

# Investment for Profit and Human Promotion: A Bantu-philosophical Approach to Economic Ordering

Ntibagirirwa Symphorien

## 1. The issue at stake

The current process of economic globalization certainly has a lot of virtues and hopes for the world, but it has one crucial vice that undermines human freedom: it is mostly market and profit-directed, as if these would automatically result in human development. Hence the expression which often comes on the lips of World Trade Organization, World Bank and other associated institutions is trade. However, although trade can lead to economic growth, I doubt whether it is synonymous with human development which poor countries need so much. My concern is this: how can the poor enter into the trade game and win? How can they enter the market and meaningfully benefit from it?

For instance, one may say that in Burundi (my own country) there is trade. In this trade Burundi imports more than twice it exports. This means that Burundians consume more than twice what they produce. This is not in itself a problem. But the problem is that these imports involve a large amount of debt which the Burundian government might not be able to service in the future. The danger is that future generations might be taken hostage and their chance to engage in development will seriously be undermined.

The question then is how poor countries like Burundi can participate not only in imports but also in exports, not only in consumption but also in production. I will argue that it is when economic investment will be directed not only to profit but also for human promotion. The condition for this to happen is to first change the way we conceive of the human being. In effect, the concept that underlies the ongoing process in which the expansion of the market and the search of greater profit seem to be an end in themselves is the Smithian concept of *homo oeconomicus*. I would like to expose this mechanistic concept underlying the present economic evolution and challenge its narrowness in order to suggest an alternative. The alternative concept I suggest is taken from the Bantu people of Africa, namely the conception of the human being as *umuntu-w'ubuntu* (human with/in self) and *umuntu-mu-bantu* (human being-with/in-others).

## 2. The Smithian *homo oeconomicus* and its narrowness

The concept of *homo oeconomicus* is better captured in the following famous words of Adam Smith himself:

*It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their self-interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our necessities but of their advantage (Smith 1776: 14).*

In these words, Adam Smith was answering the question of how individuals can increase wealth. Here, of course, the answer is simple and clear: it is by pursuing their self-interest. In other words, the freedom to pursue one's own interest promotes collective welfare. The implication of Smith's analysis is a laissez-faire economy. The problem is that this kind of analysis does not consider those who can neither buy nor sell, because of the socio-economic conditions in which they are, for instance, the poor and the vulnerable. I think the crucial question is not **how** wealth should be increased by self-interested individuals, but rather **why**. One may quickly object that Adam Smith had already addressed the question of **why** in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1808) in which he develops the principle of sympathy considered to be a genuine concern for the interest of the other. Effectively, Smith argues that sympathy comes from the immediate experiences

and entails that the benefactor suspends his self-interest (see Kharil, 2001).

However, in the economic discourse of neo-liberalism, much emphasis is rather laid on self-interest rather than on the interest of the other. This is not seemingly without foundation since it is not clear how the self-interested economic man of *The Wealth of the Nations*, always tuned to economic matters, is also the man of sympathy in the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*. I do not intend to discuss the issue of the continuity and discontinuity between the two works of Smith (see Macfie, 1959). Instead, the point I want to put across is that even if Smith had answered the question why, it does not help us so much because the answer is conceived within the ethical framework of utilitarianism. Consequently the economic man in the utilitarian ethics is not necessarily the virtuous one found in agent-based ethics. I am most likely to meet a powerful objection here from those who argue that the economic man is indeed virtuous in so far as he provides economic aid and humanitarian assistance to those countries which are lagging far behind in economic development. However, according to David Sogge, aid and humanitarian assistance, among others, are ways in which the powerful institutions encode their doctrines and impose them on the less powerful. Effectively, aid and humanitarian assistance encourage authorities in poor societies to pay more attention to powerful outsiders especially the donors and lenders than to the need of their own people (Sogge 2002: 14-15).

The question "why" calls for arguments beyond mere economics, to echo the words of Katsumi Sigiura (1999: 263). The question "why" has the advantage of covering the whole development of the human being, rather than the simple mechanistic and mercantilist aspect. For the economy to cover human development, one must transcend the narrow mechanistic concept of *homo oeconomicus*.

In the discourse and the practice of neo-liberalism, much emphasis is laid on self-interest, and as a result the economic order evolves on the narrow understanding of the human being as merely *homo oeconomicus* who aims at fulfilling his own interests by rational calculations (see Bouckaert 1999). For a neo-classicist, these rational calculations must lead to economic efficiency and an increase in profit. Accordingly, the ideology of the market that results from these calculations knows no other values except efficiency, productivity, and profitability, which, if analysed deeply, drive us to a kind of economy that is cut off from ethics (cf. Litonjua 1999: 228). Indeed, the *homo oeconomicus* is particularly known as a profit maximizer. From this perspective, it would appear as if there is nothing wrong with the maximization of profit, provided it is intended for the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. It is a noble ambition!

However, there is something deeply wrong when this profit is pursued for its own sake, and when some people are undermined or neglected as a result of the drive for profit that benefits a few people. Given a population of 100 people, if 5 of them succeed to maximise their utility, it does not necessarily follow that this utility is distributed so as to benefit to the remaining 95. A precise application is the privatisation of health care in Burundi. Only those who can pay medical services can benefit from health care. Those who cannot pay but having already been treated are held prisoners in the hospitals; while those who cannot pay and who are not yet treated are left to die... I am battling with this question: in the end who benefits from this trade of health care?

The utilitarianism of the *homo oeconomicus* is misleading because in the end it is not really the greatest number of people who are served as it is claimed. Instead in the present world economic order, it is the greatest utility for the smallest number that is the issue. I do not mention the fact that in the achievement of this greatest utility people could be used as means: experiments on humans, low-cost labour, children labour, prostitution, human trafficking, arms' industries, etc. Even war which kills people becomes a business that yields a lot of profit.

Neo-liberal economists have taken the utilitarian claim of “the greatest happiness for the greatest number” to mean that economic growth leads to poverty reduction, and poverty reduction leads to development, and development leads to collective welfare. However, there is more unhappiness, more discontent than the happiness thus promised as it is obvious in the following moral paradoxes:

***i. Growth of international trade, yet economic marginalization of the poor***

Economically, the international trade is apparently increasing, yet poor countries and the poor within developed countries continue to be left behind and marginalized. While we talk of exports of technologically manufactured goods and services, the poor countries are still exporting raw materials (mineral resources, agricultural products) because they have neither the technological infrastructure nor the know-how required to transform them. Furthermore raw materials are low in price; and so poor countries cannot get enough foreign exchange. And if they try to export more raw materials, they have to face the depletion of these resources and subsequent pollution. Increasingly, poor countries are forced to use the little foreign exchange they get to purchase manufactured goods and services and arms for (in)security) of which the price keeps increasing while the price of raw materials keeps decreasing. Poor countries are left with no other option than to contract debt. In the long run, there is no possibility of saving for future investment. The problem is that the poor might eventually try to force their way by means of what Manuel Castells (1996) calls criminal economy: trade of drugs and human beings (women and children), exportation of human organs, smuggling, corruption, etc; in short, a kind of economy that disqualifies our humanity. The developed countries are already living this truth as they have to face the reality of illegal immigration, terrorism, insecurity, contagious diseases, etc.

***ii. Universalisation of political liberalism, yet socio-political instability and the demise of the state***

Politically, after the failure of communism and its state planned economy, political liberalism is being universalised. It is even the condition suggested for economic take off and development in the developing countries.<sup>1</sup> Yet, besides the claim of socio-cultural identities with political consequences, the social and political instability is increasing in poor countries, states are decaying. And the cause of that instability is rooted in economic processes. How can the arms industry and trade flourish if there are no situations of warfare in the world, often in poor countries?! The cases of Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, etc. are to be seen against this backdrop. And how can poor countries buy these arms if they do not sell their natural resources or mortgage their own countries in order to contract debts.

***iii. International solidarity, yet inequalities and social injustices.***

Socially, while we talk of international solidarity, we must at the same time be aware of

---

<sup>1</sup> Of course, it is not obvious that the link between economic take off and political liberalism can go unquestioned. Seemingly, the world economic order has to go with international democratic order- liberal type, such that global capitalism requires global political liberalism (cf. Mittelman 1998: 231). However, this link between political liberalism and economic growth does not seem to be obvious in the case of East and South East Asia with the Asian tigers whose economic growth has been spectacular in the last years (see Ntibatirirwa, 2006). Thus, that the connection between political liberalism and economic liberalism worked in the case of Western countries, and some few other countries around the world, does not mean it will necessarily work everywhere. I may praise political liberalism for one aspect, that is, in so far as it is a historical and political achievement in which, citizens become aware of their political nature.

the obvious inequalities and social injustices between and within countries. It is true that there is a growing consciousness of the fact that people increasingly belong to the same world thanks particularly to the progress of the communication technology. In this consciousness, the local and the global seem to belong together, and their inter-penetration remains tied to market expansion and profit maximisation. Human rights abuse in warring countries can be known to the world, and the network of NGOs can operate in countries where there are conflicts.

However, while the media refer to various aspects of poverty such as violence, terrorism, crimes, starvation, some poor people try to copy styles of life in which various multinationals request to be free from taxes of all kinds when the poor countries rely on these very taxes to invest, to finance security, to provide the education needed to plan the future, employment, health and food production. And the lack of these fundamentals result in wave of migration of people from poor countries, terrorism, and other forms of violence which might be difficult to control even in those societies where security was thought to be sufficiently mastered. It might be true that some NGOs come to help in the name of international solidarity. Nevertheless, apart from the fact that some are, in fact, a kind of business unit, the means they use and their standard of living which they manifest in societies of starving and poor people question the very concept of solidarity.

#### ***v. Triumph of the market, yet moral decline***

Ethically, the search of profit and the triumph of the market are followed by moral decline. I am aware that the expansion of the market and the search for profit are obviously not a moral pursuit. And I can't be naïve to go as far as suggesting multinationals become charitable organisations. The market and profit maximization are perceived to be the engine which moves history to universal well-being of humanity. In this kind of well-being, human relationships are viewed in terms of economic competition and competitiveness. These relationships are often seen as devoid of any collective responsibility and concern for the common good. Poverty is defined in terms of economic failure, that is, failure to relate economically. There is hardly any cognizance of the fact that competition as defined in the present economic globalization might lack a fair play.

Obviously there is no way in which the nascent industries of poor countries can compete with industries of developed countries, or the subsidized agriculture of developed countries could compete with the non-subsidized agriculture of developing countries. There is no way in which the weak can compete with the strong; there is no ground on which the "haves" can compete with the "have not". As the haves keep having more and the have-nots keep sinking in poverty, our spiritual values keep decreasing. As the market expands and profit increases, the spiritual wealth decreases as the seller sees nothing except profit, while those who can neither sell nor buy are tempted to steal or beg, and hence losing their integrity and dignity which are sources of true freedoms.

The market expansion and the maximization of profit go hand in hand with the development of individualism. Individualism endangers social relationships not only in the society at large, but also in families. And as societies and families collapse, people lose their moral reference. The implication of this loss of moral reference could be the disappearance of people's identity and culture. We are already witnessing some reactions to this disappearance in terms nationalism, racism, and even religious fundamentalism which endanger human life in so far as they might involve the violation of people's freedom and abuse people's rights.

#### ***vi. An economic prosperity that undermines the environment***

The logic of economic growth seems to be the following: the more the economy grows, the more development there will be. This lifestyle and development model creates an environmental crisis of massive proportions. There are two major ways in which economic

prosperity is undermining the environment, namely, through depletion of resources and through pollution. The first consists in the consumption of natural resources, both renewable and non-renewable ones while the second refers to the toxification of the environment as a result of economic activities. There is a growing consensus concerning the fact that renewable resources are being over-exploited while the non-renewable resources are being depleted for the sake of competition and profit maximisation.

Furthermore, poor countries which produce these renewable and non-renewable resources will run short of them as they are their only resources of revenue. And since the revenue yielded by the exploitation of these resources is already too little to finance programmes of development, one can guess the consequences that this leads to. One consequence connected with such an over-exploitation will be that the poor countries will not be able to finance the resources that need to be renewed.

Pollution is another by-product of economic utilitarianism which is as dangerous as the consumption of renewable and non-renewable resources. In fact, the exploitation of renewable and non-renewable resources goes hand in hand with pollution. Pollution affects not only human beings but also the whole of creation. The global warming of which we are being alerted is a case in point.

With the above paradoxes, it is obvious that there is a need to challenge the concept of *homo oeconomicus* in its narrowness. We need a new concept that could help us to recover our commitment to ourselves as human beings individually and as members of the human community.

### **3. Recovering the human-being as a being-with/in-self (*umuntu-w'-ubuntu*) and being- with/in-others (*umuntu-mu-bantu*).**

Let us first clarify a little bit these two concepts of *umuntu-w'-ubuntu* and *umuntu mu bantu*. Obviously, it is a question of the human person (to be distinguished with the simple human being) and his twofold dimension, namely, the human person as he is in himself, that is, his constancy, his identity<sup>2</sup> and the moral baggage that goes with this on the one hand, and the human person in relation with other humans and the moral baggage that also goes with this on the other hand. This baggage revolves around the value of humanity or person-hood (*ubuntu*), hence *umuntu-w'-ubuntu*. Literarily, *Umuntu-w'ubuntu* refers to a person of humanity, a person of harmony and integrity. It is a human person as s/he realizes himself or herself as an individual person in his universe which includes one's guiding principles, cherished values, innovating and constructive choices, self-determination, self-realization in harmony with others.

However, this humanity or personhood cannot really be achieved outside human community. Hence the concept of *umuntu-mu-bantu*.<sup>3</sup> *Umuntu-mu-bantu*, is a human

---

<sup>2</sup> Ricoeur's concepts of *idem* (same) and *ipse* (the self, of the self, or by oneself) which are unified in that of self-constancy described below could help up to understand our African concept:

Self-constancy is for each person that manner of conducting himself or herself so that others can count on that person. Because someone is counting on me, I am accountable for my actions before another. The term responsibility unites both meaning; counting on and being accountable for. It unites them, adding to them the idea of a response to the question 'Where are you?' asked by another who needs me. This response is the following: 'Here I am!'... (Ricoeur, 1992: 165).

<sup>3</sup> The particle "*bantu*" means "people". But as used in the whole concept of *umuntu-mu-bantu*, it means people as community.

person who recognizes his situation among others as moral necessity. Thus *umuntu-mu-bantu* refers to a human person as s/he realizes himself or herself in the universe of other human persons<sup>4</sup> like him, including their guiding principles, the values they cherish, their dynamics in their universe, etc.

Nevertheless, *Umuntu-mu-bantu* is not just Augustine Shutte's Xhosa *umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu*, meaning that the African personhood is merely an "outside thing" which the community empowers and inculcates (Shutte, 1993). Rather *Umuntu-mu-bantu* means that a person is recognized as such by others through the way one enhances them by one's creativity, dynamics in one's universe, one's self-determination and realization, as well as one's care for oneself and for others. It seems that too much emphasis on the community as the source of empowerment of individuals used to oppose Western individualism led most African thinkers to marginalize this important aspect (see Mbiti, 1970; Shutte, 1993; Tshamalenga, 1985; Wiredu, 1985). It is this "neglected" aspect that could particularly be relevant in the articulation of a philosophy of economic development in Africa.<sup>5</sup>

The above conceptual framework of *umuntu-w'-ubuntu/umuntu-w'-ubuntu* carries with a host of values such as responsibility, accountability, justice, common good, cooperation, harmony and peace with others and the whole of universe. However, I would like to outline briefly three moral values which together with the values I have just enumerated help to appreciate Bantu agent-based ethics while challenging the paradoxes that surround utilitarianism<sup>6</sup>

**i. Dependability:**

By dependability, I do not mean dependence, in terms of the fact that one cannot fend for oneself without drawing on the support of others. I use dependability to mean responsibility for each other (cf. McFadyen 1991: 154). Responsibility for one another requires that each one struggles to be a person of humanity in order to build a world in which everybody finds meaning by which to live. According, profitability and the expansion of the market held in esteem in today's economic evolution have to be evaluated in terms of the quality they bring to our world as a whole and not just in terms of the quantity they bring to some lucky individuals in isolation who happen to be successful in economic competition.

**ii. Mutual trust**

Dependability cannot stand alone without mutual trust. In a world where there is no mutual trust, dependability would make human relationships exploitative. The value of mutual trust involves a shared hope, some form of common project. In the neo-liberal economy, the value of mutual trust has lost its relevance as the economy claims priority over social and ethical values, particularly in those cases where people's needs give place to preferences and rational calculations of self-seeking individuals. According to Bouckaert (1999: 27), in a society where mutual trust counts, economic institutions will be concerned with their social and moral reputations. In the same respect, K. Arrow argues

---

<sup>4</sup> In the African cosmology, these include the living, the dead, and not yet born.

<sup>5</sup> Here I am drawing on my PhD dissertation (in progress at the University of Pretoria, South Africa) in which I use the above Bantu conceptual framework to construct an African philosophy of economic development.

<sup>6</sup> The three ethical values I suggest to characterize *umuntu-w'-ubuntu* and *umuntu-mu-bantu* are just chosen as a matter of preference among many others which I intend to explore in a longer study.

that in a well functioning economic system, relations of mutual trust bring people not to deceive one another, even in the case where deception might constitute an economically rational behaviour (Arrow 1987). It is against this background that the kind of ethics we are proposing here calls for economic cooperation rather than competition where economic freedom is maximally presumed yet is perpetually endangered by the "survival of the fittest".

### **iii. Respect**

Respect means that in a human community, people have equal dignity and have to be treated as such. However, there is a kind of respect which tends to ignore the other. That is not the kind of respect we are talking about as far as the Bantu value system is concerned. We are talking of the mutual supportive respect grounded on the fact that as a community we share a common destiny. Although he is not part of the Bantu people, W. Pannenberg has words to describe the kind of respect I am trying to put across in the Bantu conceptual framework:

The other man is respected if I know that the same infinite destiny that is at work in myself is also at work in him. I always have to keep myself open to the possibility that the other person can still find his way beyond himself to new possibilities. **I am obligated to help him**<sup>7</sup> to do that, by my criticism of what he already is, which goes along with respect of his particular possibilities. The person who fails to respect and to help the other in his infinite destiny for God also injures his own destiny... Mutual respect is the foundation of all true human relationships (Pannenberg 1970:84-5).

With the above reflection on *umuntu-w'-ubuntu/umuntu-w'-ubuntu*, Adam Smith's *sentiments* that natural conscience and sympathy are the ground for social life are strengthened against the mechanistic behaviour of the economic man. In fact, I can't but believe that the failure of economic neoliberalism in Africa lies in the fact that the economic assumption that the freedom to pursue one's self-interest promotes collective welfare does not fit in the African value system based on the concept *umuntu-w'-ubuntu/umuntu-w'-ubuntu*.

With respect to the above conceptual framework, I would like to underline some practical requirements that should be considered to achieve the investment for human promotion.

## **3. Practical requirements for the economic investment for human promotion**

### **i. Regulation of international trade<sup>8</sup>**

From the view point of international organisations, international trade should be organized in a way that would help poor countries to grow and develop rather than fall behind. For this to be achieved there should be a code of conduct in order to compensate international imbalances. International aid and other assistance of whatever kind should promote self-

---

<sup>7</sup> My emphasis

<sup>8</sup>Some of the following suggestions are based on my Masters dissertation, *An Ethical Approach to Economic Globalization: An Alternative to Samir Amin's Humanism and Hans Küng's Global Ethic and its Implications in the Burundian Context*. University of Natal (unpublished). I am grateful to Professor Klaus Nürnburger (retired) from the University of Natal who supervised this dissertation and whose book, *Prosperity, Poverty and Pollution* was useful to me especially in its chapters 14, 16 and 18.

reliance and sustainable development by empowering local potentials.

### ***ii. The burden of debt.***

At the end of 2000, the total debt of my country (Burundi) amounted to 186.7 % of GDP while the debt service amounted to 58.5 % of goods and services. The external debt alone amounts to 178.5 % of GDP. The cancellation of debt for poor countries is necessary if they are to be integrated into the world economy and have a chance to develop. However this requires the will on the part of the developed countries and their governments, the world economic institutions as well as investors. The money used to pay back the debt could be redirected to local investments, projects of development aimed at eradicating poverty and supporting education without which human resources, knowledge and technology required for economic take off and human development cannot be achieved. It could also be used as a credit guarantee for investors who fear risks of whatever kind in warring countries.

### ***iii. The terms of international trade***

In international forums, the language spoken is that of free trade. This free trade is clearly to the advantage of the rich. The green rooms! In effect, in most cases the exports of the poor countries hardly enjoy fair prices or the reduction of tariffs and taxes. Poor countries should be given the possibilities to negotiate fair and equitable prices even though raw materials often traded are low in value.

### ***iv. Abolishing some forms of trade***

One of the forms of trade that should be abolished, which I have in mind, is the arms trade, because it destroys countries instead of building them up. Warfare discourages the initiatives of people and undermines the future of a society. Of course, one may ask how it will be possible to deal with corrupt or dictatorial regimes. This is a crucial problem since power sharing and social justice are seemingly being addressed thanks to military interventions. However, pacific resolution of conflict through legal management, reinforcement of social justice as well as preventive diplomacy could help in minimizing military intervention. As globalisation promises us universal well being, the issue of demilitarisation should more and more be put on the agenda.

### ***v. National good governance***

The national leadership must have the following virtues: public accountability, democratic procedures, the rule of law, the containment of corruption, enforcement of justice as well as the state's effort to provide necessary social, economic, and social infrastructure. To avoid, unnecessary conflicts, national leadership should foster social justice, treasure conflict resolution through a powerful legal system and democratic accountability. Furthermore, military expenditure should be cut in order to finance national development and develop individual initiatives, while soldiers should participate in socio-economic development by sparing some time for public works. Finally, the national leadership should give priority to local skills and exploit local resources to fulfil local needs primarily. This would help avoiding unnecessary competition and irresponsible exploitation of natural resources.

### ***vi. Ethical conduct in economy***

The national and international private sectors of the economy should not only be concerned with the endless pursuit of an expanding market and the relentless pursuit for profits. They should engage ethical marketing practices by committing themselves to codes of conduct provided by international and national organisations. Accountability should be one on their highest values, and hence be ready to expose their business

practice to public scrutiny through audits. To avoid relying solely on the importation of external products, the private sector helped by the intellectual class should provide alternative products and methods of production through research and experimentation which, unfortunately, do not have much attention and sufficient investment in poor countries.

***vii. The role of civil society groups and NGOs***

In poor countries, particularly Burundi which is best known to me, national and international voluntary groups and NGOs are flourishing. It is easy for them to fall in the routine of providing the immediate needs and humanitarian assistance. In the effort of redirecting national economy to give it a moral quality that is exemplary internationally, these groups and NGOs should try to experiment new life styles in order to fill the welfare gaps left open by the seemingly decaying state without pretending to replace it. In a particular way they should support local initiatives which may be required particularly by investors.

These are some of the practical requirements that could help to channel economic investment towards human promotion in the line of Bantu conceptual frame work and agent-based ethics. There might be many others. Whatever they may be, they would come from our need to foster mutual accountability and human responsibility for a better and harmonious world. In the African value system, a better life is not necessarily based upon quantity, but quality.

## References

- Bouckaert, L. 1999. The Project of a Personalistic Economics. *Ethical Perspectives*, 6(1): 20-31.
- Castells, M. 1996. *The Rise of the Network Society*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Litonjua, M. D. 1999. Global Capitalism: The New Context of Christian Social Ethics. *Theology Today*, 56(2): 210-228
- Khalil, E. L. 2001. Adam Smith and Three Theories of Altruism. *Louvain Economic Review*, 67 (4): 421-435.
- Macfie, A. L. 1959. Adam Smith's Moral Sentiments as the Foundations of his Wealth of the Nations. *Oxford Economic Papers. New Series*, 11(3): 209-2228.
- McFadyen, A. 1990. *The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theory of Individual and Social Relationships*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mbiti, J.S. 1970. *African Religions and Philosophy*. New York: Anchor.
- Ministère de la Planification et de Reconstruction /UNDP (Burundi). 2002. *Rapport Annuel sur la Coopération pour le Développement*. Bujumbura.
- Mittelman, J. H. (ed.) 1997. *Globalization: Critical Reflection*. London: Lynne Rienner.
- Ntibagirirwa, S. 1999. *A Retrieval of Aristotelian Virtue Ethics in African Social and Political Humanism. A Communitarian Perspective*. (Unpublished Masters Dissertation)
- \_\_\_\_\_ 2001. *An Ethical Approach to Economic Globalization: An Alternative to Samir Amin's Humanism and Hans Küng's Global Ethic and its Implications in the Burundian Context*. (unpublished Masters Dissertation).
- \_\_\_\_\_ 2001. *A Shift from Being to Having in the African Value System: Of what help can virtue Ethics be to the Social, Economic and political Re-arrangements in Africa*. A paper presented at the School of Governance, University of Durban, Westville.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 2006. "Le miracle asiatique": Qu'apprendre de l'expérience asiatique du développement. *Ethique et Société*, 3(1): 18-34.
- Nürnbergger, K. 1999. *Prosperity, Poverty and Pollution: Managing the Approaching Crisis*. New York/London: Zed Books.
- Pannenberg, W. 1970. *What is Man?* Philadelphia: Fortress Press.
- Ricoeur, P. 1992. *Oneself as another*. Illinois: The University of Chicago Press.
- Shutte, A. 1993. *Philosophy for Africa*. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press.
- Smith, A. 1776. *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, ed. Andrew Skinner. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Smith, A. 1808. *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. 2 vols. Edinburgh: Bell & Bradfute
- Sogge, D. 2002. *Give and Take: What is the Matter with Foreign Aid?* London/New York: Zed Book.

Sugiura, K. 1999. Institutional Economics Needs Interdisciplinary Studies of Social Sciences. *Journal of Economic Issues*, 32(2): 257-264.

Tshamalenga, N. 1985. Language et socialité. Primat de la Bisoité sur l'Intersubjectivité. In *Philosophie Africain et Ordre social*. Kinshasa : Kinshasa: FCK, 59-81.