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CAVE HILL PHILOSOPHY SYMPOSIUM
This page contains all the abstracts accepted for the Symposium, and links to the full text when we have it. Please note that the texts are all in pdf format, for which you may need the Acrobat Reader, which can be acquired at Adobe.
Please note also that e-mail addresses have all been altered to include 'nospam' after the '@', so none of them will work as given.
The listing is mainly in alphabetical order, but it begins with the keynote-cum-UNESCO World Philosophy Day lecture, and then four persons presenting an integrated panel session.
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Charles Mills
c-mills@nospamnorthwestern.edu
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Abstract
Justice is one of the oldest concepts in the Western philosophical tradition, being the central theme of Plato's Republic. Moreover, the revival of Anglo-American political philosophy stimulated by John Rawls's 1971 A Theory of Justice shifted the focus of normative political theory from issues of our political obligation to the state to issues of social justice. Rawls's work has been hugely successful: A Theory of Justice has been translated into more than 30 languages and has generated a secondary literature of literally thousands of articles. Yet a startling feature of this vast literature on justice is the neglect of racial justice as a theme, despite the founding of the modern world on planetary racial injustice. In this talk, I will argue that we need to rethink liberalism (the now-hegemonic ideology of the modern world) so as to reorient it towards rectificatory justice as a central concern.
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Ergin Bulut
erginb@nospamgmail.com
Michelle Castro
mccastr2@nospamillinois.edu
Heather Greenhalgh-Spencer
hai-lu@nospamjuno.com
Cameron McCarthy
cmccart1@nospamillinois.edu
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Summary and Abstracts
This session focuses urgent attention on the heightened importance of visual analysis and critical discourse analysis in the evaluation of radical transformations now taking place in late modern third and first world societies centered on the emergence of the global city and the intensification of electronic mediation and digitalization. We aim to provoke conversation that range from various theoretical disciplines from poststructuralist philosophy to Paolo Freire's thought, as well as cover realms of political economy in its relation to re-articulation of human subjects within the global city as well as the algorithms of video games. Michell Castro critically analyses the language policy in Chile in terms of country's relation to broader processes of globalization and Paolo Freire's philosophy. Castro provides philosophical clues as to how the dialectical processes of globalization can pave the way for a more dialogic space. Heather Greenhalgh-Spencer explores the relationship between technology and the practice of teaching and learning in its spatial dimension of the classroom, challenging the binaries held about the body. Drawing on the contributions of visual methodologist such as Norman Fairclough and Gillian Rose and their productive conversations with social science scholars such as David Harvey, Aihwa Ong and Walter Benjamin, participant Cameron McCarthy explores processes of gentrification that are consequential to race, space and the struggle over the iconography of the present and the future in globalizing Chicago. Ergin Bulut's intervention is in the world of video games. Approaching these cultural artifacts as software that codes subjectivity in the 21st century, Bulut explores alternative ways of incorporating video games into the fabric of everyday life as a step for a broader visual materialist pedagogy. Ultimately, we believe that with their theoretical and historically grounded approaches, the participants of this panel provide a much needed critical perspective in visual communication studies and curriculum studies, contributing to the field both theoretically and methodologically.
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What is it like to teach in an on-line space as compared to a material classroom? How does the body figure in to the 'silences' that take place in both material and on-line classes? In what ways do online spaces change, enhance, and rupture the traditional pedagogical stance. In this presentation, I attempt a nomadic inquiry, an attempt at geographic and philosophical mapping of the site of the body. Specifically, I am interested in the ways that bodies get mapped and performed in classrooms (both real and virtual) and spaces in-between. Interested in the bodies of both students and teachers, I investigate the ways that new and old technologies of the body can change the way we think about the binary of the postmodern body or modern body. I'm interested in new understanding the ways that bodies relate to space and each other within the site of schooling.
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Educational policymakers often overlook the action of dialogue when they set national curriculum, which can cause problems with implementation. Specifically, language policy has been the subject of reform in many countries due to globalization and the internationalization of the economic market. Because of this, Chile has joined many countries in these efforts by implementing the English Opens Doors Program (El Programa Inglés Abre Puertas [PIAP]), which makes English a compulsory course for all school-aged children. This paper will look at this issue from a Freirean point of view and will analyze antidialogical and dialogical actions in relation to PIAP in Chile. First, I will explain what antidialogical and dialogical action look like through the eyes of Freire; then, I will map out significant political changes in Chile, which mark a move from dialogical reform to antidialogical reform; next, I will examine how globalization, linguistic imperialism, and power work together as key factors in making PIAP an antidialogical action; and finally, I will conclude with ways in which PIAP can be made into a more dialogical program that works with the people, not for them.
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In this presentation, I approach video games as one of the ideal commodities of digital capitalism precisely because they are embedded in the ubiquitous intersection internet, consoles and mobile devices. Understanding video games as software that inscribes and codes subjectivity, I claim how Walter Benjamin's dialectical approach to technology and seeing offer alternative ways of integrating technology and video games into classroom and everyday life in order to create space to educate ourselves - not only youth - for a more inclusive society that might manage to capture the critical juncture we are going through. I also argue that Benjamin's thought is central for creating a visual materialist pedagogy.
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Racial theorization still separates race from the dynamics of our late-modern society. This presentation aims to redirect the topic of race and education to a place that is considered outside the field of education, to the margin where education now is drawn into the fast moving currents of change fueled by the amplification of meanings and images in electronic mediation in the digital economy, in the volatile world politics post 9/11, but most of all in the crescendo of movement, migration and the work of the imagination of the great masses of the people. I want to shift conceptual and practical focus on racial antagonism in education from the mainstream and multicultural emphasis on teaching and curriculum reform, to the coordination of racial identities, the organization of affect and the differential patterns of historical incorporation of different social groups into modern social institutions defined by the restlessness of modernity. How can a more complex understanding of racial identities and social institutions renew and reform our imagination of schooling?
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Lawrence Bamikole
bamikolelawrence@nospamyahoo.com
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Abstract
In the majority of cases, politicians, analysts and scholars talking and writing on the subject of political violence have concentrated attention on the victims and effects of violence and violent activities at the exclusion of the perpetrators of violence and their motives. This has led to an inadequate understanding and analysis of the meaning, forms and justification of violence. What is being suggested in the paper is that a better understanding of the issues relating to political violence requires a shift of emphasis from the victim/effect approach to the perpetrator/motive approach. This approach takes into consideration the role of perpetrators of violence, their motivations and the social conditions under which they operate. This position will be illustrated by the violence of dance hall in Jamaica and the militia violence of the Odua People Congress (OPC) in Nigeria.
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Tunde Bewaji
tundebewaji@nospamyahoo.com
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Abstract
The Caribbean societies, being former plantations of various European powers and subsequently colonies of these powers; some gaining political independence, others being nominally granted statehood, while others are still overseas territories of these powers; it can be understood why there is so much cultural trading, contest and exchange between the Caribbean and Europe. The impact of modernity on the agglomeration of captive Africans, indentured Indians, destitute Europeans forced into the colonies, through the forces of Eurocentric educational systems and practices, dependency economies, religious domestication, technological integration, social-psychological presentations, judicial control and financial subservience all reverberate into all aspects of the existence of the rainbow demography of the Caribbean.
In this essay, I examine the ontologies and epistemologies of the cultural contestations consciously and unconsciously taking place through historical exigencies in the relations between Europe and the Caribbean. The overall objective of the study is to see how the back and forth movement of cultural materials constitute factors for consolidation and challenges to social cohesion and global integration.
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Bob Brecher
R.Brecher@nospambrighton.ac.uk
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Abstract
Even people who think torture is justified in certain circumstances regard it -- to say the least -- as morally undesirable, however necessary they think it is. So I shall approach the issue by building on some of the arguments I make in Torture and the Ticking Bomb (Wiley 2007) and analyse the extreme case where people such as Dershowitz, Posner and Walzer think torture is justified, namely the so-called ticking bomb scenario. And since the justification they offer of torturing the person apparently concerned is always consequentialist - again, since no one thinks that torture is in any way "good in itself" - I shall confine myself to consequentialist arguments. That is to say, I shall take the argument on its own terms. For any non-consequentialist objection to torture offered other than in purely academic contexts - however well-merited -- merely invites the response, 'So much the worse for non-consequentialism': if a moral theory insists that torture is wrong even if it would save thousands of lives that just shows how wrong the theory is (compare Kant, on lying).
The main argument is thus in two parts. First, I shall argue that the relevant details of the "ticking bomb" scenario fall apart under analysis; what might at first appear plausible turns out to be at best unwarranted supposition and at worst (and ironically) an intellectually irresponsible refusal to think realistically. Second, I shall propose that even if that were not the case, the likely moral and political consequences of permitting torture would be worse than those of the putative bomb's going off. Finally I shall briefly consider a genuine case in certain ways analogous to the "ticking bomb" and conclude that Walzer's and others' realism about the need for those exercising power to be willing to get their hands dirty cuts both ways.
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Felicia Browne
fdujon@nospamgmail.com
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Abstract
Animal Rights is a growing concern for social and moral philosophers. The increase in animal-rights advocacy with an intense concentration on ensuring rights to animals has created a new sphere of application for the concept of 'Rights'. Most advocates have consistently maintained that animals, as sentient beings have the ability to feel, i.e. that animals can experience pain and in some overt cases, happiness. As such, they reason that human beings have a moral, and in many cases legal obligation to protect the rights of these animals. It is in my belief that animals have rights and should be protected under the law. But, can animals really have rights, in the proper sense of the term?
In most developed countries (like Canada, North America and Britain) and some developing countries (like Barbados), there are laws protecting the 'rights' of some animals like dogs. The concept of Rights is well-known from the writings of John Locke's famous Two Treatises which postulate that human beings have natural rights insofar as it is purely derived from God. He noted that these natural rights i.e. the right to life, liberty and property, etc. are absolute and universal. From Locke's line of reasoning, these rights are equal for everyone, and as such no individual has more freedom or liberty than another. But this equality of natural rights proposed by Locke was stipulated for the human species. How can it become applicable to non-human animals that are known to be devoid of rationality? However, can these natural dispositions which human beings are endowed with be attributed to non-rational beings like animals? If rights are only 'natural' to human beings, why have animal-rights advocates unyieldingly defended that those species also have rights? If their claims are valid - hypothetical thinking that is, how consistent are these rights? My brief hypothesis will avow that higher primates like dogs, cats, and cows, etc., do have rights, while lower animals like rodents do not. In essence, I will attempt to evaluate this notion of "Rights" in context to the current debates on animal rights. It seeks to understand why only certain animals (dogs, cats, some wildlife, etc) can actually have those rights, while others (rats, mongooses, chicken, etc.) are left to fend for themselves.
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Cody Campbell
codycampbell.lb@nospamgmail.com
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Abstract
In Plato's Allegory of the Cave, leaving the cave entails an epistemological change that, it seems, should be accompanied by a corresponding ontological shift, though the allegory doesn't describe it in much detail. Ascending out of the cave, the explorer of reason "undergoes" major transformations, and subsequently appears different to others when he has descended back into the cave. The ascent and descent are both described as "confusing" and "painful," thus linking thought with action - or rather reason with being. To get a better glimpse of this ontological shift, it's productive to examine some images of the philosopher in Plato. In Republic the metaphor of the stargazer, for example, as well as the image of Socrates himself, appear to paint the philosopher as someone at the margins of society, someone who, to say the least, lacks nuanced people-skills. In this reading, the ontological shift that follows the epistemological epiphany renders the philosopher isolated, incapable of having relationships with others. In the allegory of the cave, Socrates points out that the philosopher is happiest outside the cave, gazing at the beauty of the forms. The happy philosopher, in other words, is a solipsistic philosopher, one who basks in the glory of his own rationality. He must be "compelled" to return to the cave for political reasons and to establish what seem to be forced relationships for the sake of the polis as a whole. This paper will explore the possibility that, whatever the metaphysics of the ontological change, this shift seems to leave the philosopher lonesome and unsociable. First, in order to establish what the initial epistemological shift is, I will do a close reading of the allegory of the cave. Second, by looking at a few images of the philosopher, such as the stargazer and the "useful philosopher," I will connect the epistemological shift to an ontological one that manifests itself in social relations. Finally, I will read the image of Socrates in Plato's Symposium as an illustrative example of the philosopher at the margins of society.
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Eric Chelstrom
chelstre@nospamgvsu.edu
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Abstract
John Searle’s account of collective intentionality is important, but its account
of the origin of institutional facts is problematic. In this paper, I specifically address
the issue of the creation of institutional facts. I argue that Searle is unable to give an
account of first-order institutional facts and propose a modification informed by the
early phenomenologist. By first-order institutional facts, I mean those institutional facts
that are not founded on other institutional facts. Even if Searle is correct that criticism
of his ad hoc cases was not a significant problem for The Construction of Social Reality, it
certainly has become a problem in Making the Social World. My alternative account argues
that the possibility of institutional facts depends on what phenomenologists call horizon
intentionality, especially in its intersubjective manifestations.
In brief, Searle asserts that making institutional facts is simply something that we do
naturally. However, his examples of ad hoc creation of institutional facts are unsatisfactory.
(Searle 2010: 19-22, 94-100) While Searle treats his two “simple” cases as basic examples
of institutional facts coming into being, it is fair to argue that these cases are not all simple
in the way he thinks.
More problematic for Searle is how he understands the nature of institutional facts.
There are two claims Searle makes that generate his problem. First, Searle claims that an
institutional fact is a fact that “require[s] human institutions in order to exist at all”. (ibid,
10) Second, Searle claims that “an institution is a system of constitutive rules, and such a
system automatically creates the possibility of institutional facts.” (ibid.) Institutions are
systems of constitutive rules. And, Searle treats constitutive rules as a type of status
function declaration that establishes institutional facts. (ibid: 96-100) Worse, it is unclear
as to how constitutive rules are not themselves institutional facts; a constitutive rule
constitutes, in whole or in part, the very institution it establishes and has the deontic
power associated with asserting a status function. In sum, Searle’s account of the
institutional facts appears to run thus: 1) institutional facts require institutions; 2)
institutions are constituted by institutional facts. If that’s correct, then Searle’s account is
circular and ad hoc cases Searle claims are not problematic should be rendered impossible
on his view.
Searle can argue that this misrepresents his view, he claims: “All status functions are
institutional facts, but not all institutional facts exist within preexisting institutions
consisting of constitutive rules.” (ibid: 23) In claiming thus he contradicts his assertion that
institutional facts require institutions. Searle is thus faced with a dilemma, accept that
institutional facts require institutions, rendering incoherent any hope of accounting for the
origins of institutional facts; or allow that institutional facts do not require institutions and
revise his theory. The first option is clearly untenable. The latter is unpalatable for Searle
because of his insistence that language is an institution and language is a necessary
condition for institutional facts. Complicating this further, Searle admits of the existence of
nonlinguistic institutional facts. (ibid, 63)
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Mark Devenney,
M.Devenney@nospambrighton.ac.uk
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Abstract
The redefinition of rights of equality and liberty by radical and deliberative democrats
during the last decades of the 20th century resulted in the denial that a consideration
of property is integral to political philosophy. Theorising property as intrinsically
political demands a return to Marx but on terms he may not have recognised. I
outline six aspects of a politics of property in this paper. First, I argue there can be
no universal justification for any regime of property. Property is by definition the
institution of a wrong. Second, regimes of property are socially articulated, and
contingent delimitations of our world(s) which come to presented as natural. Third,
the articulation of something as property establishes a border, determining what can
be owned, how far ownership extends, where it is limited, as well as terms of use and
terms of abuse. It establishes a set of property relations, and defines a vocabulary
of the proper. Fourth, property as social and political, establishes limits to what is
proper. It thus requires laws and norms of trespass. The definition of certain actions as
criminal establishes (a) violation of the use of resources ‘rightfully’ limited to some,
(theft) (b) establishes where bodies are entitled to be (which country, which property,
which premises and the like) (trespass and immigration), and (c) establishes what one
is entitled to do with one’s own body during certain times (proper behaviour). Here
sovereign state power is enlisted to enforce relations of property beneficial to some,
but not all. Fifth, any regime of property delimits forms of impropriety. The forms of
impropriety are also practices for the management of the proper, or to use Ranciere’s
term forms of policing. Sixth, and last, a challenge to any political regime must of
necessity put in to question both the forms of proper behaviour, and the regime of
property. These are intrinsically related to each other.
I conclude by arguing that democracy is always improper. Property, in all of its
forms entails enclosure. Enclosure requires the drawing and the maintenance of
boundaries of exclusion and inclusion. The sovereign determination of the proper,
as well as of the exception to the proper defines trespass. Trespass is a form of
democratic enactment when, and if, it destabilises enclosure. Who are the figures
of the trespasser in contemporary politics: the immigrant, the squatter, the suicide
bomber, and the hacker. These figures stand in for different forms of refusal of
enclosure. The first violates the sovereign delimitation of citizenship rights. The
second violates the laws of property which structure the earth. The third transgresses
the legal, political and actuarial controls exercised over bodies, and instantiated
in various forms of property law. The fourth refuses to recognise the borders
distinguishing mine from thine. This paper is an intervention in contemporary
political philosophy, seeking to redraw the philosophical analysis of politics, with
reference to a politics of what is proper.
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Curtis Forbes
curtisjosephforbes@nospamgmail.com
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Abstract
This paper is a reappraisal of scientific realism's capacities as a resource for critical analysis of science's role in modern society.
Debates over scientific realism have raged within the humanities for more than half a century. Many different responses have been made by scientific realists to the claims of anti-realists, mostly focused on disputing the metaphysical and factual claims made by anti-realists (e.g. about the nature of reality, or the methods governing theory acceptance and data collection in science). Few defenses of scientific realism, however, have aimed to demonstrate its potential a resource for social critique and praxis. This ignores the fact that most anti-realist, social constructivist accounts of science were borne of sociological efforts to provide such critical perspectives on the place of modern science in society. It also gives the impression that scientific realism is, in fact, fundamentally non-critical, perhaps even complicit in the ideological mechanisms of social injustice.
It has often been argued that some form of metaphysical and ontological relativism is a methodological necessity for sociologists of scientific knowledge, for without such an anti-realist perspective they are supposedly incapable of giving a naturalistic explanation of how and why scientific beliefs and doctrines change over time (Shapin 1995, 292). Thus, for the most part, sociologists of scientific knowledge have adopted such an anti-realist perspective, especially those critical of science's place in modern society. Many such critics go so far as to accuse scientific realism of legitimating and perpetuating "scientism," an unjust epistemic hegemony that furthers social injustice. As such, only an anti-realist view of science, it is often assumed, could ever serve as a resource for critically analyzing the specific role played by science in perpetuating social injustice.
I argue against the view that scientific realism cannot usefully inform critical, sociological analysis of science's place in modern society. With the concepts of idealization and perspectival knowledge now well-developed within realist philosophy of science (e.g. in Giere 2006 and Chakravartty 2007), today's scientific realism proves very capable of framing critical discussions about the ideological role and social context of modern scientific representation. To demonstrate scientific realism's critical capacity I give a distinctly realist account of the roles played by specific scientific representations in producing and sustaining modern social hegemonies. I argue that specific scientific representations facilitate hegemonic social forces when epistemic authority is unwarrantedly used to uphold idealized representations (whose partiality inevitably reflects particular goals and values) as fundamental and indisputable truths. This constitutes a significant step forward for scientific realism, making clear that sociologists of science and would-be science critics need not turn to anti-realism as a matter of course.
Works Cited
Shapin, S. (1995) "Here and Everywhere: Sociology of Scientific Knowledge" in Annual Review of Sociology, 21, 289-321.
Giere, R. (2006), Scientific Perspectivism, Chicago, Chicago University Press.
Chakravartty, A. (2007), A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Marisa Forbes
marisa.forbes@nospamyahoo.com
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Abstract
Living in a 'rights-based' era has pushed the focus away from community building to the needs (and wants) of the individual. As such, the debate of what are our natural rights has taken us far away from the goal of societies which is ever increasing with globalization. The world is becoming one big society but the focus is getting smaller.
This mistake is leading us astray as there can be no natural rights: rights are based on geo-politics and therefore change with the types or society and with the changes that occur in society. If rights were a natural phenomenon they would be instinctive for everyone and the United Nations would have no need to formulate what rights are natural or should be universal. What we refer to as natural rights are mere priviledges that differ from society to society, none that could accurately be termed "natural".
Analyzing this issue using the phenomena of globalization; politics within borders; Plato's Laws and Jamaica's constitution has brought me to the conclusion that natural rights cannot exist, except in theory.
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Clevis Headley
headley@nospamfau.edu
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Abstract
In Anglo-American political philosophy, the dominant philosophical perspective is one of political liberalism. Political liberalism, among other things, considers the individual as primary; society then is merely an aggregate of individuals and not an organic unity of interdependent selves. Furthermore, political liberalism glorifies the rights of individuals, for individuals so conceived are the primary bearers of rights. And finally, individuals are conceived as autonomous, rational, self-interested individuals, although this is by no means the ultimate characteristic of political liberalism. On this view, individuals are primarily defined in terms of these normative qualities, as opposed to accidental features of race, sex, class, national origins, and cultural tradition.
In this essay, I will critically evaluate certain limitations of political liberalism and of political philosophy. I will utilize the case of reparations for African Americans to illustrate, among other things, why political liberalism is incapable of serving as a plausible conceptual scheme whereby African Americans can render their socio-political condition intelligible and communicable.
I do not intend to argue that African Americans are not entitled to reparations. Indeed, the history of the social existence of African Americans in American society is one of unimaginable suffering, a historical situation that cries out for justice. Instead, following Miranda Fricker, I will use the notion of hermeneutical injustice to establish that African Americans lack access to the appropriate language needed to effectively describe their condition and, consequently, are the victims of a vicious epistemic injustice. In other words, my claim is that political liberalism is ill equipped to provide African Americans with the epistemological resources necessary for them to illuminate their condition and to argue for some kind of rectification.
Finally, I will employ the notion of disciplinary decadence, as conceived by Lewis Gordon, to suggest a way beyond the theoretical inertia of political philosophy. I will offer some brief considerations to render political philosophy and, more specifically, political liberalism more relevant to the African American condition.
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Bryce Henson
bryce.henson@nospamgmail.com
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Abstract
A recent article entitled “Deadly Games” from ESPN’s Outside the Lines examines the two worlds of Rio de Janeiro as the “Marvelous City” prepares for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics. These two worlds are the antithesis to each other. One world is the beautiful beaches of Copacabana and Ipanema and the beautiful modern skyline, while the other world is the favelas in the hills, under the supervision of drug traffickers and gangs. As Costa Vargas (2004) informs us, a hyperconsciousness of race, but negation in everyday discourse is common in Brazil. That stated, nowhere in the article does the author writes about race; missing an opportunity to debunk Brazil’s claim to a “Racial Democracy” and bring about an open and meaningful discussion about race in the country with the world’s second largest African population.
In this article, I analyzed the spatiality of race relations in three Brazilian films (City of God, City of Men, and Elite Troop) that take place in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro through semiotics and post-structural frameworks. In these films, I see the favela as the site of Blackness juxtaposed to the city as a site of Whiteness and am interested in the ethnoracial composition of each world’s residents in addition to their daily activities. However unlike ESPN’s author, I do not see these as separate entities, but rather sites that operate like a Chinese finger trap, in that the further they are away from each other, the tighter they become bounded to one another. Therefore, I’m also interested in the ebb and flow between the favela with its Blackness and the city’s inherent Whiteness. How does issues such as region, class, and occupation embroider a more complex society in the highly miscegenated Brazil? I seek to unravel the intricacies of these issues in three of contemporary Brazil’s popular and internationally well-known films
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Anne Hewitt
ashewitt@nospamgmail.com
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Abstract
Aristotle famously wrote that 'law is mind/wisdom (nous) without passion/desire (orexeus)', yet the Athenian democracy was far more open to allowing a range of varied evidence into its courts, evidence that could, and in fact often seemed aimed at, eliciting particular emotions in the jurors that might influence their judgements. Through an examination of arguments by orators, through dramatic representations of justice, along with an analysis of the structure and procedures of the Athenian People's Court (dikasteria), this paper will address the positive role emotion might play in finding and understanding justice.
Emotion is often viewed as inimical to justice and paired instead with opinions and judgements marred by partiality, bias, and prejudice. My aim is not to undermine this view in its entirety, rather, through the illuminating historical example of Classical Athens, I want to explore how emotion might be incorporated into legal reasoning, into the courts, into our political theories and practices in such a way as to hone and enhance our ideas about what is just and how we might realize it.
To this end, I will consider questions such as: to what extent might an emotional plea distort our capacity to judge fairly the facts of a case, and to what extent might emotion illuminate something crucial to our understanding of what has happened and where responsibility might lie? What place, if any, do pity, compassion, love, and disgust play in application of the law? Are emotions involved in our capacity to be sensitive to crucial particularities that make mechanical imposition of general laws unjust?
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Kevin Layne
krlayne@nospamgmail.com
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Abstract
The CSME (Caribbean Single Market and Economy), as established by the members of CARICOM (Caribbean Community), has as its main focus the uniting of the region into one economic space, much like what has been done in Europe. The main elements cited by the CSME according to the CARICOM official website are:
- Free movement of goods and services
- Right of Establishment
- A Common External Tariff
- Free Circulation
- Free movement of Capital
- A common trade policy
- Free movement of labour
While the first six (6) of these elements listed can be established via a legal framework, the seventh presents a different challenge. While it too can be can be set up via political and legal methods, its acceptance by the citizens of the individual states requires a fundamental shift in the mentality of said citizens. As it stands, each member state within CARICOM has a nationalistic bent, due in part to the fact that there is a real border (the sea), which restricts migration unlike the imaginary lines that divide the countries in Europe. While there are nationalistic and cosmopolitan arguments that can be made concerning the free movement of labour within CARICOM, there is no doubt that in order for the small developing states that make up CARICOM to survive, there must be a much closer unity in order for their voices to be heard.
I argue that the current method of conveying the message of the benefits of CMSE is deeply flawed. Economics alone cannot be portrayed as the main driving force behind coming together. Also, the current method of choosing who can and cannot currently freely move between territories can easily be seen as creating a tiered system of "haves" and "have-nots", and can be seen as elitist. Rather than furthering the cause of CSME, I argue that these can and will have the reverse effect of destroying CSME. I present the argument that in order for CSME to work, a much more philosophical approach is needed. Citing the works of H. Odera Oruka and Fredrick Ochieng'-Odhiambo, I suggest that the concept of sage philosophy is one methodology that could be employed. In order for CSME to succeed, it needs to be sold at a grassroots level, and in order to do that in an environment like CARICOM that tends to have a nationalistic slant, the commonality between the territories must be accentuated. Two of those commonalities are the shared colonial history as well as the local wisdoms that each territory has. I argue that if these two are used as the starting point, especially highlighting the ideas and ideals that are shared across the region, and using that as the backbone of any impetus for CSME, then the initiative may have a chance. Without the acceptance and toleration of the free movement of persons across the region by the general populace in each territory, no matter how many other economic initiatives are put in place, CSME is doomed to fail and possibly cripple any further initiatives at uniting the region by CARICOM.
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Peta-Ann Long
narielp@nospamgmail.com
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Abstract
"We in the Caribbean would regard ourselves as part African, part European, part Asian, part native American but totally Caribbean. That is extremely difficult to understand for those who are accustomed to exercising power, because homogeneity has been the principal social organization in such civilizations, whereas heterogeneity is a principle of social organization as we see it."
Professor Rex Nettleford
The "melting pot" analogy used to describe the Caribbean states, presents a unique illustration of the future world that the philosophy of globalisation seeks to usher in. Unlike thriving More Developed States, the Developing States of the Caribbean have to move beyond the socio-political issues inherited by its history. In a bid to achieve this "More-Developed" state, countries like Jamaica have strategized and debated plans and prospects that they deem necessary to move the country forward.
However, critical analysis of the current situation of any society would highlight the issues that need be addressed before progress can be made. The proposed goal must be informed by a fundamental understanding of the historical and psychological issues that contribute to the social structure of Developing States like those in the Caribbean.
Additionally, an examination of the traditional political ideologies that have been adapted and applied to 'third world' political structures must incorporate the trend and influence of globalization and the issues of the Borderless Global Community and Changing Structures.
My position is simply that the role and purpose of government in the developing world is significantly different from that of the 'More Developed Countries', particularly regarding issues to of development. One needs to understand the cultural, political and economic ideologies, and sift out what is pragmatic for the developing world, thereby creating models that are applicable to the peculiar circumstances of these societies.
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Kahiudi Mabana
kahiudi.mabana@nospamcavehill.uwi.edu
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Abstract
As several postcolonial scholars - such as Charles Forsdick, David Murphy, Jean-Marc Moura, Corcoran Emily Apter, Homi Bhabha or Gayatri Spivak - have shown, the link between French Francophone Studies and Postcolonialism raises many theoretical issues, which need to be clarified and deeply considered. Postcolonial theory stems from the Anglo-American tradition and is relatively recent compared with the old Francophonie since the neologism was created in 1886 by Onésime Reclus. Its praxis precedes and overtakes any chronological limits, any temporal boundaries. Although postcolonial theory was initially inspired by the input of French or francophone scholars like Sartre, Foucault, Memmi, Césaire, Fanon, Derrida, etc. in American and British scholarship, Francophone studies do not fit in the postcolonial framework as easily as one would wish, because of their specificity and pecular development conditioned by the French linguistic rigidity and the French hegemonic establishment.
Official Francophonie still sticks to French language/culture and maintains its links to France as nation state whereas postcolonialism goes beyond the language-nation-state framework in order to generally deal with issues such as exile, migration, races, minorities' culture, cultural hybridity or hybridization, notions of identity and nationalities, and feminism, without necessarily refering them to the eurocentric or nationalist vision of the Western theoretical and rhetorical discourse. This explains why French studies have been namely replaced by Francophone Postcolonial Studies in several Anglo-American universities. Therefore writing in French in a postcolonial context becomes an act of subversion or denial of the French standard language, a decentring from the mainstream speech of the Paris establishment. The emergence in 2007 of the concept of Littérature-monde disturbed the French and Francophonie establishment to the extent that President Sarkozy could humoristically claim "Francophonie sauvée par l'Amérique" [Francophonie saved by America] (Le Monde, March 2007).
In short, there is in France a crisis intrinsic to Francophonie at the political and cultural level since it excludes non-French citizens while trying to incorporate them in the cultural sphere. The concepts of Francophone Postcolonial Studies and Littérature-monde form part of attempts to go around the dichotomy French vs Francophone, Centre vs Periphery. The postcolonial approach stems from a political perception of literary criticism as indicated by the title of Charles Forsdick "Challenging the monolingual, subverting the monoculture: the strategic purposes of Francophone Postcolonial Studies". My paper will aim to update this complex debate and, maybe, suggest some reflections from a literary and philosophical point of view.
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Roger Marples
R.Marples@nospamroehampton.ac.uk
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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to determine the nature, justification and limits of toleration
within a liberal multicultural society. While the value of toleration in the context of
cultural diversity is more than a pragmatic means to securing a modus vivendi
between groups with different and sometimes radically opposed conceptions of the
good, its value is not as foundational as a number of liberal philosophers would have
us believe; as a liberal value it is one amongst many. Equally fundamental values are
those of personal autonomy and respect for persons, and philosophers wedded to the
view that the defining characteristic of a liberal state is its commitment to the
principle of neutrality, whereby it should refrain from promoting any particular
conception of the good, all too readily assume that a ‘perfectionist’ alternative
committed to citizens’ autonomy and the securement of its necessary conditions, has
fewer liberal credentials. The political liberalism articulated by, amongst others, John
Rawls, Bruce Ackerman and Charles Larmore, is not only inadequate as a solution to
the question of where the limits to toleration should be demarcated, it is ultimately
both theoretically incoherent and impossible in practice. In particular, the ‘political
virtues’ to which Rawls is committed in Political Liberalism require a civic
education, non-neutral in aim and necessarily committed to favouring the cultivation
of personal autonomy as something more than an unintended side-effect of a neutrally
justified public policy. Rawls’s political liberalism unavoidably collapses into a form
of comprehensive liberalism. Political liberalism’s attempt to limit restrictions to
toleration by reference to circumstances likely to undermine autonomy in the political
sphere alone, ignores the extent to which autonomy is an ideal appropriate to every
area of life and, in so doing, is more likely to find itself in the uncomfortable position
of condoning many intolerable practices perpetuated by illiberal groups
unsympathetic to the liberal ideal of the freedom to form and revise one’s own
conception of the good life.
The more comprehensive liberalism favoured by Will Kymlicka and Joseph Raz, is
right in grounding toleration on the value of autonomy rather than neutrality. While
differing over the extent to which the state should promote worthwhile forms of life,
they are correct in their endorsement of a limited degree of state perfectionism and
the importance of cultural membership to the formation of autonomous choices.
However, in spite of the significance they accord to self-determination, their
commitment to the preservation and protection of cultural groups leads them to ignore
the degree to which illiberal groups undermine the autonomy of women as well as the
burgeoning autonomy of children. As such they are both guilty of over-extending the
boundaries of toleration in relation to illiberal groups within a liberal society.
The paper concludes by demonstrating that the harm principle – so frequently invoked
by liberals since Mill, as a criterion by reference to which the limits to toleration may
be determined - has a demonstrable utility when the ways in which it is intimately
related to autonomy-retarding practices associated with certain cultural and religious
groups, are fully appreciated. Such an appreciation provides the justification of a
much greater degree of state intervention in the lives of cultural or religious groups
than any of the political theorists mentioned above would allow.
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Sandra McCalla
oneras1973@nospamyahoo.com
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Abstract
We will seek to argue in this essay that, although individuals subject to a government usually have an obligation to obey particular laws they have no prima facie obligation to obey all laws. For the purpose of this paper prima facie obligation and prima facie duty will be used interchangeably. A prima facie obligation/duty will be viewed as one that must be fulfilled unless it conflicts on a particular occasion with an equal or stronger obligation. Although there are some legal obligations that are weaker than others we will maintain that as long as the laws surrounding these are fair then human beings have an obligation to obey. One needs to be cognizant of the fact however that some laws are unjust, this would beg the question as to what extent if any is one obligated to conform to those unjust laws and how do we adequately identify such laws?
We will explore the above mentioned views with the ideology purported by Rawl's and the idea of fair play in mind. He conceives of legal systems, at least those in democratic societies as, "complex practices of the kind which gives rise to the obligation of fair play; [a fundamental obligation, not derived from utility or from mutual promise or consent] and he concludes that those who benefit from such legal systems have a prima facie duty to obey their laws." To what extent is this plausible; are the laws in every democratic society just?
Some views held by W.D Ross will also be explored. He warns us not to construe prima facie duties as 'things' which appear to be duties but are not in reality such. He contends that this would be a complete misinterpretation of his view. Ross insists that when an act is a prima facie duty, this is an objective fact about it - it is a duty. Its 'prima facie' character comes from considering the action in this single light alone. While we agree with Ross that overridability of a prima facie duty does not imply that it lacks moral weight, we disagree with the six classes of these duties that he purport as some of these are not separate but interrelated. We will also argue unlike Ross that these duties or obligations are subjective rather than objective due to the moral and cultural underpinnings. Also, an objective 'prima facie duty' would be a contradiction in turn.
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Michael Monahan
michael.monahan@nospammarquette.edu
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Abstract
The critical-theoretical literatures on race, gender, class, and ability make common appeal to the notion of privilege. There is male privilege, white privilege, class privilege, heterosexual privilege, and ability privilege, all of which are understood in relation to some corresponding oppressed group(s). In the broadest terms (the particulars of which will of course vary from group to group, and even case to case), the concept of privilege is meant to capture the benefits that accrue to these dominant groups as a result of the ongoing exploitation and oppression of the dominated groups. Such benefits may be material, psychological, epistemic, aesthetic, or symbolic (this list is not intended to be exhaustive), and privileged individuals need not even be aware of them, let alone affirm them. While the development of theoretical accounts of privilege has been a crucial advance in our understanding of oppression, this paper will argue that current articulations of the concept can obscure as much as they illuminate. More specifically, the concept of privilege is presumed to operate within an economy of scarcity that fundamentally misconstrues the relationships between the privileged group(s) and the oppressed group(s). By drawing out and critically appraising this implicit account of scarcity, I will argue that, while the concept of privilege does not need to be abandoned altogether, it needs to be seriously reconfigured in order to better facilitate our understanding of oppression. Because my own work has focused primarily on racial oppression, I will appeal primarily to the concept of white privilege for my analysis, though I believe that the implications here will extend beyond the specific context of race.
The discourse of white privilege emerged in large part in an effort to capture the more implicit and unconscious manifestations of racial oppression, as opposed to more overt and explicit expressions. Thus, there are avowed white supremacists on the one hand, those who openly and consciously affirm racial oppression (even if they might not themselves understand it as oppressive), while on the other hand there are those who may have no overt or explicit oppressive attitudes or actions, but nevertheless implicitly support and/or benefit from the larger social context of oppression. Shannon Sullivan has referred to this distinction as that between "white supremacy" on the one hand, which "refers to conscious, deliberate forms of white domination," and "white privilege" on the other hand, which refers to the unconscious habits that support and affirm white normativity and domination over and against nonwhites (2006, 5). In this way, privilege is meant to point toward a kind of condition that certain people inhabit as much as it does an attitude that they possess or an action they undertake. Consequently, it is (at least partially) divorced from intentionality in a way that more overt forms of oppression are not. The concept of privilege thus provides a means to capture the way in which oppression can function at the unconscious, habitual, unintentional level. It makes it possible the describe a world in which oppression can continue to thrive even if all the beneficiaries of those relations of oppression are well-intentioned. One can thus be privileged as a consequence of racism independent of one's desires, attitudes, or actions. This is a very important development that needs to be preserved.
Nevertheless, while the idea of privilege offers this important conceptual tool in understanding oppression, it is not without its weaknesses, both theoretical and more practical/rhetorical. As Lewis Gordon has observed, the concept of privilege, as it is applied in the context of race, does not distinguish between those benefits which are in a sense owed to all (he refers to them as "human rights"), and those benefits which are luxuries secured only through the domination and exploitation of others (2004). Take the paradigmatic example of whites being generally free from the unwarranted scrutiny of store security. Is this the "privilege" of not being followed and viewed as always-already under suspicion of shoplifting, or is it rather the "right" of being regarded as innocent until such suspicion is justified? That is, does the injustice here (the oppressive aspect) lie in whites not being followed, or rather in nonwhites being followed? What about access to health care and education? Surely the problem here is in the fact that nonwhites are deprived of these social goods, not that whites (as part of their white privilege) have access to them. Gordon sums this point up as follows: "[The concept of white privilege] requires condemning whites for possessing, in the concrete, features of contemporary life that should be available to all, and if this is correct, how can whites be expected to give up such things? (2004, 176)" But what Gordon does not take into account is the role that scarcity can play in the evaluation of such examples.
To sketch this argument very briefly: the idea that access to health care or education are "privileges" might be more plausible if they are the sorts of social goods that operate within an economy of scarcity. If it is necessary in order for whites to enjoy the the levels of health care and education that they presently have access to that nonwhites have proportionately lower levels, then health care and education are indeed benefits of oppression that whites enjoy at the expense of nonwhites. White benefit in this way can only be secured through nonwhite deprivation. However, if this is the case, then the distinction between white supremacy and white privilege seems to rely on both a robust distinction between doing and allowing on the one hand, and a rather liberal allowance for white ignorance on the other. Both of these assumptions are contentious, given the vigorous debate about so-called negative responsibility as regards the former, and the racist phenomenon of the "epistemology of ignorance" on the other (c.f. Sullivan and Tuana, 2007). If we take the notions of the epistemology of ignorance and negative responsibility seriously, then what we now think of as "white privilege" is better understood as white supremacy in a self-deceptive guise of passivity and (effectively deliberate) ignorance. It seems less plausible, in other words, that my enjoyment of these benefits is best understood as a kind of condition of white privilege, rather than and exercise in white supremacy. At the same time, if health care and education do not function within an economy of scarcity, if it is the case that nonwhites can have increased access to these social goods without proportionately reducing the access of whites, then it is surely the case that the present inequality is not so much a privilege enjoyed by whites as it is the structural deprivation of the fundamental rights of nonwhites, which is surely better understood as a practice of white supremacy than a benefit of white privilege. Ultimately, this paper will argue that "privilege" marks at best only a particular style of oppression, but there is no difference in kind.
Works Cited
Gordon, Lewis R. 2004. Critical Reflections on Three Popular Tropes in the Study of Whiteness. In What White Looks Like: African-American Philosophers on the Whiteness Question. Ed. George Yancy. New York: Routledge. 173-193
Sullivan, Shannon. 2006. Revealing Whiteness: The Unconscious Habits of Racial Privilege. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Sullivan, Shannon and Nancy Tuana, eds. 2007. Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance. Albany: State University of New York Press.
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Kasper Mosekjær
kaspermo@nospamruc.dk
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Abstract
In this paper I analyze the concept of emergency within the debate of "war on terror". In the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, it have often been argued that when emergencies strike the balance between civil liberties on the one hand and security on the other shifts so a decrease in civil liberties can be justified with reference to the increase in the threat against security. I will argue that the argument for a decrease in civil liberties with a reference to emergency constitutes a misleading simplification of what is at stake. My argument is two-fold. Firstly, I will show that it is hard, if not impossible, to come up with a definition of emergency that will capture all of the cases we tend to see as emergencies and, furthermore, that a definition will fail to show what we understand by the essence of emergency. Either it will be too broad and cover too many diverse scenarios or it will be too narrow and be nothing more than a list of specific scenarios. Secondly, it will be argued that even if one could find a definition that would somehow satisfy our requirements, this would at best be practical unimportant in the discussion of the balance between security and civil liberties. I will argue, by referring to how and why it is relevant to balance civil liberties and security against each other, that a mere reference to emergency cannot do the job, when there is an increase in the threat against security. Civil liberties and legal rights are often understood as basic rights that cannot be fortified unless there's something big at stake. When civil liberties are overridden it must be done in proportionality with the threat to security, which means that the threat to security must be as specific as possible. This cannot be done, I will argue, under reference to an overall conception of emergency. In conclusion, measures against emergencies must, in the light of the seriousness of the practical dilemma, be measures taken in accordance to the specific threat against security.
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Bill Puka
billpuka@nospamgmail.com
Unable to attend
Abstract
A two part discussion relating two phenomena: the first, democracy in relation and contrast to either the political republic or oligarchy surrounding it, and the second, democracy in historically tribal groups, as in some societies of Northern and Eastern Africa--Libya and Uganda especially, and Nigeria in West. Considered: why no form of centralized political organization can be a democracy. This was originally recognized in forming the United States. Here government was designated to defend and administrator democratic social organization, handling undemocratic adjudications of failures in democracy, and in an undemocratic way. Yet everywhere, most in scholarly works, one sees democracy contrasted on par with autocracy, oligarchy, plutocracy and theocracy. Democracy usually is alive and flourishing in politically repressive autocratic nations in a variety of voluntary social institutions and practices, no government regulation needed. The reason democracy is more easily advanced within tribal groups is because tribal groups already possess the sense of cohesion and tradition to bring social coordination and stability bottom up, without reverting to state police powers. Holistic and diverse societies have already developed strong national identities, pushed pervasively by an oligarchical government holding questionable elections and stifling dissent. This national identity is considered a must (even by outside AID groups, of a political liberal bent) for developing powerful state institutions key to social stability. One can see this in Uganda, Nigeria and other nations where stability and repression arise in tandem with no movement to try social stability through democratic institutions. Hold a vote and electing a parliament is the key to democracy as other states see it, and is held high as a triumph of democracy. But the sort of democracy demanded in recent North-African revolutions--in Tunisia and Egypt, for example, where the population claimed that "we are the country"--never seems to be gained in this way. And this is no surprise. Once emphasis is placed upon national identity and political democracy, democracy is under siege. Attempts to create bottom-up small enough forms of social organization to allow mutual self-government--government of, by and for the people where the people rule and the leaders follow, ministering to and serving them--is squashed. It is portrayed as rebellious, insurrectionist and anti-nation. If social groups can not stop power-mongers from creating a centralized state, top down, the chance to create viable social democracy is greater. But bottom up institutions and their social formation usually can not compete with the enforced institutions legally and officially imposed by the state, the further supported by official indoctrination. We see this currently in Uganda and Nigeria, not to mention Libya. Still, when one contrasts protection for individual rights, the creation of private spheres of discretion in society, with the mutual self-determination that is democracy, it is not clear that the latter is really wanted or preferred to benevolent oligarchy, or that it has been seriously tried.
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Elaine P. Rocha
rochaep@nospamyahoo.com
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Abstract
Almost forty years ago Evelyn P. Stevens published Marianismo: the other face of machismo in Latin America, an article that would heavily influence historians in Latin America because it analyzed the strong role of religion in the definition of gender roles in Latin America. According to the author, the Catholic emphasis in Mary as the virgin mother was useful to impose moral decency and sexual control over women, preaching for their submission to male’s authority. As a consequence, the roles of machos were the other face of the same myth: patriarchal power and free sexuality. However, new historiography has called for a review in the interpretation of the roles of women in Latin America. From colonial period to modern times, the worshiping of Mary has supported women warriors, like the soldaderas in Mexico, it has supported women’s struggle for better education, and more recent, the struggle of the mothers of political prisoners in Argentina, for example. Moreover, the roles of Catholicism in Latin America must be understood with the resistance to the religious colonization that gave Latin American Catholicism diverse versions depending on the African or indigenous influence. This paper proposes to analyze Stevens’ thesis under the perspective of gender and race in social and political context, exposing the complexity of Latin American devotion to the Virgin Mother.
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Brian Smith
bsmith@nospamsuffolk.edu
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Abstract
This paper attempts to make sense of collective responsibility in a way that circumvents some of
the limitations of the contemporary philosophical approach, which tends to focus on collective
delineation, guilt ascription, and the project of quantifying just how distributive blame is among
members of a collective. By appealing to thinkers like Karl Jaspers, Hannah Arendt, and Richard
Rorty, this paper argues that collective responsibility is best seen as a pragmatic posit that can be
used for enhancing our moral outlook. Part of this pragmatic approach is to think of collective
responsibility in the vein of what Jaspers calls “political guilt” and “metaphysical guilt”—that is,
political guilt speaks to the degree to which a collective is held responsible while metaphysical
guilt speaks to the degree to which a collective holds itself responsible. This paper argues that it
is most effective to think of collective responsibility in the vein of metaphysical guilt, which is
best understood as eliciting creative and discursive strategies to cope with the shame and guilt
that inevitably come with being human. These are the various ways in which we come to terms
with the troubling fact that wrongs are committed for our benefit, on our behalf, in our names,
and in our presence with disconcerting regularity.
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Frej Klem Thomsen
fkt@nospamruc.dk
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Abstract
In this article I critically examine a standard feature in conceptions of discrimination which I dub the group criterion, specifically the idea that there is a limited and definable group of traits which can form the basis of discrimination and by implication the notion that discrimination cannot occur on the basis of other traits. I illustrate the prevalence of this assumption and then review two types of argument for the criterion. One focuses on inherently relevant groups and relies ultimately on luck-egalitarian principles; the other focuses on contextually relevant groups and relies ultimately on the badness of outcomes. I demonstrate that the first type has problems fitting standard intuitions about groups that are central to discrimination and connecting a stable list of prohibited traits with luck-egalitarianism. I then demonstrate that the second type can only succeed by introducing a threshold that is difficult to justify. I conclude that as neither type of argument is convincing the distinction introduced by the criterion is morally arbitrary, and as such the criterion is untenable. Finally, I sketch some of the both conceptual and practical implications of abandoning the criterion, including how it affects the wrongness of discrimination, the concept of indirect discrimination and the legal prohibition against discrimination.
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Bianca Torchia
btorch@nospamuvic.ca
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Abstract
My project in this paper is to explore the concept of truth as employed by truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) or analogous bodies that have been established after human rights violations in transitional states. One consistent assumption behind the transitional attempt to deal with past atrocities has been the rejection of national amnesia through the insistence that the truth about such atrocities become a part of public awareness. Thus, truth and reconciliation commissions act to document and acknowledge the legacy of conflict and human rights abuses in countries that are struggling to overcome a heritage of collective violence. These commissions mirror more formal judicial bodies as they can investigate conflicts, hear testimony and act within a specified national and temporal jurisdiction. However, truth and reconciliation commissions have no power to prosecute nor can they act as as judicial bodies to investigate those accused of crimes, making these commissions distinct from criminal trials. Because of the non-judicial nature of these commissions, the judicial expectation that these commissions deal with the "truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" is misguided. Truth and reconciliation commissions reject the narrow rules of evidence that the Western law tradition requires, and instead TRCs accept opinion, hearsay and muddled intergenerational memory when hearing testimony. How then, without pressing witnesses for "just the facts", does a truth commission come to produce an authoritative account of a contested past? Rather, how does a TRC tell the truth? I argue that the final reports issued by truth and reconciliation commissions are, at best, approximations of the truth, as these reports are themselves idealizations. As Martin Jones' argues while discussing scientific representations, idealizations are strictly false representations that simplify a certain system in order to produce a better understanding of that system. Thus, any idealization is an approximation of the truth. Idealizations typically result in a more simple model of a system than would have been otherwise, so simplification is often the purpose of idealization in scientific representations. I argue that this element of simplification is crucial to the ways in which TRCs represent the history of a conflict through their final reports. I argue that the importance of simplification for these commissions is borne out of the relationship between TRCs and storytelling; stories told by TRCs are akin to stories told elsewhere, such as in newspaper articles. In order to provide a fair characterization of how events have unfolded, journalists must select what features of an event they include in their finished report so as not to lead the reader in an unintended direction. For example, in newspaper articles discussing rape, mention of the victim's revealing attire will provide the reader with questions regarding whether the sexual encounter could have been some way consensual. Similarly, TRCs reject the need for "the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" in simplifying their reports to include only details that lead readers to a fair understanding of the human rights abuses committed.
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