

The expression of hate in hate speech

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In this paper, I offer an account of how hate speech expresses hate. In so doing, I answer some objections to expressivist views. First, I expand on earlier work on derogatory discourse as expressively normative speech. There is, I hold, a relevant category of utterances such that: an utterance u that carries an expressive presupposition of an emotive attitude e updates the context of u by enacting the normative appraisal that is constitutive of e in the context (when u is felicitous). Utterances that are expressive of hatred fall under this category of normatively expressive speech. The account requires a combination of (a) conversational contexts as contexts that can be updated with the normative requirements of the speech acts performed, and (b) an account of emotions and sentiments as normative or evaluative appraisals, in particular, of hate and related sentiments as evaluative appraisals.

The relevant category of utterances to consider display certain *systematic* features. This requires understanding whether the systematicity pertains to the occurrence of the sentiments or to speech proper, or both.

The present account follows other illocutionary accounts of hate speech and of oppressive speech (Langton, McGowan), differing from them by adding the emotional dimension to the speech acts performed.

The positive claim I advance, then is that hate speech is illocutionarily expressive and presupposes ongoing hate as a sentiment which “organizes people’s social world and helps strengthening the connection of the ingroup (“ingroup love”) at the expense of various outgroups (“outgroup hate”)” (Fischer et al 2018, p, 311).

I will conclude by replying to some objections to the idea that hate speech has any necessary connection to hate as an emotion (Brown 2017a).