

Moral Language and Its History

Matthew Congdon

1. A Problem in Recent Social Philosophy

Moral language is constantly developing. In the twentieth century alone, an impressive list of new moral categories denoting wrongdoing entered our moral lexicon, including terms like ‘racism’, ‘genocide’, ‘child abuse’, ‘sexism’, ‘sexual harassment’, ‘domestic violence’, and ‘hate speech’.¹ None of these terms were in wide circulation a century ago, and yet our contemporary moral vocabularies would be unthinkable without them. The development of new moral terms points to a fundamental feature of our lives with language, namely, that to possess a language is to be continually invested in expanding its powers of articulacy. In the moral domain, this becomes vivid when we recognize that our descriptions of action-types—like ‘sexual harassment’ and ‘hate speech’—are not ready-mades, standing by to be incorporated into maxims, but must be fashioned, developed, and refined by us. Yet what exactly are we doing when we bring ethically significant acts and events under new descriptions? Are we naming moral realities that already exist, fully formed and intact, prior

¹ On the historical development of the concept of ‘racism’, see Fredrickson 2002. The term ‘genocide’ was invented in 1944 by the Polish jurist, Raphaël Lemkin in response to the Armenian Genocide and the Nazi Holocaust (Hinton 2002; Alexander 2004b). The term ‘child abuse’ was introduced in 1961 in Denver, Colorado by C. Henry Kempe at a meeting of the American Academy of Pediatricians (Hacking 1999: 125). ‘Sexism’ was coined in the 1960s, overtaking earlier phrases like ‘male chauvinism’ and ‘male supremacy’ (Schapiro 1985). On the invention of the phrase, ‘sexual harassment’, in the mid-1970s, see Brownmiller (1990: 279–94) and Freedman (2002: chap. 12). Modern use of ‘domestic violence’ (along with related terms like ‘domestic abuse’ and ‘intimate partner violence’) also arose in the seventies (Jackson 2007: xix; Javier and Herron 2018: xvii–xxi; Lockhart and Danis 2010). ‘Hate speech’ was first used by legal scholars in the late 1980s (Brown 2017 cites Matsuda 1989 as the first use of the phrase in print).

to their expression in language? Or do ethical phenomena bear a more sensitive relation to the descriptions under which they fall, such that developments of new moral categories help constitute the very objects they bring to light?

The question of how best to understand historical changes in our ethical and political concepts is central in recent discussions of social critique and ideology exemplified by Charles Mills, Sally Haslanger, and others.² A core idea in these discussions is that the critique of ideology—understood in a broad sense as the conceptual aspect of unjust social practices (cf. Haslanger 2017b; Gooding-Williams forthcoming)—should go beyond criticizing beliefs and judgments in a narrow sense and include the criticism of historically inherited conceptual schemes, for it is such schemes that determine what sorts of beliefs and judgments can be framed, formulated, and considered intelligible in the first place.³ These inherited conceptual schemes, moreover, structure more than just the way we think about and judge the world. They structure the world itself. A conceptual scheme of two sex categories, for example, exists not merely in the minds of those who adhere to it. It is materially manifest in the design of toilet facilities, just as ableist conceptual schemes are materially manifest in sidewalks without curb cuts and capitalist schemes of wage labor in the design of the factory gate, the punching-in station, and the assembly line (Haslanger 2012: 463; 2015: 22).⁴ This is a two-way street, for our schematically shaped material resources go on to reinforce our conceptual schemes, by training the habits, dispositions, and common sense of those socialized within those spaces. Ian Hacking and Sally Haslanger refer to this

² See, for example, Mills (1997; 2005; 2007; 2017); Haslanger (2012; 2015; 2017a; 2017b); Fricker (2007: chap. 7), Celikates (2018), and Jaeggi (2018).

³ See the debate between Shelby (2003; 2014) and Haslanger (2017b).

⁴ This materialist commitment in contemporary ideology theory is inherited from Althusser: “Ideology always exists in an apparatus, and its practice, or practices. This existence is material” (Althusser 2008: 40)

reciprocity with the metaphor of a “feedback loop.”⁵ A community’s having adopted a particular scheme of concepts tends to influence how they structure the world around them, and how the world around them is structured tends to influence the scheme of concepts they find most natural. So ideological conceptual schemes are doubly pernicious: they get the world wrong, hiding from view real forms of suffering and injustice, while simultaneously shaping the world in their image.

We may think of the development of the sorts of concepts with which I began—critical notions of ‘racism’, ‘sexism’, ‘hate speech’, ‘sexual harassment’, etc.—as efforts to develop *anti-ideological conceptual schemes*. If ideology is “doubly pernicious” in the sense just described, then the development of anti-ideological schemes of concepts will involve a corresponding double aspect. On the one hand, the new scheme of concepts would allow us to see the social world more clearly by bringing into view forms of suffering and injustice that our ideological schemes had obscured.⁶ On the other hand, the development of anti-ideological concepts would not only allow us to see better, but alter what is there to be seen. Toilet facilities would be redesigned, curb cuts added to public walkways, and the organization of work changed, all of which would “loop” back up to reinforce the newly transformed shared cultural schemas.

This paper addresses a question that arises when we combine this idea about “loopy” social phenomena with a second idea, also found in contemporary critical social theory, namely, that ideology critique involves an appeal to *moral facts*. As Haslanger writes, “the presupposition that there are *some* moral facts cannot be avoided by those engaged in

⁵ On “feedback loops,” see the references to Hacking and Haslanger in Sections 2 and 3 below.

⁶ See, for example, Mills: “As a result of having these [new anti-ideological] concepts as visual aids, we can now see better: our perceptions are no longer blinded to realities to which we were previously obtuse” (Mills 2005: 176).

justified political resistance” (2015: 40). In a similar vein, Charles Mills writes that ideology produces “not merely ignorance of facts *with* moral implications but moral non-knowings, incorrect judgments about the rights and wrongs of moral situations themselves” (Mills 2007: 22). As Rahel Jaeggi puts it, this is a rejection of “ethical abstinence,” i.e., the attempt to maintain a methodological neutrality concerning competing moral visions when engaging in social critique (Jaeggi 2018: 1–33). Haslanger, Mills, and Jaeggi’s comments are all representative of what we may call *ethically-oriented social criticism*. Social criticism is *ethically-oriented* insofar as it acknowledges its taking place from an ethically non-neutral standpoint and explicitly brings moral considerations to bear upon the object of critique in ways that go beyond non-moral forms of criticism, such as a merely epistemic or functional critique. If we take this approach, we should ask: does an appeal to “moral facts” constitute an appeal to something that lies *outside* the feedback loops of the discursively constructed social world? According to a long tradition in the history of moral philosophy, this must be so, for otherwise the relevant moral facts would lose the categoricity and necessity they need to do their job.⁷ Yet can we really hold that moral facts enjoy a special ontological status that insulates them from the forms of historical alterability and discursive construction to which the rest of the social world appears to be subject? Do the ways we conceptualize and talk about morals not reach down to affect the objective structure of ethical life itself? Are moral facts just as loopy as other social phenomena? If they are, what follows for the possibilities of ethically-oriented social criticism?

⁷ The notions of ‘categoricity’ and ‘necessity’ in moral philosophy are complex, and I do not provide a settled account of either here. Roughly, the *categoricity* of moral demands contrasts with their being merely conditional upon the desires, inclinations, and attitudes of moral agents. The *necessity* of moral demands refers to their modal robustness: if x is wrong *here and now*, it must be wrong in all possible worlds where sufficiently similar conditions obtain. The worry is that the “loopiness” of any discursively constructed “fact” will be too conditional and contingent to allow for either condition to be fulfilled.

I argue that efforts in recent critical theory to address these questions have faced difficulties because they assume an overly narrow picture of the sorts of discursive construction there are. In particular, an exclusive focus upon a merely *causal* picture of the transformative effects of conceptual change limits what we can say about the discursive construction of moral facts. For it leaves out the possibility that discursive construction can, in some cases, take the form of a *rational development* that has ethical purpose ‘built in’ to it. In Section 2, I illustrate the limits of a merely causal view of discursive construction by showing how Hacking’s discussion of the discursive construction of child abuse leads to a dilemma that takes the following form: Moral facts are loopy or they are not. If they are, we lapse into an uncritical relativism that is inconsistent with the aims of a critical social theory. If they are not, we embrace an ahistorical moral realism that appears inconsistent with the historicist commitments of this strand of critical social theory. A social theorist who chooses this second option must also explain the apparent rift that has opened up between social and moral ontology, which looks suspiciously like the fact-value dichotomy in a new guise.

In Section 3, I turn to Haslanger’s recent work on the role of moral facts in ideology critique. Haslanger, I argue, suggests a way out of the dilemma facing Hacking, yet leaves this point undeveloped. This sets the agenda for Section 4, which develops a notion of *rational discursive construction* that attempts to elaborate Haslanger’s suggestive remarks about the historical and culturally mediated nature of moral facts. In developing this view, I draw from Charles Taylor’s notion of *articulation*, which refers to a form of linguistic expression that brings something to light while simultaneously maturing or actualizing the very thing brought to light. My aim in the paper is limited to making conceptual space for this sort of view. I am not proposing to attempt a positive argument for the idea of “rational discursive

construction,” but to show that it follows dialectically from certain commitments already held by the critical social theorists discussed here.

2. Hacking on Child Abuse

In several places, Hacking (1991; 1995; 1999; 2002) cites child abuse as an example of a social kind that has been “made and molded” over time, in this case, starting in the 1960s. ‘Child abuse’ is, Hacking says, an “interactive kind,” i.e., a kind that exists in a co-constitutive relationship with the humans and social relations to which it is applied. Hacking’s account is complex, but some key points run as follows: the modern concept of ‘child abuse’ is not a synonym for what earlier generations called ‘cruelty to children’. The new term involves a medicalization and “societization” of a problem that had previously been treated as a private issue (1991: 280; 1999: 134). The new category connected violence and mistreatment of children to patriarchal domination and the abuse of women in the home (1991: 260). The concept introduced new distinctions between “normal” and “deviant” behavior and provided new ways for both victims and abusers to label themselves (258). Because people can become aware of the way they are labeled and change their behavior accordingly, the concept ‘child abuse’ led victims to experience their hurt differently, as events previously ignored or repressed were consciously viewed as abusive (254; 258). In such respects, Hacking argues, the social facts surrounding child abuse were made and molded by acts of discursive construction.

Yet what should we say about the *moral* status of child abuse as it is made and molded over time? Hacking’s view shifts. In *Rewriting the Soul*, Hacking (1995) urges that child abuse “*is* a real evil, and it was so before the concept was constructed. It was

nevertheless constructed. Neither reality nor construction should be in question” (Hacking 1995: 67–8). Here, Hacking urges that discursively constructed phenomena are no less real than non-constructed phenomena, and that a distinctively moral valence like “evil” can be part of their reality prior to the development of the relevant concept. A few years later, however, in *The Social Construction of What?*, Hacking (1999) Hacking criticizes his earlier statement: “What a terrible equivocation! “What ‘it’ is a real evil? The object, namely, the behavior or practice of child abuse. What ‘it’ is said to be socially constructed? The concept. My switch from object (child abuse) to idea (the concept of child abuse) is worse than careless” (Hacking 1999: 29). In this self-critique, Hacking charges his former self with equivocation and updates his view to avoid it: now there is a non-constructed reality that is objectively wrong (child abuse itself), which should be distinguished from the discursive construct (the concept of child abuse). The objective evil of the act is secured by separating object and concept. Moral ontology and social ontology seem to come apart—at least with respect to their susceptibility to discursive construction.

Yet this is too quick. As Hacking himself argues, object and concept are reciprocally constitutive in the case of historically emergent action-types, and he continues to include child abuse on a list of kinds that “come into being hand in hand with our invention of the ways to name them” (Hacking 2002: 170; cf. 69). As we just saw, Hacking holds that what we today call ‘child abuse’ is not the same action-type as, for example, what the Victorians called ‘cruelty to children’. The point is not just that our labels change, but that our changing labels change their objects. As such, Hacking is committed to a historical ontology according to which the object itself comes into being as a result of its expression in concepts. So, by Hacking’s own lights, it is not clear just what, ontologically speaking, “the real evil” *is* prior to the development of the concept.

The problem is compounded when we ask about the historical status of “evil” as Hacking uses it in these passages. What is evil? Is evil a social phenomenon, and so subject to the same looping effects as any other bit of social reality? Or should we join a long tradition in the history of philosophy of viewing the fundamental categories of morality as exempt from the historical mutability to which the rest of the social world is subject? Towards the end of his discussion, Hacking sketches two options:

One says that if our consciousness is now raised so that we see an event as abusive, then that event always was abusive, even if no one intended it that way or experienced it that way when it occurred. . . .

The other option resists this, and says the events were not evil in their time, though it would be wrong to repeat acts like that now. (Hacking 1999: 161)

Presumably there are views between these extremes, but the chapter ends without Hacking indicating where the discursive constructionist should fall.

Without a further story about the views between these extremes, Hacking’s discussion is constrained by the dilemma introduced above. Moral facts either remain untouched by the feedback loops that characterize social facts generally, and so we wind up with ahistorical moral realism (“that event always was abusive . . .”), or they are loopy, and so we wind up with thoroughgoing historical relativism (“the events were not evil in their time”). The dilemma also implicitly structures Hacking’s self-criticism. In an effort to recover the idea that child abuse is a “real evil,” he tries to separate out, precisely, a *loopy phenomenon* (the concept of child abuse) from a *non-loopy phenomenon* (child abuse itself). But

this maneuver makes sense only if we assume that the loopiness of moral facts—or more broadly, their being the historical results of discursive construction—*a priori* rules out their critical potential.

Why might one think this? A possible diagnosis is that Hacking is thinking of the effects of discursive construction in *merely causal* terms. This would be to conceive of the determining force of discursive construction as metaphysically on par with other merely causal forces, the way a cold northern climate influences a community's norms concerning clothing and housing, or the way soil erosion influences a community's agricultural practices. To the extent that communal norms and social practices are causally influenced in these ways, their alterability is subject to a high degree of contingency. They go, so to speak, whichever way the wind blows. Thus, if the question whether moral facts are discursively constructed is reduced to the (arguably separate) question of whether moral facts are *causally constructed* by discursive acts, Hacking's dilemma appears inevitable. For then moral facts must either escape the looping effects of discursive construction altogether or else be determined by whatever hegemonic modes of discourse happen to be in power. Yet this merely causal picture leaves unexplored another possibility, namely, that there exist forms of discursive construction that shape their object *rationally*, taking place within a historically developing "space of reasons," as opposed to a merely causal space. I develop this suggestion in Section 4. My claim in the present section is merely negative: restricting ourselves to a causal picture of discursive construction makes it difficult to see how we could avoid Hacking's dilemma.

To begin getting into our alternative view, let us consider Haslanger's discussion of the role of moral facts in ideology critique, asking whether she avoids the dilemma facing Hacking.

3. Haslanger on Ideology and Moral Facts

Some social theorists adopt the notions of discursive construction and feedback loops while taking a firmer stand than Hacking on the existence of moral facts. A prominent recent example is Sally Haslanger's work on ideology critique. She draws on Hacking, urging that the looping effects of discursive construction help explain the self-reinforcing ways that racist, sexist, and other unjust ideologies shape the social world and the 'common sense' of its inhabitants (see, esp., Haslanger 2012: Essays 2, 3, 6, and 17; Haslanger 2015; Haslanger 2017a; Haslanger 2017b). Yet she places a greater priority than Hacking upon defending a critical social theory capable of not only explaining how ideology works but also subjecting it to normative critique. In doing so she comes closer to the realist side of Hacking's two options, defending the idea of "moral facts" that justify the critique of unjust ideologies (2015: 40). Haslanger's account is illuminating and I think there is much it gets right. My focus here, however, is what it leaves out. Haslanger points us in the right direction, suggesting at key points in her argument that moral facts can be at once objectively critical and thoroughly mediated by historically and culturally local discursive frameworks. Yet to make sense of this idea, we need to distinguish a rational form of discursive construction that remains undeveloped. To see this, let us take a closer look at her view.

In her Spinoza Lectures and some recent articles, Haslanger discusses a problem for her view that is similar to the problem we just explored in Hacking.⁸ On her account,

⁸ Haslanger's published work on ideology critique is extensive, but my focus here will be her Spinoza Lectures, *Critical Theory and Practice* (Haslanger 2015), particularly the second lecture, "Ideology and Morality," and a subsequent article, "Culture and Critique" (Haslanger 2017). These two pieces contain Haslanger's most detailed statements to date on the role of "moral facts" in criticizing ideological and loopy social phenomena. A forthcoming piece, "Political

ideology is characterized by a loopy relationship between an unjust *cultural technê* and *resources* (Haslanger 2012: 461–7; 2015: 20–3; 2017a: 156–9; 2017b: 12–6). Because ideology shapes not only patterns of thought but also the material organization of social life, the wrongness of those very conditions can become difficult to see. Her leading case study in this lecture is a 2013 report on forced medical interventions (e.g., forced C-sections) and arrests of pregnant women (e.g., a twenty-year felony prison sentence to a woman whose miscarriage was suspected to be self-induced) in the United States over several decades, which revealed that the majority involved women of color and women in poverty (Paltrow and Flavin 2013; cited in Haslanger 2015: 31–2). The feedback loop Haslanger identifies is roughly as follows. A historically developed *cultural technê* constructs the social meaning of poor pregnant women and pregnant women of color as “irresponsible,” “uncaring,” and even “disposable incubators” (43) and so as posing a threat to the fetus in ways that mandate forced medical interventions and arrests. This shapes the organization of *resources* in the policing of pregnant women and the institutional norms surrounding pregnancy, which in turn loops back up to reinforce the conceptions, dispositions, and habits of thought that make up the initial cultural *technê*. The result is that moral knowledge is blocked: “Ideology systematically prevents us from noticing some of what’s morally relevant by shaping and filtering experience to provide a practical orientation that reinforces the dominant structure” (42–3; cf. 2017a: 159). This predicament raises Haslanger’s question: If ideology is characterized by a loopy relation between the cultural frameworks we rely upon to make sense of the world and the resources that structure the world itself, then a moral critique of ideology must somehow escape the loop. But how does this happen?

Epistemology and Social Critique,” (Haslanger forthcoming) is also relevant, though I do not discuss it here.

An important part of the answer is that ideology is never completely hegemonic and, hence, even under severe ideological conditions there is potential for oppositional perspectives. There are many ways to theorize this point, for example, through variations of standpoint epistemology (Harding 2004), the notion of “counter-publics” (Fraser 1990; Haslanger 2017b), “outlaw emotions” that run against the grain of dominant norms (Jaggar 1989), resistant exercises of imagination (Medina 2013), variations on Du Bois’ notion of “double consciousness” (Du Bois 1986: 364; Mills 2007: 15), pragmatist notions of “contentious politics” (Anderson 2014 and 2015), and beyond. The idea that oppositional perspectives are always possible under ideological conditions is important. However, it is only part of the story. For it does not follow from a point of view’s being oppositional that it is just, good, or anti-ideological. Consider, for example, the movement by some American white women in the 1920s to protest their gender-based exclusion from full membership within the Ku Klux Klan (Cataneo 2020). As Haslanger writes, the critical theorist requires, in addition to the idea of oppositional consciousness, “a more morally substantive critique” (Haslanger 2017a: 162). That is, ideology critique must take the form of *ethically-oriented social criticism*.

It is at this point that Haslanger makes explicit the role of *moral facts* in her account:

If ideology is to be judged in terms of the injustice of its effects and the values it promotes, it would seem that there must be a fact of the matter about what is just and unjust, good, and valuable. If *in fact*, women—and not fetuses—are entitled to the full rights of personhood, then a rights critique of our dominant cultural models of

pregnant women is not ideological, even if it relies on background values
(2015: 40; emphases in the original; cf. 2017a: 165).

The personhood of pregnant women is a “moral fact” (2015: 40). I emphasize that “moral facts,” as Haslanger invokes them here, are sharply distinguished from what she elsewhere calls “social facts” (Haslanger 2012: 76, 104–5, 109–10, 136, 261, 307, 410, 414, 425). Examples of social facts include socially constructed ideas about who is “cool” and who is a “dork” (410), the idea that crop tops are “cute” (406), as well as culturally dominant notions of race, gender, and class, as in the cultural stereotypes attributed to pregnant women in Haslanger’s leading example. The full personhood of pregnant women is a *moral fact*, not a *social fact*, for the very point of protesting the cultural schema in question is that it is, precisely, not a social fact that all pregnant women are recognized as persons. At most, it is an aspiration of social criticism that this *becomes* a social fact, that the world is transformed into one in which pregnant women actually do enjoy recognition of their autonomy, dignity, and rights, and those values are enshrined in and protected by functional social institutions.

The point I wish to underscore is that the invocation of the personhood of pregnant women as a *moral fact* is meant to carry a normative force *different in kind* from the sorts of culturally contingent norms that govern who is “cool” or a “dork,” as well as the norms surrounding culturally dominant formations of race, gender, and class. Moral facts must be of a different normative order than merely social facts insofar as they can be brought in to criticize an ideological picture of certain pregnant women as *irresponsible, uncaring, disposable incubators*. The result is an ontological distinction between the social facts and moral facts surrounding the personhood of pregnant women. Social and moral ontology appear to diverge. But what accounts for this divergence?

This is not an easy question to answer, as Haslanger explicitly leaves the ontological nature of “moral facts” open, preferring not to commit herself to any particular metaethical view (2015: 40n47; 2017a: 165n14). There is, however, at least one ontological commitment implied by her argument, namely, that *at least some moral facts are not loopy in the way that all social facts are*. For the critical role moral facts play in her account derives, in part, from their maintaining a rational authority or objectivity irrespective of the loopy effects of ideology. That is, the moral fact that poor pregnant women and pregnant women of color are persons cannot be discursively constructed out of existence, whereas the norms surrounding the relevant ideological stereotypes can. By framing the problem as a matter of gaining a critical perspective upon the ideologically pernicious feedback loop of cultural schemes and resources, and then proposing knowledge of moral facts as part of the solution, those moral facts are pictured as existing independently of the looping effects of discursive construction that seem to characterize the rest of social reality. If the appealed to moral facts were just as loopy as the social facts they contested, it would be unclear why this should qualify as a form of ethically-oriented social criticism as opposed to a mere clash between equally contingent cultural schemes.

Here we are navigating difficult ground, however, because the idea of moral facts existing outside the loopy effects of discursive construction can seem to conflict with things Haslanger herself says about the historical and cultural mediation of value. She says (rightly, I think) that we should “resist claiming moral knowledge from a neutral standpoint, that is, knowledge ungrounded in situated social, moral, and cultural knowledge” (2017a: 166). In a similar vein she writes, “Culture shapes what we value and our reasons for action. The point is not just that culture shapes what we *take to be value*, that is, our beliefs about value, but *what is valuable*” (Haslanger 2017a: 162). She approvingly cites J.M. Balkin’s claim that, “Without

culture, human values are inchoate and indeterminate; through culture they become differentiated, articulated, refined” (Balkin 1998: 28; cited in Haslanger 2017a: 162). Clearly, Haslanger is committed to a notion of value that is thoroughly mediated by cultural schemes, and so we are led back to a thesis that, just a paragraph ago, we had seemed to reject: moral facts are discursively constructed.

If we want to render this picture internally consistent, we are led to the following puzzle: moral facts must be in some sense discursively constructed, yet *not in the same way that ideological social facts are discursively constructed*. We need to be able to differentiate between the forms that discursive construction can take, identifying in particular a *rational* form of discursive construction that articulates latent or inchoate values in a morally progressive direction, in contrast with blindly causal forms of discursive construction that have no internal moral or rational orientation. Haslanger’s comments points us in this direction, but we still need a story about the discursive construction of moral facts that avoids collapse into the loopy dilemma faced by Hacking.

4. Rational Discursive Construction

Our task, then, is to identify a sense in which objective moral facts are “discursively constructed” that is distinct from the sense in which ideological social facts are “discursively constructed.” A conflation of these two senses leads to the dilemma we saw in Hacking. For if “discursive construction” refers only to the sorts of causal feedback loops at work in the sustaining of ideology, then moral facts must either (a) escape discursive construction altogether or else (b) bear no more or less rational authority than the ideological social facts they oppose. But the model of causal feedback loops is just one form that discursive

construction can take. My aim in this section is to distinguish a type that transforms its object not just *causally* but *rationally*.

It will be helpful to begin by recalling Haslanger's definition of discursive construction.

Discursive construction: Something is discursively constructed just in case it is the way it is, to some substantial extent, because of what is attributed (and/or self-attributed) to it. (Haslanger 2012: 88)

Notice that this definition is broad enough to include all three of the following cases:

Case A: A cultural technê exists in the United States within which poor pregnant women and pregnant women of color tend to be stereotyped as *uncaring*, *irresponsible*, and *disposable incubators*. The way they are labeled shapes their lives by reinforcing practices surrounding the policing of pregnant women (Paltrow and Flavin 2013). The labeling sometimes has a self-fulfilling effect, as those labeled *irresponsible* are forced into a position that renders them unable to fulfill their responsibilities as caretakers. The result is “a structure of social relations that is ideologically sustained” (Haslanger 2015: 32).

Case B: At Beth's middle school, students are divided randomly into four groups each year: *Sugar Maples*, *Oaks*, *Pines*, and *Spruce*. Each

group engages in learning activities together, collaborates on art projects, and competes with other groups in intramural games. Beth is a Sugar Maple. As the school year goes on, this substantially shapes her identity. It organizes the way her time is spent, leads her to develop particular friendships, and builds a sense of camaraderie with her fellow Sugar Maples. They gradually develop a shared conception of their qualities as a group: “Oaks may be better athletes, but everyone knows a Sugar Maple has a talent for art!” By the end of the year, what started as a randomly assigned group has become a mini-community with a mini-history, whose members share senses of identity and meaning.

Case C: Charlotte finds new words to express a bond of affection she has for a friend. The new words seem to capture subtle aspects of the bond that she had not previously been able to voice, and so help illuminate the nature of the friendship. At the same time, this new way of articulating the meaning of the friendship does not leave the friendship unchanged, but strengthens and matures the very bond in question. The friendship grows and becomes more determinate as Charlotte finds new and subtle ways to express it in words.

Discursive construction is at work in Case A in the ways discussed in Section 3, involving a causal feedback loop between an ideological cultural technê and resources. It is at work in Case B insofar as various aspects of Beth’s life—her behaviors, attitudes, identity,

relationships, the organization of her time—have become what they are, to a substantial extent, because she is categorized as a Sugar Maple. Moreover, as she and her fellow Sugar Maples go on to self-attribute certain characteristics (“We are less athletic but more artistic than Oaks”), they reshape the meaning of the initial group label, and so on in a feedback loop. Finally, it is at work in Case C insofar as Charlotte’s friendship is not merely *described* but altered and matured by its articulation in language. Hence, it is reasonable to see all three as instances of discursive construction.

However, there are important differences between them, and noting those differences will help us define the rational form of discursive construction we are looking for. To home in on the relevant differences, consider two senses in which discursive construction may or may not be *normatively oriented*. An act of discursive construction may or may not be:

- (i) *epistemically normative*—meaning that the discursive act of labeling, attributing, or categorizing aims at picking out genuine features of the object of discursive construction (i.e., the discursive act has *objective purport*);

or

- (ii) *developmentally normative*—meaning that the object of discursive construction matures, becomes more subtle, better defined, or in some other way undergoes positive development or growth as a result of its being labeled, categorized, or predicated in a certain way.

We could picture a two-by-two grid sorting all instances of discursive construction into four types: those that are normatively oriented in both ways, (i) but not (ii), vice versa, and neither. The *rational* sort of discursive construction I want to identify is normatively oriented in both senses and, moreover, in a way that relates (i) and (ii): it matures and develops the very object it strives to bring into epistemic focus. Let us look again at our three cases with these criteria in mind.

Case A involves (i) but lacks (ii). The ideology that stereotypes poor pregnant women and pregnant women of color as “irresponsible,” “uncaring,” and even “disposable incubators” involves acts of predication that purport to pick out real qualities of actual people. We may wish to protest these characterizations as false, yet the very fact that we take them to be suitable targets of epistemic criticism assumes that they have *objective purport*. However, they lack (ii). Far from leading to a deepened, subtler, more sophisticated, or otherwise positively developed form of the reality to which they are applied, they distort, stunt, or actively damage it. More importantly, the act of labeling in this case does not even *aim* at this sort of maturation or growth of the object in question (in a way that does occur in Case C; more on this shortly). Whatever alterations the act of discursive construction has upon its objects take place via merely causal (or, more specifically, violently coercive) means, not via discursive agents’ good faith efforts to nurture, develop, or in some way actualize the discursively constructed object.

Case B lacks (i) objective purport. Since the four groups at school are chosen randomly, Beth’s being categorized as a Sugar Maple is not an attempt to capture or track some objective feature she bears. There simply is no trait that makes it epistemically apt for her to be sorted as a Sugar Maple rather than, say, an Oak. There may be reason to think (ii) is present, if being so categorized leads to positive effects in Beth’s childhood development,

but we can leave aside this question, since the form of discursive construction we are looking for involves *both* (i) and (ii), and in a way that relate to one another.⁹

Case C involves both (i) and (ii) and so provides a model for the sort of *rational discursive construction* we are looking for. On the one hand, as Charlotte struggles to articulate the meaning of her friendship, her efforts of interpretation are subject to epistemic constraints of objectivity. Some interpretations she attempts may be criticized as deluded or inaccurate, whereas others may be praised as discerning and illuminating. In this respect her articulations have objective purport. On the other hand, the object of interpretation, namely, the friendship itself, is not left unchanged by Charlotte's hermeneutical efforts. It is deepened and matured, perhaps by touching other aspects of Charlotte's value commitments that had previously seemed unconnected, or by a fresh insight into the ambivalences and vulnerabilities that are part of a meaningful friendship. If we imagine that Charlotte and her friend undertake these discursive efforts jointly by having a conversation, then it becomes even more evident that the activity of articulation is itself a part of the very friendship being articulated. The friendship would have been something different—remaining unrealized or immature in certain respects—if this activity of articulation had not taken place. In short, the object of articulation is subject to not just any change, but change for which metaphors of *maturation* and *growth* are appropriate. Moreover, criteria (i) and (ii) are fulfilled not independently but through one another. The object that has matured is the very same object brought more clearly into epistemic focus. Charlotte's articulation thus follows a doubly

⁹ One could argue Case B involves (ii), insofar as Beth's evolving identification as a Sugar Maple fosters relationships, attitudes, and forms of behavior that are positive parts of her childhood development. However, as I will clarify in a moment, the form of maturation or growth I have in mind is more specific: it is a maturation of not just any features of the categorized person or thing, but *precisely those features that are targeted when discursive construction involves objective purport*.

normative logic: it brings something to light, while simultaneously maturing or actualizing the thing brought to light.

I have been using the word *articulation* to refer to the special form of rational discursive construction at work in Case C. This is a reference to Charles Taylor (1985; 2016), who distinguishes between *descriptions*, which target more or less stable external objects (as when we say that “The stroller is gray and has four wheels” or “Mercury is the planet closest to the sun”) and *articulations*, which take oneself, one’s feelings and desires, and the importance of those feelings and desires, as their object (Taylor 1985: 36–42; 2016: chap. 6). Taylor writes,

Our attempts to formulate what we hold important must, like descriptions, strive to be faithful to something. But what they strive to be faithful to is not an independent object with a fixed degree and manner of evidence, but rather a largely inarticulate sense of what is of decisive importance. An articulation of this ‘object’ tends to make it something different from what it was before. (Taylor 1985: 38)

What I want from the notion of articulation is a conceptual model for the idea that moral facts and values themselves (not just our conceptions of them) are *rationally discursively constructed* over history in culturally concrete ways. That is, I am proposing an analogy between the logic of articulation as it functions in Case C, in which the friendship evolves and matures alongside Charlotte’s efforts to articulate it, and the historical articulation of moral facts, in which the facts themselves grow more determinate, subtle, and mature through their expression in discourse. According to this model, the moral facts and values

surrounding central moral concepts like ‘personhood’, are not immutably present from the beginning of moral history, but come to be and evolve alongside humanity’s efforts to collectively self-interpret the terrain of ethical life.

To illustrate this, let’s stick with the example of ‘personhood’, since it is the central moral concept invoked in Haslanger’s example discussed earlier (and which formed Case A, above). My claim is that we can apply what has been said so far to cases like the following, urging that they qualify as genuine instances of rational discursive construction:

Case D: Over the course of human history, one of the ways human beings have tried to articulate the sacred or inviolable worth of a human life is through the concept of ‘personhood’. ‘Personhood’ articulates a life as bearing a non-instrumental and egalitarian form of moral worth, putting that life morally on par with all other ‘persons’. That concept, moreover, is not a static universal but evolves over time and across cultures in response to diverse crises, challenges, and modes of social organization. For example, both the rise of modern racism in the period of classical European imperialism and the emergence of capitalist forms of class-divided society demanded the articulation of previously indeterminate dimensions of the value of humanity—particularly negative dimensions capable of laying bare the new ways personhood was being violated, misrecognized, exploited, and systematically oppressed—that did not need to be articulated, at least in quite the same ways, in earlier societies. Moreover, as the concept of ‘personhood’ evolves, so does the very value of humanity that it strives

to articulate. For as new facets of personhood are explored and discursively expressed, older modes of living a valuable human life are deepened and transformed, while others grow obsolete and are left behind. In this way, the objective value named by ‘personhood’ evolves alongside our very efforts to express it.

The point of thinking of Case D as an instance of *rational* discursive construction is, precisely, to differentiate it from ideological instances of discursive construction (as in Case A), in which the object risks being constructed in any direction whatsoever. This is particularly urgent in the case of ‘personhood’, which can serve ideological purposes by being interpreted to exclude certain populations as non-persons. Our guiding thought is that the moral facts implied by the moral concept of ‘personhood’ are subject to historically and culturally contingent forms of discursive construction without sacrificing their critical authority because articulation is subject to the normative constraints just specified. As (i) *epistemically normative*, any particular struggle to articulate the meaning of ‘personhood’ must strive to be faithful to objective features of ethical life (e.g., we can ask how well our interpretations illuminate the worth of human beings, as well as the historically evolving ways that factors like class, gender, and race mediate the moral demands of recognizing others’ personhood, as in Case A’s ideological stereotypes of poor pregnant women and pregnant women of color). As (ii) *developmentally normative*, the struggle to articulate the meaning of ‘personhood’ can be assessed and criticized in terms of the development or maldevelopment of its object (e.g., we might ask, do the new articulations make possible new forms of valuing humanity, or modes of rational responsiveness to its violation and injury, that would have remained undeveloped, inchoate, or unrealized without them?). Understood

in these terms, the objective content of moral concepts can change, but not in just any way whatsoever, for they are constrained by dual standards of epistemic objectivity and moral maturation.

Some caveats are needed with respect to the idea that rational discursive construction is constrained by a “standard of maturation.” To speak in terms of *growth* and *maturation* may seem to come along with strong teleological commitments, as if a ‘full’ realization of human value is already present *in potentia* within present conditions, striving one day to achieve, once and for all, its ‘true’ form, the way a full-grown oak is sometimes said to be implicit within an acorn. However, the standard of maturation at work here does not have to be spelled out in terms of a fixed *telos* of moral historical development, located in a “hypothetical endpoint of moral history.”¹⁰ Rather, on the model of rational discursive construction, a plurality of forms of maturation may be possible for any given stage in moral historical development. Notice that this is consistent with our ordinary uses of the concepts of *maturation* and *growth*. We ordinarily speak of someone as having “matured” in their outlook on some aspect of life, without implying that their current outlook is the only possible form this maturation could have taken. Likewise, we speak of an artist’s sensibilities as having “matured” in a more sophisticated direction without supposing a single trajectory for their artistic career. Why not, then, think that fundamental moral values like ‘personhood’ or ‘justice’ can, over the course of a historical development, become more subtle, determinate, and intricately tailored to culturally concrete situations, without supposing that the developments in question represent the only possible paths of a morally progressive history? The standard of maturation, then, need not take the form of a single codified goal or principle that would apply universally in all instances. All that is required is that the standard is in principle

¹⁰ An approach favored by Axel Honneth (1995: 171).

intelligible to those who look critically and objectively upon a particular instance of moral maturation.¹¹

Part of what makes it inappropriate to look for a codified standard in this context is that, if the articulation model is right, then the standard of maturation is itself a result of the process of maturation. For what is at stake is not just a matter of taking an unchanging moral concept or value, ‘personhood’, and applying it to changing empirical circumstances. Rather, it is a matter of articulating and enriching the existing concept of personhood so that a previously indeterminate or inchoate aspect of its content become filled in, rendered more determinate, illuminating, or subtle. On the articulation model, the line distinguishing the allegedly ‘pure’ formal content of a fundamental moral concept like ‘personhood’ and the ‘impure’ content generated by its historically and culturally contingent contexts of application is at best blurred.¹² As such, the development and ongoing refinement of the concept of ‘personhood’ in response to concrete historical situations—in the case we have been considering, a particular history of racism, sexism, and class-based oppression—does more than extend its sphere of application. The new and unprecedented cases contribute to the growing concreteness, determinacy, and depth of the moral standard itself. New moral facts concerning the wrongness of forms of oppression rooted in capitalist class-division and modern racism, along with deepened reflections of the ways they interact with and transform older forms of gender-based oppression, become parts of the objective content of the ethical concept of ‘personhood’. We are speaking here, not of this or that *subjective conception* of

¹¹ This raises controversial issues about moral progress that I do not propose to settle here. On the idea that moral standards can remain rationally authoritative without being codifiable, see McDowell 1998. On the idea moral maturation can be judged without the help of a standard that transcends all possible cases, see Taylor’s defense of the idea that moral reasoning is always “a reasoning in transitions” (1989: 72).

¹² For this language of “purity” and “impurity” tracking the distinction between “formal” and “empirical,” see Kant’s *Groundwork* (2012: Ak. 4:389).

‘personhood’, but of the *objective content* of the concept itself, i.e., the norms of application, inference, and practical response that one must grasp in order to be credited with having a genuine understanding of what the concept ‘personhood’ means and demands of us. This objective content evolves in response to the appearance and evolution of the very forms of oppression and ideology it is deployed to criticize, in ways for which there is no comparable frame of reference in earlier societies. A thought along these lines is required if we wish to distinguish the *articulation* of moral facts from their mere *description*—and it has been my argument that critical social theorists with commitments like Haslanger’s ought to do so.

Contrast this with a model that understands the interpretation of moral facts and values along the lines of straightforward *description*, in Taylor’s sense of the term. On that sort of view, the objective conceptual content of fundamental ethical concepts like ‘personhood’ is already fully determinate and authoritative in advance of its being made explicit in language. The development of what I referred to earlier as *anti-ideological conceptual schemes*—as in the invention of categories like ‘sexual harassment’, ‘racism’, or ‘hate speech’—cannot contain any genuinely new *moral* content, but only point out *non-moral* details of how the already existing moral facts are to be applied. When it comes to their objective moral content, concepts like ‘personhood’ and ‘justice’ are in principle the same for us today as they were for, say, a medieval peasant or pre-agricultural hunter-gatherer living 40,000 years ago. This view of moral concepts and their objective content, sometimes described as “platonist,” brings us back to the ahistorical and discursively unmediated conception of moral facts that stood as one of Hacking’s two options.

In comparing the articulation and description models, my aim is not to attempt a positive argument in favor of one over the other, but only to argue that articulation model is a better fit for critical theorists who are already committed to the ideas we have been

tracking, particularly the discursive construction of the social world, the historical and cultural mediation of value, and the possibility of ethically-oriented social criticism. The idea of the *articulation* (or *rational discursive construction*) of moral facts follows dialectically from the existing commitments of this strand of critical social theory. This is especially clear when we consider a combination of two commitments in particular: (a) the emphasis placed upon the mediating role of language, history, and culture in the domain of political and ethical normativity; and (b) the commitment to a theory of ethically-oriented social criticism that includes the notion of objective moral facts—a pairing of commitments found in contemporary critical theory well beyond Haslanger.¹³ My argument has been that we can hold that moral facts are discursively constructed without threatening their objectively rational credentials, only if we carefully distinguish a rational form of discursive construction from its merely causal cousin.

5. Conclusion

So, are moral facts loopy? If by “loopy” we have in mind their being shaped by the sorts of non-rational or causal forms of discursive construction that are at work in the sustaining of ideological social facts, the answer is “No.” For if moral facts were loopy in this sense, they

¹³ For example, a core aspect of Axel Honneth’s social theory of *recognition* is that moral demands are not ahistorical givens but part of a “historically emergent space of reasons” (Honneth 2002: 503). On his account, the differentiation of three distinct “spheres” of recognition—love, respect, and solidarity—is the result of a centuries-long process of societal development whereby human beings collectively self-articulated what it means to be worthy of recognition (Honneth 1995: chap. 5). Though the details of Honneth’s theory are complex, it is safe to say that he is committed to a version of the idea that the objective value of ‘personhood’ is not immutably present from the start of moral history, but evolves alongside concrete communities’ efforts to make that value concrete by developing new concepts, words, and frameworks for its expression.

would be no more or less rationally authoritative than the social facts they are meant to oppose. Are moral facts discursively constructed? If the activity I have described as *rational discursive construction* qualifies as a genuine form of discursive construction, we have at least opened up a conceptual space in which the answer can be “Yes.” For the articulation model allows us to say that moral facts are thoroughly shaped by historically and culturally contingent discursive regimes without this posing a philosophical threat to the idea of their rational and critical authority.¹⁴

I noted earlier how certain theorists’ efforts to protect the special rational authority of moral facts leads to a picture of social ontology and moral ontology as fundamentally separate domains. I want to conclude by suggesting, in a more gestural fashion, that the impulse to separate the two is an old but persistent dogma, the fact/value dichotomy, in a new guise. Iris Murdoch, a fierce critic of the latter dichotomy, suggests that the strict separation of values from the domain of empirically contingent facts is often motivated by an effort to keep values “pure,” to maintain their capacity to transcend the messy material world to which they are meant to be applied (Murdoch 1992: chap. 2). The worry that moral facts would become ideologically tainted if they were just as subject to discursive construction as “social facts” follows precisely this line of reasoning. If the idea of rational discursive construction is defensible, however, then social and moral ontology are closer than this worry suggests.¹⁵ For if they diverge at all, it is not with respect to their

¹⁴ This idea, though heterodox, is not new. Both Hegel and Marx, for example, have both been described as “historicized realists” about ethical value (Wood 1990: 33–5), and “historicized moral realism” would be an appropriate label for the view defended here. There are resonances with contemporary views, as well. For example, Richardson (2018) argues that objective morality can change over time as a result of our constructive efforts to address morally indeterminate situations.

¹⁵ In this respect, the view defended here is consonant with recent advances in social ontology that explicitly repudiate a value-neutral methodology (see, e.g., Ásta 2018: 6).

susceptibility to discursive construction, or more broadly, their thoroughgoing mediation by language, culture, and history.

Works Cited

- Alexander, Jeffrey. 2004b. "On the Social Construction of Moral Universals: The 'Holocaust' from War Crime to Trauma Drama." In Jeffrey C. Alexander, Ron Eyerman, Bernhard Giesen, Neil J. Smelser, and Piotr Sztompka (eds.), *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Althusser, Louis. 2008. *On Ideology*. London: Verso.
- Anderson, Elizabeth. 2014. "Social Movements, Experiments in Living, and Moral Progress: Case Studies from Britain's Abolition of Slavery," The Lindley Lecture, The University of Kansas, February 11, 2014.
- Anderson, Elizabeth. 2015. "Moral Bias and Corrective Practices: A Pragmatist Perspective," *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA* 89: 21–47.
- Ásta. 2018. *Categories We Live By: The Construction of Sex, Gender, Race, and Other Social Categories*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Balkin, J.M. 1998. *Cultural Software: A Theory of Ideology*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Brown, Alexander. 2017. "What is Hate Speech? Part I: The Myth of Hate," *Law and Philosophy* 36: 419–468.
- Brownmiller, Susan. 1990. *In Our Time: Memoir of a Revolution*. New York: Dell Publishing.
- Cataneo, Emily. 2020. "A Brief History of the Women's KKK," *JSTOR Daily*, October 13, 2020, <https://daily.jstor.org/a-brief-history-of-the-womens-kkk/>.

- Celikates, Robin. 2018. *Critique as Social Practice: Critical Theory and Social Self-Understanding*. London: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Du Bois, W. E. B. 1986. *Writings*, ed. N. Huggins. New York, NY: The Library of America.
- Fraser, Nancy. 1990. "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy." *Social Text* 25/26: 56–80.
- Fredrickson, George M. 2002. *Racism: A Short History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Freedman, Estelle B. 2002. *No Turning Back: The History of Feminism and the Future of Women*. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Fricker, Miranda. 2007. *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gooding-Williams, Robert. forthcoming. "Ideology, Social Practices, Anti-Black Concepts."
- Hacking, Ian. 1991. "The Making and Molding of Child Abuse." *Critical Inquiry*. 17(2): 253–288.
- _____. 1995. *Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- _____. 1999. *The Social Construction of What?* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- _____. 2002. *Historical Ontology*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Harding, Sandra (ed.). 2002. *The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader: Intellectual and Political Controversies*. New York: Routledge.
- Haslanger, Sally. 2012. *Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- _____. 2015. *Critical Theory and Practice*. Amsterdam: Koninklijke Van Gorcum.
- _____. 2017a. "Culture and Critique," *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* XCI: 149–173.

- _____. 2017b. "Racism, Ideology, and Social Movements," *Res Publica* 94(1): 1–22.
- _____. forthcoming. "Political Epistemology and Social Critique."
- Hinton, Alexander Laban. 2002. "The Dark Side of Modernity: Toward an Anthropology of Genocide." In Alexander Laban Hinton (ed.), *Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Honneth, Axel. 1995. *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- _____. 2002. "Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions." *Inquiry* 45(4): 488–519.
- Jackson, Nicki Ali (ed.). 2007. *Encyclopedia of Domestic Violence*. New York: Routledge.
- Jaeggi, Rahel. 2018. *Critique of Forms of Life*, trans. Ciaran Cronin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Jaggar, A.M. (1989) 'Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology', in A.M. Jaggar and S.R. Bordo (ed.) *Gender/Body/Knowledge: Feminist Reconstructions of Being and Knowing*, 145–71. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Javier, Rafael Art. and William G. Herron (eds.). 2018. *Understanding Domestic Violence: Theories, Challenges, and Remedies*. London: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Kant, Immanuel. 2012. *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lockhart, Lettie and Danis, Fran (eds.). 2010. *Domestic Violence: Intersectionality and Culturally Competent Practice*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Matsuda, Mari. 1989. "Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story," *Michigan Law Review* 87: 2320–2381.

- McDowell, John. 1998. "Virtue and Reason," in *Mind, Value, and Reality*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Medina, José. 2013. *The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mills, Charles. 1997. *The Racial Contract*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- _____. 2005. "'Ideal Theory' as Ideology," *Hypatia* 20(3): 165–184.
- _____. 2007. "White Ignorance." In *Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance*, edited by Shannon Sullivan and Nancy Tuana, 11–38. Albany: SUNY Press.
- _____. 2017. "Ideology." In *The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice*, edited by Ian James Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr., 100–111. New York: Routledge.
- Murdoch, Iris. 1992. *Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals*. London: Penguin.
- Paltrow, Lynn M. and Jeanne Flavin. 2013. "Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women in the United States, 1973–2005: Implications for Women's Legal Status and Public Health," *Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law* 38(2): 299–343.
- Richardson, Henry S. 2018. *Articulating the Moral Community: Toward a Constructive Ethical Pragmatism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shelby, Tommie. 2003. "Ideology, Racism, and Critical Social Theory," *The Philosophical Forum* 34(2): 153–188.
- _____. 2014. "Racism, Moralism, and Social Criticism," *DuBois Review* 11(1): 57–74.
- Schapiro, Fred R. 1985. "Historical Notes on the Vocabulary of the Women's Movement," *American Speech* 60(1): 3–16.
- Taylor, Charles. 1985. *Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers I*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_____. 1989. *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

_____. 2016. *The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Wood, Allen. 1990. *Hegel's Ethical Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.