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CAVE HILL PHILOSOPHY SYMPOSIUM
This page contains all the abstracts accepted for the Symposium, and links to the full text when we have it. Please note that the texts are all in pdf format, for which you may need the Acrobat Reader, which can be acquired at Adobe.
Please note also that e-mail addresses have all been altered to include 'nospam' after the '@', so none of them will work as given.
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Briony Addey
brionyaddey@nospamyahoo.co.uk
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Abstract
One of the themes of the conference is the exploration of “the tensions that our ordinary commitments and values relating to freedom face when confronted by the results or assumptions of scientific enquiry.” One such tension is between the results and assumptions of behavioural genetics and ideas of freedom.
When the worry of genetic determinism is discussed with reference to human behaviour in popular debate, there seem to be three separate ideas which constitute it: i) the idea that the way in which genes give rise to phenotypic traits is deterministic (or at least more deterministic than the way environmental causal factors give rise to behavioural characteristics), ii) the idea that any genetically-based trait is immutable (or at least less mutable than environmentally-caused characteristic), and iii) the idea that because of the way genes influence human behaviour, human beings are not free.
My aim in this paper is to outline the primarily biological arguments used to dismiss the first two parts of genetic determinism and then critique the philosophical arguments that dismiss the third. I will argue that on the basis of these kinds of arguments we have dismissed too early the possible threat that genetic influences on behaviour pose for freedom and moral responsibility.
- A1: The Parity of Reasoning Argument. There is no principled difference between a) environmental causal influences and b) genetic causal influences on behaviour. We either have to worry about both a) and b) and their implications for freedom and moral responsibility or neither. We accept the fact that there are environmental causal influences on human behaviour and we don’t worry about their implications for freedom and moral responsibility, so we should take the same attitude about genetic causal influences.
- A2: The argument that whatever view ones takes on the compatibility of determinism and freedom, “the insertion of the word ‘genetic’ is not going to make any difference.”1 In other words i) if you are a hard determinist then specifying kinds of determinism won’t add anything to your case for universal determinism and it’s incompatibility with freedom. ii) if you are a Libertarian then freedom is already ruled out by environmental influences. iii) if you are a compatibilist and you think that universal determinism is compatible with freedom, then you must think that any specific kind of determinism must also be compatible.
I argue that A1 tacitly assumes that it is incompatibilist freedom (ultimate freedom) that we should be concerned with, and that if one assumes that then one can agree that there is no principled difference between environmental and genetic causal influences. However, I will argue that this may not be the case if we are concerned with compatibilist freedom.
I argue that while parts i) and ii) of A2 are right, part iii) goes wrong in categorising genetic causal influences as a species of determinism and thereby assuming it’s compatibility with freedom. Instead, it should be recognised that there are many kinds of causal influence regarded by compatibilists as ruling out freedom, and the possibility considered that genetic influences on behaviour could be similar to these causal influences in salient ways and might therefore pose a threat to compatibilist freedom.
I will conclude the paper by running through some suggestions by Patricia Greenspan of how we might approach further investigation of the possible threat posed by behavioural genetics and discuss which look the most plausible.
1 Richard Dawkins, Genetic Determinism and Gene Selectionism, in Genethics, ed. Justine Burley and John Harris (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 255.
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Surendra Arjoon
sarjoon@nospamfss.uwi.tt
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Abstract
This paper attempts to reconcile the person-situation-virtue ethics controversy that has spanned the past four decades. The main thesis advanced by situationist social psychologists is that behavior is explained by the situational features and that, essentially, character does not matter. A proper understanding of the situationist literature however, is not only that the situationists` thesis does not undermine a virtue ethics moral characterological psychology, but in fact, adds to our understanding of human behavior. Situationists propose a fragmentation theory of character (each person has a whole range of traits each with restricted situational application) and do not subscribe to a regularity theory of character (behavior is regulated by long term dispositions). In order to support this view, they cite a number of experiments. The substantive claims made by situationist social psychologist, for the most part, do not undermine or disagree with an Aristotelian virtue ethics perspective, but stems from a misunderstanding of concepts of moral character, faulty conclusions and generalizations of experimental results. Evidence from the organizational behavior and managerial research literature appears to support this view. Two related avenues for future research are suggested.
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Eddy Bermingham
deanofstudies@nospamregionalseminary.org
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Unfortunately this presenter is unable to attend.
Abstract
The notion of inscription has been deployed “fruitfully” by several Caribbean academics working in the field of Gender Studies. Their usage of this notion would seem to suggest that they are drawing quite heavily, either deliberately or inadvertently, on the work of Foucault. However, the fruitfulness of this notion needs to be considered within the context of the debates within feminism on Foucault’s thinking on the nature of freedom, subjectivity and agency. In particular, the question of whether, or to what extent, this notion has an inherently passive dimension to it needs to be addressed. So, when we talk of the body being “written upon” does this necessarily entail a body that is actively engaged in or by the process of inscription? Or rather, is the body unavoidably cast in the role of a passive tabla rasa. It is possible that the the notion of inscription must be used much more cautiously if it is not to function as a Trojan horse. Whereby, it appears to offer a way of understanding practices of social constraint but the very act of accepting the gift robs us of any genuine agency.
This paper will attempt to do three things. Firstly, outline some of the philosophical positions that can be identified within feminism with respect to the works of Foucault. Secondly, explore an inherent need for emancipatory projects and practices to develop a theory or theories of freedom, subjectivity and agency. Finally, recognising that as Foucault suggests “everything remains dangerous” I will offer some very tentative suggestions about how to continue to explore questions of freedom in the context of gender negotiations.
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April Bernard
abernard@nospamuwichill.edu.bb
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Abstract
This paper examines the terms negative and positive liberty; the former being the ability to achieve relative independence and the latter meaning the ability to transform or transcend one’s psyche beyond culturally and personally ascribed limitations and move toward authentic self-expression as women. The relevance of these terms in describing oppression and freedom for Caribbean women in the 21st century is assessed. This paper argues that a skewed definition of freedom has resulted in uneven achievements toward gender equality and reinforces patriarchal social constructs that contribute to the persistent subjugation of women in the region.
How we answer the questions about what oppresses women depends upon how we define freedom. Rather than pursuing analysis of what oppresses women, women and men are encouraged to look critically at their answer to the 21st century Caribbean Woman Question: What is the meaning of freedom? A new paradigm for defining freedom for Caribbean women is proposed, along with a blueprint and discussion of its relevance for development throughout the region and globally.
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Ed Brandon
edbrandon@nospamgmail.com
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Abstract
This paper asks whether the strategy of relativising our explicit thoughts about freedom and responsiblity is sufficient to dissolve Ted Honderich's latest worries about the consequences of determinism. It suggests that there is no straightforward way to show that there is an acceptable answer to Honderich. It briefly describes the relativising strategy and the assumptions it makes. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Roxanne Burton
roxanneeburton@nospamgmail.com
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Abstract
The African enslaved emancipation struggle, including the abolition of the trade in the British empire, was essentially one for self-determination by the enslaved. It is a struggle that still continues for various ethnic and cultural groups. But can this conception of freedom be used as a tool for understanding what Caribbean women seek to achieve?
To answer this question, I will first explore the concept of self-determination, highlighting that though discussed as a group right, its foundation must initially be seen as an individual endeavour. To that end, I will provide a scenario to explore the individual utilisation of self-determination by a Caribbean woman as a tool for answering two crucial questions; one ontological, the other moral. The rest of the discussion will then highlight how this individual exploration can be extrapolated to the group labelled Caribbean women.
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Maduabuchi Dukor
madudukor@nospamyahoo.com
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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to examine the concept of racism as it affects black African capacity for self determination in contemporary world. Slavery, ethnic conflicts, domination, discrimination prejudices are all symptoms . There is ample evidence showing that racism in terms of cultural achievements and genetic potentials is not real but illusion. Race category and reality of human life as a convenient instrument and ideology of oppression.
Racism in theory and practice is one phenomenon that has left Africans and the Negroes smarting and reeling under the technological or economic domination of Europe. Race problem, whether real or imagined is one of the greatest obstacles to African development and emancipation. Mankind certainly wallows and baths in the murky consciousness of racism with little or no knowledge of the implication.
It has been observed that any social explanation of the genesis of western racism must take three main factors into account. First, racism was congruent with prevailing form of capitalist exploitation and slavery in the new world and incipient colonial expansion in Africa. Secondly, the universalization and rapid spread of European culture have led to what I would call fetishization of western culture. This phenomenon goes a long way to rationalize the domination of the Africa and lastly, the quest for the domination of the black was systematically preceded by the ideological philosophy of Europe as superior race; western philosophers, especially of the Renaissance and modern periods contributed most to this ideology of dominations. Because of the philosophy of domination and superiority complete created by the enlightenment period and the subsequent emergence of ‘I’ and ‘centre ontologies, the Europeans embarked on the scramble for the colonialization and partitioning of Africa.
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Michael Fitzgerald
mikeatnus@nospamyahoo.ca
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Abstract
This paper examines some aspects of Heidegger’s engagement with the question of freedom following the publication of Being and Time, during what has been called his “metaphysical” decade (roughly 1928-38). My aim is to show how this engagement arises from the inquiries of his previous “phenomenological” decade, as a deepening of the radical, non-substantialist and non-anthropological sense of the finitude of the human situation. This sense of the freedom of finitude suggests a way in which to understand the human situation that both accounts for and yet transcends the desire for certainty found in the sciences. The question of freedom becomes fundamental to Heidegger’s thinking precisely because of its peculiar relation to phenomenological inquiry: the possibility of “relation to world, stance, and irruption”, as Heidegger puts it in “What is Metaphysics?” is attested to in such inquiry, which places the questioner in question, thus attesting to the freedom that grounds the comportment of questioning. The sense of freedom that Heidegger seeks to articulate here, then, is the “freedom of finitude”, which I argue means the freedom that gives rise to finitude, not vice versa. The “ontologization of freedom” that Heidegger engages in, arguably throughout his career, is not an “ontology of freedom” in a substantialist sense, as if the inquiry were intended to articulate what freedom is. Rather, exploration, inquiry and disclosure in the phenomenological sense are the very phenomena that disclose how being is grounded in, or originates from, the finitude of freedom, and thus allow for the articulation of our finite relation to world and its transcendence in such inquiry itself.
The connection I want to draw between the inquiries that lead up to Being and Time and those that follow it has to do with Heidegger’s articulation of the radical uncertainty of our finitude, which he argues is made possible by, or is a possibility of, freedom. Indeed, this uncertainty is the phenomenon of freedom, i.e., the freedom of the finite. Philosophical inquiry, at least in the form of phenomenological hermeneutics, seeks to hold open this uncertainty, particularly in the face of the scientific or theoretical attitude, found equally in the natural and the human sciences, which seeks to reduce uncertainty. In view of the nexus of freedom, finitude and uncertainty, then, it could be argued that the sciences, in seeking certainty, aim correlatively at “infinitization” or universalization, and consequently at the foreclosure of the very freedom that makes possible the scientific stance towards beings itself.
To illustrate this, I look briefly at the notion of development, which the human scientific approach seeks to bind to the past in a way that forestalls the re-appropriation of our history in ever-new, unprecedented ways. In the theoretical determination of how past development has occurred, a “will to manage” the future manifests itself. Such an attitude conceals the freedom of finitude that makes it possible, and hence the possibility of free development.
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Stephen Geofroy
sgeofroy@nospamfhe.uwi.tt
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Abstract
Like other thinkers before him, and in company with many post-moderns, Richard Rorty claims that human beings have no essential nature to be true to. 'Our uniqueness lies in the ability grounded in linguistic ability that allows us to create worlds through
redescriptions'.
Applied to the area of gender and to male gender identity in particular, interesting possibilities emerge for a conference dedicated to a consideration of aspects of freedom. A relevant approach is thus not to seek to discover some self-evident and unquestionable essence of what it means to be male, but rather to investigate and interrogate the precise configuration in which conceptions of maleness are constructed. In recent decades, the problematization of masculine gender constructions is a major issue in gender theory and has far-reaching implications for many spheres of life.
This paper explores historically constructed masculine gender identity in the Caribbean and emerging contemporary patterns. These have importance as they provide the ‘scripts’ that many young males feel obligated to conform to as they engage in a search for identity, belonging and personhood. Some available frames of reference may be quite liberating while others contribute to oppression and an accompanying diminishment of life possibilities. Particular gender roles, for example, have proven significant in the sphere of education as a factor in male academic underachievement and in the area of health as driving the epidemic of HIV.
On the macrolevel, hegemonic masculine construction has been connected to an overarching patriarchialism perceived as ‘an ideology that exerts a profound influence on the structure of society’ and imposes codes that influences the life of categories of persons considered as ‘Other’.
In contrast to some culturally discordant understandings of self and others offered by the constitution of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ that have emerged in Caribbean culture, this paper explores the possibility of a centered self and the importance of language and symbolic culture for what could be entailed in the path toward more liberating ‘redescriptions’ of masculinity for the contemporary Caribbean.
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Sirkku K. Hellsten
sirkku.hellsten@nospamformin.fi
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Unfortunately this presenter is unable to attend.
Abstract
The paper shows how poor governance and corruption have led into a vicious circle of mistrust and ethnic – rather than national – accountability, leaving many post-colonial African states fragile and unstable. Lack of public trust has made the state structures inefficient and (re)distribution of resources and service delivery unequal and biased by enforcing sub-national 'libertarian communitarian' politics that tends to understand autonomy, freedom and independence in terms of ethnic and regional self-interest rather than the common good of all citizens of post-colonial nations. The vicious circle of 'libertarian communitarianism' encourages corruption, nepotism, croyism, and other forms of favoritism, thus preventing developmental structures and political cooperation from working for the benefit of and freedom for all citizens. Rather it enforces the narrow advantage of the elites, as well as of those ethnically or otherwise close to them. This creates ‘a new type of prisoner’s dilemma’ set in a communal rather than individualistic context and limits the political freedom gained after independence.
In order to remedy the situation the paper suggest that first of all, there is a need to reconceptualize the idea of freedom and autonomy in the globalized context as well as to clear the confusion between the concepts of ‘state’ and that of ‘government’ in the minds of the citizens as well as the leadership. Secondly, the author argues that all parties need better to understand the complex historical, economic and social circumstances and transitional political arrangements in Africa since these have gradually led into ideological vacuum that diminishes ‘actual freedom’ and forces people to fit in tightly defined ethnic, communal, economic clicks which rather limit than enforce both individual autonomy and national integrity. They also enforce people to rely on private rather than public ethics and social networks for their wellbeing. Finally, the papers suggest that in order to gain real freedom and independence, new nations need to build up public trust so that they can enforce impartiality and to find new political directions with ethical underpinnings. This requires also that we need to invest more in reflective civic and professional ethics education that adopts a balanced view between political realism and idealism as the starting point for institutional reforms as well as for long term attitude- and behavior- change all that will together strengthen the state and guarantee more equal and impartial distribution or resources and services, and more efficient and accountable use of development funds. In order to tie my theoretical points to the practice I shall use Kenya as my case study.
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Volker Kaul
vkaul@nospamluiss.it
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Unfortunately this presenter is unable to attend.
Abstract
Most of contemporary postcolonial philosophers believe postcolonial self-constitution to be ‘multiple’ or ‘hybrid’. Aim of this paper is to refute the postmodern strains in postcolonial studies and to show that, on the contrary, postcolonial self-constitution is centered around strong identities. Analyzing postcolonial self-constitution in terms of identitarian hybridity is wrong, insofar as this incorrectly ignores the fundamental evaluative aspects of agency in self-constitution. It is the confrontation with and the rejection of colonialism that can be considered as the source of postcolonial self-constitution. Colonialism was built upon intellectual, cultural and moral differences among races, and in many respects the dignity of persons and their claims for recognition make (post-)colonial self-constitution a matter of strong identity. It are the collective identities of race, ethnicity, religion and nationalism which constitute the postcolonial self. The essay will conclude with the question if strong postcolonial identity can be considered as a foundation of autonomy.
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Kahiudi Mabana
k.mabana@nospamuwichill.edu.bb
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Abstract
The Congolese Tchicaya U Tam’Si (1931-1988) and the Kenyan Ngugi Wa Thiong’o (1938-) both occupy an interesting place in the Francophone and Anglophone African literatures. There are many similarities between them – starting with their names and going on to their sources of inspiration. They both share a unique fight for African authenticity and definitely an identical dream for an African continent free of Western cultural obstacles. Although Ngugi has theorized his Marxist conception in Decolonizing the mind, we will use more his novel Devil on the Cross and compare it to Tchicaya’s Bal de N’dinga. If the first book exposes the New Africa involved amid the trends of new religions, the second one is a novella that describes the murder of a young person who wants to fully enjoy the event of Congo’s independence. It is all about the paths Africans use to celebrate their liberation or symbolize their freedom. We will try to interpret the attempts by these writers to explore the ways by which simple Africans escape their daily existential challenges. The aim of this paper is to draw some philosophical reflections from these two plots.
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Roger Marples
R.Marples@nospamroehampton.ac.uk
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Abstract
This paper has the two-fold aim of being both critical and constructive; critical of the view that freedom is something explicable entirely in terms of the removal of constraints on a self-chosen course of action, and constructive in so far as it defends positive freedom as conceptually linked to personal autonomy. In so doing it links (contra Berlin) the nature of freedom to its value – as having more to do with the capacity and opportunities to choose from a range of significant alternatives than being merely unencumbered by constraints. Freedom is thereby shown to have a particular significance in the lives of persons on the grounds that it is a necessary condition of personal well-being.
Alternative possibilities may be identified in a variety of ways, but their criteria of significance are a function of something altogether less subjective than the fact that they are desired. Desire-satisfaction accounts of freedom and well-being derive their support from a familiar and widely held position within philosophical psychology in spite of the fact that it is based on little more than Humean dogma. It grants logical priority to desire over value and is thus unable to account for human interests and well-being in anything other than subjective terms with consequences that are both paradoxical and disturbing.
It is the principal task of the first part of this paper to reverse this order of priority and thereby account for well-being by reference to those interests in which a person may be said to have a genuine stake or interest, the absence of which are likely to result in personal harm. One such interest is that of personal autonomy. The relationship between autonomy’s value and significance in the life of a free person and the rights to which s/he is entitled are made explicit.
The second part of the paper attempts to locate freedom within a wider conceptual framework; especially the values associated with human rights, justice and democracy. In so doing, it will be made apparent why slavery is particularly invidious on the grounds that it is incompatible with the dignity and self-esteem associated with such values.
The paper concludes with an evaluation of the claim that many of the heirs and successors of those who were bought and sold as a commodity continue to be disadvantaged - not least in terms of educational opportunity, itself a powerful contributory factor in determining the extent of a person’s freedom and the opportunities presented for autonomous well-being. The extent to which affirmative action is appropriate and what form it might take is briefly addressed. In so doing, I hope to be able to undermine the fatuous distinction between freedom and the conditions of its exercise, which so many liberal political philosophers have been at pains to uphold.
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Michael J. Monahan
michael.monahan@nospammarquette.edu
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Abstract
Questions surrounding the ontological status of racial categories continue to vex philosophers of race, especially in the English-speaking world. The exact nature of the reality, or lack thereof, of race stands not only as an important metaphysical question in its own right, but informs moral, social, and political theory on a fundamental level. In this essay, I will use a particular historical moment to explore a set of responses to these basic issues surrounding the reality of race. Using the case of Irish transportation during the latter half of the seventeenth century to the West Indies, and Barbados in particular, I will explore some of the implications of treating race as an historical and socially contingent, yet nevertheless “real” category of being.
During this historical period, tens of thousands of Irish people came to the West Indies both as voluntary and involuntary indentures. In the beginning of the period in question, these new arrivals to the Caribbean seemed to occupy a dubious racial position somewhere between the Protestant, English-speaking (most of the Irish were not English speakers at this time) Scottish, Welsh, and English servants, freemen, and landholders on the one hand, and on the other hand the West African slaves who gradually came to dominate the labor pool during this period as the economy switched from tobacco to sugar production. From 1640 to 1680 on Barbados, there is some evidence of collaboration between Irish servants and African slaves in efforts to escape and even rebel, but by the end of the century even the fear on the part of the plantation owners of such cooperation seems to have dwindled away. One way to understand this shift is in terms of an increasing salience for white identity among the Irish on the island.
What lessons or implications for racial ontology can be drawn from this historical moment? One approach would be to claim that, since races are nothing but historically contingent categories organized around political hierarchies, this serves as another example of the Irish “becoming white” within a particular context. However, drawing in part upon the metaphor of racial “conjuring” offered by Barbadian philosopher Clevis Headley , I will argue against this interpretation. In its place I will offer an account in which this historical moment illustrates a contestation over the meaning of whiteness, rather than over who counts as white. In other words, the Irish in this case were, in a significant sense, white all along - the shift occurred when they began to endorse a particular understanding of what whiteness entails. I will conclude by pointing toward ways in which this interpretation has important implications for our thinking about questions of the moral and political status of race, especially as relates to “colorblindness” as both a practice and an ideal.
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Frederick Ochieng'-Odhiambo
fochieng@nospamuwichill.edu.bb
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Abstract
The paper examines the notions of international justice and individual self-preservation. The argument being that rigid adherence to the former could play against the latter. And this, it is asserted in the paper, is an undesirable state of affairs because basic human rights are inherent and absolute rights. One denied this right is likely to lose his/her capacity for a rational and self-conscious life. For any human being to function with a significant degree of rationality, self-consciousness and morality, he or she needs a certain minimum amount of physical security, health care, and subsistence. One cannot enjoy other rights if he/she is denied this right. The absolute nature of the right to individual self-preservation places an obligation on everyone to respect the right irrespective of geographical boundaries, religious affiliation, race, or ethnic group. Unfortunately, the relationship between the affluent countries and the so-called third world countries, because it is embedded on the notion of international justice, does not give due consideration to the principle of human minimum. The paper advances the position that to the principles of international justice should be added the principle of human minimum. This would ensure the desired relationship between the affluent nation-states and the poor ones.
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Oghenekaro Ogbinaka
karogbi@nospamyahoo.com
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Abstract
There is a way one could equate the notion of “freedom” with that of “enlightenment”. Immanuel Kant in answering the question what is enlightenment states that enlightenment is man’s emergence from [freedom] self-imposed minority. He goes on to assert that the motto of enlightenment is: “Have the courage [freedom] to use your own understanding!.” The idea of being courageous to take one’s destiny head on is crucial for all Africans in the quest to assert not only the African in its space as humans, but for the aim of all-round development of Africa and Africans. As Kant noted “it is most convenient to be a minor. If I have a book to reason for me, or a confessor to act as my conscience, or a physician to prescribe my diet, I need not take any trouble myself. As long as I can pay, I do not have to think. Others will spare me the tiresome necessity.”
This paper will explore this Kantian position by way of indexing it in the light of the African situation; against the backdrop of freedom from enslavement and political freedom.
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Paul Reynolds
Reynoldp@nospamedgehill.ac.uk
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Abstract
In this paper I want to reflect on the central paradox of being free,
which is that the price of freedom is often the unfreedom of others.
Certainly, in terms of global economic development, slavery and the
continuing centre-periphery dynamics of international capital, the human
consequences of free societies - both in their freedoms and liberties
and in the material contexts within which these freedoms have been
articulated - have been unfree societies and peoples. To have a
commitment to freedom as a human ideal is always to choose to constrain
autonomy and define parameters of unfreedom, and this agenda sits behind
contemporary ethical issues in respect of global environment,
inequalities and ideological conceptions of freedom.
Using liberal theory, Nietzsche and Sartre, I will explore the paradox
of the state of being 'unfree free' as an ethical position and as a
basis for a society or community within which freedom is a common
currency rather than an individual possession.
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Meghan A. Robison
robism01@nospamnewschool.edu
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Unfortunately this presenter is unable to attend. Abstract
Two hundred years after the British abolition of slavery, the categories of master and slave continue to play a predominant role in determining the meaning of freedom. Arguably, the most famous philosophical account of the master-slave relationship can be found in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, known as the master-slave dialectic. In that text, Hegel suggests that the experience of freedom emerges as the result of a complex process of recognition between two people who are originally related through bondage. Hegelian freedom is experienced through the working out of this dynamic, a dynamic whose structure is determined by dependence and whose movement is driven by necessity. After a brief look at this aspect of the master-slave dialectic I will explore two non-dialectical suggestions regarding the relationship between slavery and freedom.
To begin, I will examine key passages in Aristotle's Politics wherein he famously gives a taxonomical account of human community. I will look closely at Aristotle's categorization of the relationship between ruler and ruled as the most efficacious structure for satisfying biological needs within the oikia. Then, I will discuss Aristotle's account of freedom as exclusive to the polis. After explaining the Aristotelian oikia-polis configuration in relation to the opposition between necessity and freedom, I will turn to examine Hannah Arendt's reappropriation of this notion in her categorization of the public and the private realm in The Human Condition. This portion of my paper will facilitate my larger investigation, which will seek to make clear several of Arendt's often-ambiguous claims about freedom in The Human Condition and "What is Freedom" and On Revolution.
First, I will elucidate the unique conceptual framework Arendt constructs between the ontological conditions of "plurality and natality" in relation to political "action." In this way, it will become clear that Arendt's notion of freedom — like Aristotle's — cannot be theorized in terms of a dialectical dynamic precisely because it requires the establishment of a relation between men and women that is irreducible to necessity or dependence. I will then argue that Arendt's description of action as the actualization of both the human capacity to begin and of ontological uniqueness, primarily distinguishes her conception of freedom. Because Arendtian action is always "spontaneous and unprecedented" it necessarily interrupts activites that have predictable process characteristics as it establishes a space where freedom can appear.
To conclude, I will explicitly argue against the claim that Arendt's exclusion of slavery from her political theory leaves a vacancy in her notion of freedom Instead, I will suggest that it is precisely this move—as the implicit excavation of the relevance of the master-slave relationship from the human experience of freedom—that allows Arendt to describe more robust grounds for the rejection of slavery and to reveal new possibilities for theoretically apprehending freedom as a political human experience.
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Daphne M. Rolle
dmrolle@nospambsu.edu
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The bicentenary celebration of the passing of the Abolition Bill by the British Parliament in 1807 has prompted much discussion on injustice, compensation, and freedom. In the early 19th Century the definition of freedom may have appeared to be quite straightforward when confronted with the enslavement of millions presenting itself as a moral stain on civilization. Two hundred years later, with the United Nations having formally declared all forms of slavery as unlawful and immoral, we may need to rethink the concept of freedom. Fundamental questions to be addressed are: 1) What does freedom mean in a world directed by the two opposing yet interdependent forces of entitlement and resistance? The entitlement which leads to unrestrained pursuits of economic gain is in opposition to and yet feeds the resistance to such pursuits. The conflict that subsequently arises fosters a sense of the right to freedom from all forms of constraints, political, economic, military, and so on; 2) What kinds of boundaries are necessary to define our free spaces? It is necessary to determine if it is individual freedom that is of primary importance or the establishment of national or regional boundaries. If individual freedom is the focus, our efforts need to be put into articulating theories of individual responsibility. If the primary concern is one of establishing boundaries that will identify independent states/regions, our efforts must be put into articulating public policy that will enhance the freedom of the nation-state which will in turn protect its individuals.
It is the project of this paper to address the questions outlined above in an effort to articulate a concept of freedom that is appropriate for the present social context in which we live. I will argue that a goal-oriented concept of freedom, such as that driving much of the abolitionist literature as represented in the works of William Wilberforce, David Walker, and others is not sufficient for today’s concerns. Drawing on the work of David Walker I will engage in an analysis of freedom which requires a consideration of other key concepts such as necessary boundaries, power and responsibility.
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David Shikiar
da_shikiar@nospamyahoo.com
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Abstract
Freedom is, for Hegel, the self-sufficient normative concept of modernity. In my paper, I provide a new explanation of how Hegel derives all genuine normative principles – ‘rights’ – from the concept of freedom itself without any appeal to nature or divine will. I also show how thinking through the normative content of freedom points towards a reconciliation of individual freedom with the institutional duties of family, civil society, and state. Otherwise put, Hegel indicates how one should think through the concept of freedom, or self-determination, in a manner that reconciles property rights, the ‘moral’ right to construct a concept of the good life and live in accordance with that free construct, and the rights of institutions to the participation and cooperation of their members.
Hegel derives rights from the concept of freedom via the concept of recognition; a right is a mode of freedom having been given ‘existence’ (Dasein), i.e. normative social effectuality, through the mutual recognition of social agents. He divides his account into three sections: ‘Abstract Right’, ‘Morality’, and ‘Ethical Life’, respectively. ‘Abstract Right’ justifies property rights not through reference to general utility, but to how property is a necessary consequence of the recognition of the freedom of the individual in her embodiment and her relation to things; thus property constitutes the first, minimal, but necessary, stage in the unfolding of a conceptually adequate structure of self-determination. As a sphere of right it is deficient, as it systematically abstracts from all setting of ends and so from the very end of upholding property rights themselves. Hence, as indifferent to all ends it is compatible with its negation, crime. Morality repairs this defect as the sphere in which subjects freely set and pursue ends. But moral subjectivity too has a defect, namely its premature attempt to realize individual freedom in abstraction from the norms that inform ethical-institutional life. Hence, moral subjectivity lacks the resources to provide itself with a definite end and so contradicts itself. Nonetheless, property rights and ‘moral’ rights are not to be discarded, but grounded in the more adequate sphere of ethical life.
Individual freedom is reconciled with institutions in the following way. First, insofar as modern ethics must be based on the recognition of freedom it must also recognize rights of institutions, as modern institutions constitute an organic, free, self-determining whole. Second, it belongs to the very essence of modern institutions to protect, uphold, and defend individual rights. Thus, as an organic structure in which the whole has authority over every part and the norm of individual freedom is recognized, modern ethical life is ‘rational.’ Third, by promoting free reflection it necessarily promotes insight into its basic normative principles, so that individuals can freely adopt these principles as their own and so remain self-determining in fulfilling their institutional duties. Fourth, the very mode of life afforded by participation in institutions provides sources of meaning for individuals beyond the pursuit of private interests. Thus, modern ethical-institutional life for Hegel constitutes a space of free and rational activity.
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Dick Stoute
dstoute@nospamsunbeach.net
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Abstract
We all live in our individual mental worlds created and restrained by our beliefs, thoughts and ideas. Each of our mental worlds represents, or models, the world we see around us, but the models we create are significantly influenced by our culture, language, environment and learning. While it is easy to accept the beliefs of others and in so doing adopt their mental model of the world, we can all choose not to do this. Philosophy gives us the tools to examine our view of the world, from our own perspective, find its flaws and correct them. Doing this helps us to create a new worldview and generates feelings of freedom, of being able to live in and explore new mental worlds.
This new world view is larger as it has within it the old model along with new beliefs thoughts and ideas that expand it, but quite often the ideas that create the new world view are rejected following a challenge and this new world view collapses back into its original, well accepted form. This reinforces the old view and encourages us to give up our search and accept that old view is correct. This collapse and acceptance generates feelings of oppression and frustration, as our feeling of freedom, of having discovered a new way of viewing the world, is lost along with the opportunities presented by that new world view.
But philosophy also gives us the tools to examine ourselves, question our beliefs, ideas and emotions and determine how to work around their influence to see our individual mental worlds from a remote perspective. Doing this breaks restraints created by well-established beliefs about ourselves and the world we experience. This view from the outside facilitates the creation of a new worldview which is more robust than one redesigned from inside as it provides an overview that shows how the old view was formed, why it is so resilient and why the new world view, created from inside the same belief set, failed.
The new model created by doing effectively puts people into the model rather than viewing the model through their eyes. Freedom is created by this approach as it correctly suggests that each person is free to view the world in a different way. None of these views are necessarily any better than any other; all are approximations, all are simple models of a complex world.
This indicates that there is little benefit to be derived from arguing about which worldview is “correct” as a correct worldview cannot be obtained. Instead it suggests that, we can create freedom by collectively building analyzing more complex models.
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Ntibagirirwa Symphorien
nsymphorien@nospamyahoo.fr
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Abstract
The focal point of my reflection will be the present economic neo-liberalism. My aim is to challenge it from the perspective of African value system in order to lead it to human promotion. To achieve this objective, I will critique its philosophical assumption which, I argue, is essentially utilitarianism. This moral outlook suggests the principle of the maximization of utility as the ground for the distribution of benefits and burdens in a society. However, it is not clear how this maximized utility should be distributed. Thus the issues of the balance of the self-interested individual benefit and the community benefit on the one hand, and the growing gap between the have and have-nots on the other, are not addressed.
Against this background, I propose philosophical guidelines for today’s economic order based on a double concept from Bantu philosophy, namely the human person as umuntu-w’-ubuntu (human-being-with/in-self) and umuntu-mu-bantu (human-being-with/in-others), that is, a human person whose humanity is fully accomplished in the community of other humans. This double concept is an alternative to that of the Smithian homo oeconomicus whose rationality is self-interest and the maximisation of utility.
The advantage of this Bantu philosophical framework is fourfold. Firstly it provides us with a strong case of agent-based ethics in the (Bantu) African value system and its relevance for economic thought. Secondly it unveils and fosters our natural conscience and sympathy which are supposed to guide our social life as defended in Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, yet which are not taken seriously in the present economic ordering. Thirdly, the spirit of competition characteristic of neo-liberalism in which there are winners and losers finds itself challenged in favour of the spirit of cooperation characteristic of a win-win economic game. Fourthly, it provides us with an African foundation on which to build an accountable and responsible economic order.
Against this ethico-philosophical background, I suggest some practical orientations about what can be done for Sub-Saharan African countries which are still far away from the ladder of economic development, for them to participate meaningfully in the global economy.
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Sharifa Wright
Sharifa@nospamyorku.ca
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Abstract
In the European tradition the Bible has served as a source of existential grounding; from Spinoza to Hegel to Kierkegaard, this tradition has influenced Africana thought through both the secular and the divine.
This paper seeks to revisit the Bible through the knowledge production of slaves and former slaves in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Popular slave spirituals and slave narratives have served as an enduring commentary on slavery; but the insight these texts offer on freedom is perhaps even more useful for understanding the invaluable critique that Africana thought offers to a larger discourse on freedom and humanity. Slave narratives and spirituals at once appeal to the notion of subjective and the objective; autobiographical projects are also social narratives and the rhythmical utterances of spirituals invoke the subjective grounded in objective understanding of “Us” and “We.” In fact, when it comes to freedom, slave narrative and spirituals call to question the relevance of the categories of subjective and objective modes of understanding human experience. By examining how these texts take up the Bible, an even more specific critique can be launched on how the very question of freedom already negotiates the terms of a discourse meant to understand freedom.
The Biblical discursive space that is maneuvered by slave narratives and spirituals does not aggressively pursue subjectivity as a mode of understanding Freedom and thus is able to evade some of the pitfalls evident in the discourse on freedom offered by the likes of Hegel and Kierkegaard. Where Hegel and Kierkegaard’s approach to understanding freedom starts from the question of “Who is free?”, these early texts of Africana thought disturb the assumption that this question can be answered without alienation— they destabilize the theoretical paradigm which mandates that this question be asked. The hermeneutical project witnessed in the different variations of the spiritual “Rock My Soul” and the works of Frederick Douglass, Mary Prince, Olaudah Equiano and Harriet Jaoobs is most telling of this distinction. The slave narrative and spirituals demonstrate how slaves in the Caribbean and North America took up the Bible, not as a means of gaining new knowledge through narratives such as Abraham’s, but as a means of conducting immanent critique of a status quo that sought to buffer itself as site for interpreting the question of freedom and determining the right to freedom through Bible.
This paper seeks to continue a conversation about which questions the question of Freedom and to do the much delayed and important work of “regard[ing] the slave as a perspective in the world.”1
1 Gordon, Lewis R. Existentia Africana p. 10.
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