegrino seems to base his case for this point on the possibility (or impossibility) of achieving

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24 Aristotle 1097b22-1098a20.
25 Aristotle 1116a22-1116a25.
27 Of course, there are other neo-Aristotelians – such as Foot (2001), or Thompson (1995) – who are quite happy with Aristotle’s metaphysical biology, and indeed have taken very seriously the task of finding a biological basis for a conception of human flourishing from which the details of a virtue ethics could be derived.
29 Aristotle 1098a15-1098a16.
30 MacIntyre 1981, pp. 188-189.
31 Meilaender (1991) and Sokolowski (1991) espouse similar views about the nature of professional ethics.
consensus in either of these two areas, a basis which seems to me somewhat beside the point.32 However, I want to make a claim that is structurally similar to his: that the idea of a telos is at least initially easier to understand as the basis of a professional ethics rather than as a basis for all of ethics. But this is not the case because of the possibility of reaching consensus about this telos is greater for professional ethics than for normative ethics proper, but because the relational aspect of the kind of teleological ethics explored in this paper is more salient in a fundamentally relational practice such as education than in the broader sphere of human life.33

The claim that an ethic can be built around the idea that relations, rather than individuals, have a “normative essence” or telos, is a somewhat stronger claim than MacIntyre’s. Indeed, much of his project is explicitly an attempt to strip Aristotle’s metaphysical teleology away from his ethical teleology – yet we can find echoes in his description of the relational aspect of the practices of human life.34 Although MacIntyre does emphasize the interconnected nature of the persons engaged in practices, the account given here takes this a step further by conceiving of the telos not simply as the aim or goal of a particular practice, but as the normative essence of a certain kind of relationship within that practice. If, for Aristotle, it is the telos of man as a species that determines which human qualities are virtues,35 then it will be the telos of a certain kind of relationship that determines which relational qualities are virtues. They will be virtues insofar as they promote the particular end or good of that relationship, and will determine which sorts of action are generally sanctioned and forbidden, and which consequences most desirable, within that context. Importantly, though, the locus of value is always the relationship itself rather than the character either of educator or student, the actions either performs, or the states of affairs that are brought about as a result.

Note that while this line of thought is compatible with a teleological – or even a “virtue-based” ethics – this is by no means the standard view taken by virtue theorists.36 For them, as for Aristotle, the concept of human flourishing is ethically basic, and it is derived from the characteristics of the human life-form. Although this life-form definition typically involves the role of community and personal relationships in constituting the good of man,37 it is man and his flourishing, rather than relationships and their flourishing, that is identified as the locus of moral value. In the following section, I will defend the claim that, even if our relation-based model fails to give an accurate account of all of morality, it is plausibly more applicable to educational practice than to other spheres of human activity.

**The Pedagogical Relationship**

Education, unlike chemistry, or physics, is an essentially human practice, embedded within and tied to other dimensions of human life and flourishing. Many of the old essentialist conceptions of education – the Platonic model is perhaps a prime example38 – have either been utterly repudiated or at least stripped of as much of their old epistemological and metaphysical baggage by modern and postmodern theorists.39 Gone are the bold claims to objective truth and epistemic certainty, to the metaphysical “meeting of minds” and the body of abstract doctrines that were once used to ground the kind of essentialism I might have seemed to embrace in the previous paragraphs. In the wake of thinkers like Lyotard, Derrida, Foucault, and countless others, no pedagogical thesis can be taken for

32 Pellegrino 1995. I owe the point about Pellegrino’s unfortunate fixation on “consensus” to Kyle Fruh.
33 In fact, it seems likely to me that the project of establishing tele for ethics proper might be similarly simple, if the structure is such that every type of human relation – whether it is that between mother and child, husband and wife, soldier and commander, or even bank teller and customer – has a particular “normative essence” of its own. Making the relation ontologically basic in a way that both Aristotle and MacIntyre do not might rid us of the need to establish a telos for, as Foot puts it, “the human being qua human being,” since it is not individuals but the relations between them which are the relevant teleological units (Foot 2001).
36 Slote 1998a; 1998b.
37 Though not always – some have read Plato as advocating an individualistic virtue ethics. See, for instance, Barker 1959.
38 For modern versions of the Platonic model, see Hirst & White 1973, Brent 1987.
39 Most notably Rorty 1982; 1990a; 1990b.
Is it a mistake, then, in this day and age, to conceptualize education as a roughly autonomous practice centered on a relationship with a telos of its own and a set of standards internal to it?

I believe there is a space between antiquated essentialism and postmodern antifoundationalism for the kind of practice-based analysis I wish to pursue here. Hogan and Smith (2002) have argued for just such a possibility, suggesting that if philosophical thinking is to inform our understanding of education and how it is to be carried out, such thinking must be practical rather than theoretical in character, centered on the practice of pedagogy rather than on its conceptual constitution. Thus my claim about the centrality of the relationship to the practice of education is not that it can be made sense of metaphysically only as a relation between persons, but rather that conceptualizing it as relationship-based, with certain goods to be realized within that relationship is the most fruitful way to accommodate the insights of Gilligan’s care-based “moral gestalt.”

What, then, can be said of the relationship at the heart of educational practice? We might begin on a phenomenological note by characterizing education as an “inter-human event” of a very particular kind, whose features distinguish it from other relations. It is an event characterized by mutual consent: a meeting of at least two personal intentions, one seeking knowledge and the other offering it. The relation is inherently asymmetrical, because it requires that the professor know something that the student does not. Crucially, though, its moral and phenomenological contours cannot simply be reduced to the activity of the professor: this is not mere indoctrination. Since the engagement of the student both with the professor and with the material being taught is essential to completing the interaction, we find that this is an irreducibly two-place relation, and both parties are necessarily constitutive of it. These features are all important in determining the telos of the pedagogical relationship, just as morally relevant features of other sorts of relationships must figure in determining their respective goods. Thus the tele of various relationships determine what are virtues relative to that particular relation, and these virtues in turn specify the duties, obligations, rights, and so on that are important to – or perhaps even constitutive of – those relations.

This is similar to my suggestion that relationships have a “normatively construed” purpose or telos that can generate virtues or obligations appropriate to it. Where I differ from Pellegrino is in pointing out, as Little (1998) does, that “different relationships may find their respective essences mirrored in key elements of the [justice and care] orientations,” in interconnected versus atomic gestalts of the self. Little proposes a “division of labor” between the two orientations: endorsing Gilligan’s claim that that “all human relationships, public and private, can be characterized both in terms of equality and in terms of attachment,” but contending that “not all relationships find their normative essence mirrored in each orientation.” However, she doubts that a full moral theory can be generated from an ethics of relationships, and she wants in any case to be quite clear that “the orientations provide illuminating stances from which to develop ethics of these relationships, not that they constitute those ethics ready-made… To say, for instance, that a relationship’s central telos is caring does not itself imply that caring is, in such a relationship, lexically or even presumptively ordered ahead of other competing duties or virtues. It is to say, rather, that there is something wrong with the relationship if there is not enough caring” – meaning, perhaps, that it is a necessary but not sufficient condition for ethical behavior in that relationship.

Though, as before, I think Little’s conservatism here keeps her from embracing the fullest insights of Gilligan’s work, her formulation is a useful starting point. We are now in a position to flesh out more concretely what I have been saying about the centrality of relationships in this ethical

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42 Davis 1999, p. 184.
44 Gilligan 1988, p. 20.
framework. I suggest that that the *telos* of a relationship can be viewed as delineating necessary but not sufficient conditions on the flourishing of the relationship, allowing that other features might need to be present in order for such a relation to be judged fully functional or good. Both Little and Gilligan have suggested that the “the experience of being at once separated and connected to others through a fabric of human relationship” and the differing ontologies of the self associated with each of these gestalts can find their appropriate expression in different kinds of relationships. That is, it seems plausible that there are certain kinds of human relationships, such as those involving bartering and exchange, which simply do not appear to have a concept of ‘care’ at their core. These interactions seem much better regulated by rights-based moral guidelines, perhaps indicating a “normative essence” of justice: that without which the relationship would be judged dysfunctional or morally problematic. On the other hand, denying the necessity for *some* kind of human caring in such relationships seems odd, too – surely I see my accountant as more than simply a tool, even if I am not deeply emotionally invested in her well-being. In fact, I think the idea that care might be the *telos* of all human relationships, even those of utility, is perfectly coherent and even promising, although a somewhat weak notion of ‘care’ would likely be needed. But an answer to this question – as well as to our actual question, of whether care is the *telos* of the pedagogical relationship – requires a more careful explication of ‘care’ itself.

**Care as Telos**

I believe it is with Kierkegaard and Heidegger that the relevant dimensions of care begin to find their clearest expression, so it is to them that I will turn first for a notion of “care” appropriate for the teleological framework outlined in the previous sections. Søren Kierkegaard, one of the earliest Christian existentialists, promoted concern or care for concrete others in order to counteract what he deemed an excessive philosophical focus on abstract universals, which obscured the significance of individual human existence. For Kierkegaard, without care or concern, even action itself is impossible. Crucially, he also identifies a tension between care as burdensome anxiety on behalf of another, and care as *solicitude*, a loving act which is the fulfillment of a human desire for connectedness. Heidegger’s phenomenological approach to care is also sensitive to this tension, but he makes it metaphysically, not just ethically, fundamental. Whereas Kierkegaard sees care as an essentially individualized, subjective concern for a concrete other, in *Being and Time* Heidegger employs the concept an abstract, ontological level to make sense of the basic structure of the human self. He writes that “by working out the phenomenon of care, we [can gain] insight into the concrete constitution of existence.” Interestingly, it is also in Heidegger that the two modes of caring most relevant to the practice of education – hinted at in Kierkegaard – were clearly identified: *Besorgen*, defined as simply supplying the needs of others, and *Fürsorge*, defined as solicitous tending or nurturing. It is easy to see how these two modes of care – “taking care of” and “caring for” – are essential in delineating the ethical contours of any helping or healing profession.

Nel Noddings employed these two concepts in her own work to make sense not just of the ethical dimensions of the helping professions, but the ethical dimensions of all of human life. Noddings takes ‘relation’ as ontologically basic and the ‘caring relation’ as ethically basic. Unlike Kierkegaard and Heidegger, she defines ‘relation’ in psychological terms, as “a set of ordered pairs generated by some rule that describes the affect – or subjective experience – of the members.” She names the two parties

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47 Gilligan 1982, p. 3.
49 Kierkegaard 1843/1958, pp. 116-117.
50 Interestingly, Heidegger’s description of the human condition and the nature of being and care were – according to him – profoundly influenced by Aristotle’s work in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. See Heidegger 1924/1997.
51 Stack 1969.
54 Noddings 1984, p. 3.
55 Noddings 1984, pp. 3-4.
in the relation the “one-caring” and the “cared-for,” pointing up the fact that this relation, like that at the heart of educational practice, is asymmetric. “The focus of our attention,” she writes, “will be upon how to meet the other morally,” and the relation in which we do so will be shown to be “ethical caring.” Noddings identifies “apprehending the other’s reality, feeling what he feels as nearly as possible,” as the essence of caring, using concepts of ‘engrossment’ and ‘motivational displacement’ to describe the commitment that such care involves.

Still, since Noddings is concerned with uncovering a fundamental, not domain-specific, ethical truth, she believes that efforts to speak of different kinds of caring appropriate to particular relationships “tend to obscure the fundamental truth.” She writes, “whatever roles I assume in life, I may be described in constant terms as one-caring.” She adds that “formal constraints” – those introduced by the formal requirements of a profession – “may be added to the fundamental requirement, but they do not replace or weaken it.” Noddings thus resists the idea that an ontology and corresponding morality can be so particularly situated. Rather than building a theory of pedagogical caring on the nature of the relation between teacher and student, she works an analysis of caring itself, and the features of this relationship peculiar to the teaching relationship are added on top of this more elemental ethics.

But this is only because she intends her theory not only to cross but indeed transcend disciplines, applying not just to other “caring” professions or even other “caring” relationships, but to all ethically motivated behavior. In the next section, I will argue that our domain-specific teleological approach can assimilate some of Noddings’ insights without committing itself to some of her more problematic claims regarding the nature of care.

**Pedagogical ‘Care’**

Bruchacher (1978) has developed a typology of pedagogy in tertiary education in which he identifies three main categories: didactic, heuristic, and philetic. Didactics is the chief form of pedagogy used in higher education, its most prevalent form being the lecture. In heuristics, by contrast, the professor works to get students to think for themselves: the typical form here is the seminar, in which something like Socratic dialogue or Dewey’s problem-solving method is often employed. Philetics differs slightly from the first two pedagogical forms. Brubacher writes, “the hallmark of philetic teaching is mutual affection between instructor and student.” Lectures and heuristics might be, as he puts it, “suffused by philetics” but this element is often the most difficult to ensure. It has, however, been cited in numerous studies as the element of teaching most crucial to student success, and it is thus the element that I make central to the form of pedagogical ethics expounded here.

The distinction between two notions of caring identified by Kierkegaard and Heidegger is crucial in the educational context, in which teachers must strive to find their place between these two occasionally conflicting notions. The “mutual affection” Brubacher describes must be bounded on many sides: not merely by professional propriety, which dictates that affection reach only a certain level of intimacy, but also in the delicate balance between discipline and encouragement without which true student engagement and progress is impossible. In the pedagogical context, ‘caring’ is generally taken to signify some kind of affective disposition characterizing the encounter between educator and student. It combines the notions of care outlined above insofar as it is both affective – often characterized as a “sentiment” akin to compassion or empathy – and dispositional – inclining the professor to behave in certain ways with respect to her students. This disposition is often thought to involve, among other things, engagement with the students’ lived experiences, recognition and in certain contexts adoption of

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56 Noddings 1984, pp. 4-5. See also p. 80.
57 Noddings 1984, p. 16.
58 Noddings 1984, p. 17.
59 Noddings 1984, p. 17.
60 Brubacker 1978, p. 87.
61 An impressive list can be found in Noddings 1993.
the students’ ends and goals, and even “increasing intimacy and mutual self-actualization” between the parties. According to Franfurt (1982), caring involves investing ourselves emotionally in the object of care, and thus making ourselves vulnerable to losses to which we would otherwise have had no response. A caring professor thus makes her students important in her life in a way which need not have been so.”

Yet such notions of “caring for” often smack of the supererogation that characterizes general ethical theories based on caring. Critics have worried that over-emphasizing care in the helping professions is akin to embracing a “slave morality,” in which one’s own desires are eternally subjugated to the needs of others. Moreover, care on its own can be easily manipulated: Davion (1993) offers the now-famous example of the Nazi officer’s wife to show how care might be exploited in the service of immoral ends. Relatedly, and perhaps more worrying, strong notions of care seem to rule out many actions and behaviors necessary for the technical “taking care of” the student that is an ineliminable component of good pedagogical relationships. For instance, how can a professor authentically identify with the “lived experience” of her student if he loathes the subject which she has made her life’s work? Doesn’t a professor have a duty not just to “identify” with the ends of her students, but to mold and shape them as well? If ethical behavior for educational professionals is truly to be derived from the good of their relationship with their students, this good must be carefully specified in order to avoid these pitfalls.

Previously, I identified the telos of a relationship as delineating necessary but not sufficient conditions on its flourishing, allowing that other features of the relationship might need to be present in order for such a relation to be judged fully functional or good, and without which the relationship would be judged dysfunctional or morally problematic. The pedagogical relationship was characterized as one of mutual consent, involving two persons – professor and student – in an inherently asymmetrical relation, but with a shared goal. The asymmetry of this relation entails that the telos typically has stronger moral implications for the educator than for her student. Identifying care as the telos means that no pedagogical relationship lacking this element can truly be judged ‘functional’ or ‘good,’ but it does not mean that care is the only morally desirable element of the relation. What it does mean is that care is the good for the sake of which other goods are pursued and realized within the relationship, and it is this fact which can help us avoid the more problematic elements of theories which take “care” as either the entire principle of action and justification, or simply one virtue among equally important others.

Above, I identified two forms of caring as crucial to the functioning of any pedagogical relationship: solicitude and service. We have seen how ‘solicitude’ is often characterized in terms of affective dispositions that run the risk of demanding supererogatory action or enabling moral complicity when made the sole focus of an ethical theory. I suggest that we define ‘caring for’ – the affective, solicitous form of care – much as Frankfurt (1982) and Baier (1985b) do: as involving some degree of emotional investment in the student as a person, making the well-being of the student important in the life of the physician in a way which need not have been so. This idea has some similarity to Noddings’s and Heidegger’s emphases on engaging with “the reality of the other,” but it falls short of Noddings’s criterion of ‘motivational displacement’ in which the aims and goals of the student become one with those of the educator.

Making caring a crucial part of the relationship between professor and student, rather than simply a virtue of the professor, allows us to avoid supererogatory commitment to the cared-for because the integrity

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63 Baier 1985b, p. 93.
64 Paley 2002. See also Card 1990, p. 106.
65 A similar worry, particularly in the feminist literature, is that a feminine ethic of care will simply serve as yet another tool for the oppression of women. See, for instance, Jecser 2002; Hoagland 1991; Slote 1998a.
67 Kuhse 1997, ch. 7.
of the ‘one-caring’ is essential to maintenance of the two-place relation. The relation which grounds the moral good ceases to exist if the needs and desires of the cared-for subsume those of the one-caring. We cannot demand of the professor that she sacrifice her goals and ideals to those of her racist student in order to truly ‘care,’ for a sacrifice of this degree represents a collapse of the two-place relation within which moral good must be realized. A relational telos that demanded that the morally relevant phenomena of life goals and belief systems become identical would be worse than ethically problematic: it would be self-undermining, or possibly even incoherent. Making ‘care’ the goal neither of the professor nor of her student, but of the pedagogical relationship in which they are engaged, thus diffuses the worries about supererogation and moral complicity described above.

Theoretical problems of moral justification aside, the question of how to implement a teleological ethic of care in a real-life institution of tertiary education remains. On the level of practical application, worries quickly arise concerning in-class implementation and institutional policy. I will quickly run through the challenges which might be thought to face a relation-based teleology of pedagogical ethics, before closing with a brief discussion of the implications the theory sketched here might be thought to have for the scope and meaning of tertiary education.

Implementation and Institutional Policy

Making caring an ethical ideal might be thought to demand the impossible of educators: requiring agents to consciously say to themselves, “I will φ because φ-ing is a way of caring” seems counter to the very nature of genuine emotional investment, and seems to run into Bernard Williams-style problems about having “one thought too many.” Yet if ‘care’ is understood as a process which by definition must not be undertaken consciously, it seems to have no way of getting a grip on moral agents: it is simply something one does not do, but about which one cannot deliberate without thereby undermining one’s very capacity to engage in it. But surely this is a false dichotomy. Many proponents of care have in fact shown that true caring is spontaneous without being thoughtless – that, to paraphrase Blum (1980), acting out of other-directed emotions need not utilize principles but also need not be unthinking. Indeed, Aristotle’s virtue ethics faces a similar dilemma, as he requires that an agent must not only know she is acting virtuously but must also act on the basis of this knowledge, which seems to contradict the essentially non-deliberative nature of many virtuous actions.

The most convincing answers to this problem typically involve elaborating the degree of specification in reasons for action. For instance, reasons such as “φ-ing will help my student understand this point” or “I will only truly be able to understand my student’s perspective if I φ” are conscious reasons to undertake caring action, but the action is not done by deliberating upon a universal, context-independent “imperative to care.” In fact, a number of studies of professional ethical behavior (related to battlefield medicine, as well as holistic and critical care nursing) have suggested that it is precisely this pattern of thought – this kind of spontaneous engagement with the morally relevant features of a situation – that characterizes effective caring attention. Benner (2000) describes caring professional practice “as a way of knowing” in the Heideggerian sense, privileging embodied engagement and intimacy with the particulars of one’s social environment.

Yet even if professors can be legitimately guided in action by recognition of the telos of the pedagogical relationship as care, a few final worries linger about the capacity for a relation-centered ethic to offer moral guidance on the policy level. Focusing our attention on the “educational encounter” and the goods to be realized within particular pedagogical relationships might seem to have

70 Aristotle 1105a30-1105b.
71 See, for instance, Hursthouse 1991, p. 128.
72 Lindblad & Sjöström 2005.
73 Sharoff 2006.
74 Little 1999.
blinded us to a jungle of institutional problems lurking just outside the classroom doors. Davis (1999) has wondered whether pedagogical ethics is best formulated as a professional or craft-based ethic, like legal or biomedical ethics, or an institutional ethic, on the model of business ethics. Professors are necessarily employed in large organizations – viz., universities – and as such represent a definite break with members of the “helping professions” of law, ministry, and medicine with whom they are often compared. One can imagine the professoriate insisting that no discussion of their pedagogical ethics can take place without at least some reference to their other goals, which go beyond simply educating their students to include advancing learning in their respective fields, and putting this learning at the service of the larger public. Have we cast our net too shallowly in focusing on the telos of the pedagogical relationship without overt reference to the other goals of the academy?

The answer would be yes, if the moral framework delineated here had claimed the capacity to adjudicate the nuances of university policy, research ethics, public relations, hiring and firing, or any number of other moral conundrums that might arise in other areas of institutional academic ethics. However, this was never the paper’s claim: rather, our professional code must necessarily be embedded within a moral framework accommodating all the aims of the academy. The sort of professional morality argued for here – while it might not have all the tools required to help us build university policy – is more than adequate for its setting and should be seen as an ineliminable component of any larger institutional ethic. The relationship between student and teacher is at the heart of tertiary education, whatever else the goals of the institutions of higher education might be, and identifying its normative telos can help us make sense of how its particular moral considerations might fit in to a more comprehensive ethical system.

Closing Thoughts

On this note, I’d like to quickly summarize the paper’s main points before reflecting a bit more on the prospects for the theory’s applicability to normative ethics proper. I identified care as the telos or ultimate good, the locus of moral value in tertiary education. This telos was taken to be a necessary but not sufficient condition of a functional or “good” pedagogical relationship, and was defined as an affective disposition on the part of a professor to openly apprehend the intellectual reality of her student. Although the moral role of the educator was emphasized in this paper, it would be a mistake to think that care functions as a virtue or motivation for action inhering in only one of the parties of the relation. Rather, this emphasis is due to the inherent asymmetry in any pedagogical encounter, and reflects the fact that while both professor and student have roles to play in promoting the flourishing of their mutual relationship, the balance of power in attaining the telos of this encounter will nearly always be on the side of the educator rather than the person in search of enlightenment.

This paper was premised on the notion that the relational nature of education meant that pedagogical ethics could be a particularly helpful lens in focusing our thinking about the prospects for a relational emphasis in normative ethics itself. Although none of the moves made in this paper depend upon an isomorphism between the pedagogical ethics outlined here and a larger moral system, it seems plausible that this paper’s conclusions – underspecified as they are – might hint at the plausibility of a general ethical theory which takes relations of all kinds as normatively basic. I don’t pretend to have offered a full-fledged defense of this idea, but I do hope that this paper has taken a small step toward demonstrating the contours – as well as the benefits – that such a theory might have.
References


